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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an ethnographic study of two specialist settings in England, where 
young children’s communication and 'communication difficulties’ were objects 
of expert intervention. It describes the intertwining of institutional discourses 
and practices, which both construct and sustain current, dominant 
understandings of good and normal communication.
Instead of delineating 'communication difficulty’ as a matter of disability or 
individual tragedy, this thesis focuses on the ‘socialness’ of face-to-face 
communication. It deconstructs the discourse of communication as a skill, right 
and need in disability childhood contexts, and the somewhat taken-for-granted 
importance of communication skills in today’s everyday life. On the basis of my 
findings, this thesis promotes an understanding of communication as a complex, 
contextual phenomenon, and aspects of 'communication difficulties’ as social 
constructions.
(
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names o f people and places in this thesis are fictional in order to protect
confidentiality.
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This thesis is divided in four parts. Part I outlines the research design, and 
situates the research project in the child welfare practice context, as well as in 
the landscape of sociological literature on communication, childhood and 
disability. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, including how it developed from the 
original research proposal to its current form. The following Chapters begin to 
illustrate the complexity of discourses that surround children’s communication. 
Chapters 2 and 3 look at hegemonic notions of ‘good’ and ‘normal’ 
communication, which emerge from both practice and social scientific literature. 
Chapter 4 points out ambiguities within discourses on children as 
communicators and socially constructed aspects o f‘Childhood’ and ‘Disability’.
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Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction to the research problem
“ Speech, language and indeed all manifestations o f  communication, play a central 
role in the psychological w ell being o f  the child and the family. A  child who 
experiences difficulties in developing communication skills is vulnerable because 
such difficulties have the potential to interfere with that w ell being. Consequently it 
is the responsibility o f  both health and educational services to identify children with 
such difficulties and provide intervention in the most appropriate manner”  (L a w  et 
al, 2000, p. ix).
To date, children’s ‘ communication difficulties’ have been exclusively the business o f 
developmentally based professions, including child Health, Education and Welfare 
services. Dominant discourses within these arenas perceive ‘ communication 
difficulties’ as a barrier to a ‘ good life ’ . Professional intervention has the legal, moral 
and pragmatic aim o f removing those barriers, or at least alleviating the societal and 
individual problems that they are seen as contributing to. In recent years, these 
discourses have increasingly emphasised the vulnerability o f young children with 
little or no speech, who are seen as being particularly in need o f additional, specialist 
support.
This thesis, however, takes a social constructionist approach to the phenomenon in 
question. It is a sociological account o f two specialist settings where multidisciplinary 
professionals routinely dealt with young children’s ‘ communication difficulties’ . 
Instead o f delineating ‘communication difficulty’ as a matter o f disability or 
individual tragedy, this thesis focuses on the ‘socialness’ o f  face-to-face 
communication. It describes the intertwining o f discourses and practices, which both 
construct and sustain current, dominant understandings o f  good and normal 
communication. Up to now, this particular focus has not been addressed in this 
manner either in the sociology o f childhood, Disability Studies or Communication 
Theory (Cobley, 1996).
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My sociological approach destabilises both taken-for-granted understandings o f 
‘ communication/difficulties’ 1 who can, and has the right to, ‘know’ aspects o f young 
(disabled) children’ s lives. My purpose is to develop a wider understanding o f how 
constructions o f ‘ good’ and ‘normal’ and communication play a significant part in 
contemporary western discourses and practices that surround these children. This 
inevitably includes a critical appraisal o f both specialist and sociological ways o f 
‘knowing’ about children. In addition, this thesis deconstructs the discourse o f 
communication as a skill, right and need in disability childhood contexts, and the 
somewhat taken-for-granted importance o f communication skills in today’ s everyday 
life. In this way, I wish to contribute not only to sociological theory but also to child 
welfare practice.
1.1.1 Introduction to the research settings
This research project was carried out in England between 2000 and 2002, It involved 
two settings, where I observed interaction among and between young children and 
adult professionals. In the first one, (the ‘Team Service’ ), a multidisciplinary team o f 
practitioners assessed children’ s communication and other health, welfare or 
educational needs. The second setting was a day nursery (the ‘ Children’ s Centre’ ), 
where disabled children were receiving additional support and education in a 
therapeutic environment.
Throughout this thesis, I will refer to the two settings generically as 
‘clinical/therapeutic’ settings. Although entirely different settings, the practices in 
both were based on clinical and therapeutic knowledges o f children with special 
needs, typically including communication needs. The two settings operated in the 
framework o f current legal and ethical guidelines for good practice, which aimed to 
maximise the child’s potential through early intervention (e.g. Dockrell & Messer, 
1999; Friel, 1997). In addition, both settings shared the idea that working in a team 
was an important element o f good practice. The key difference between the settings in
1 Throughout the thesis, I w ill use the term ‘ communication/difficulties’ , because I regard both notions 
o f ‘ good communication’ and ‘ communication difficu lties ’ as two different sides o f  the same socially 
constructed phenomenon.
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the context o f this research was that in the ‘Children’ s Centre’ , the children had 
already been diagnosed with a disability, whereas within the ‘Team Service’ , the 
children did not always come to be diagnosed as disabled (see Figure 3, p. 23).
The following descriptions o f the two research settings summarise the public versions 
o f the kind o f services were being provided. They are adapted from promotional 
leaflets for parents (illustrations o f the settings will be provided in Chapter 5).
Setting 1: The ‘Team Service’
“ The ‘ Team  Service ’ provides a multidisciplinary assessment for children under 8 
years who have com plex needs and sometimes disabilities. Children may have been 
referred to the ‘ Team  Serv ice ’ by either Health, Social Services or Education. The 
assessment team may consist o f  paediatric consultant, coordinator o f  the service, 
speech therapist, physiotherapist and occupational therapist, nursery nurse, clinical 
psychiatrist/psychologist, social worker or primary school teacher.
The assessment procedure typically involves a home visit or a visit to school, a 
planning meeting, observation/assessment in designated spaces (therapy rooms and 
observation room ), concluding meeting and reviews. The purpose o f  the service is to 
ensure that a multidisciplinary assessment w ill be provided and that it adopts a 
coordinated approach for identification and planning provision or intervention to 
meet each child ’ s assumed needs. The time required for an assessment can range 
from  one session to several sessions over a six-week period, concluding with a report 
and meeting. There is an emphasis on working ‘ in partnership with parents and 
children’ .”
Setting 2: The ‘Children’ s Centre’
“ The ‘Children’ s Centre’ - day nursery - offers physiotherapy, occupational therapy, 
speech therapy and hydrotherapy to children aged 2-5 years. M any children visit the 
centre as outpatients over a period o f  several years. Around 20 children currently 
attend the nursery.
In the ‘ Children’ s Centre’ it is believed that children w ill benefit most i f  all 
professionals work together with parents and carers as a team. For example, m obility 
can be practiced through play as w ell as during physiotherapy sessions, and therapy 
involves other aspects o f  education. Speech therapists assist children in the
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development o f  communication skills, either through speech or by non-verbal 
methods such as picture communication symbols.
It is believed that the sooner children begin to attend, the sooner they can begin to 
develop and practice their skills -  there is a broad curriculum within which goals are 
set for each child and their progress is regularly monitored. The aim o f  teaching and 
therapy in the early years is to prepare children for school. It is also believed that 
each child benefits both from  individual attention and learning to function as a group 
member. Interaction with other children and staff, as w ell as facilitation and 
positioning to enable participation, achievement and play is seen as promoting 
learning development.”
However tempting it might be, the purpose o f my analysis is not to compare, contrast 
or evaluate the quality o f practice in the two settings. Instead, I treat the two settings 
as different ‘arenas for action’ (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998), where certain notions 
o f good communication and ‘communication difficulties’ were objects o f 
intervention.
1.1.2 The evolution o f the research questions
This research project has departed from the original research design in some 
important ways, which I will now address. In the original research proposal for the 
CASE studentship (see Appendix 1), there was an exploratory aim to research the 
place o f the child’ s ‘voice’ in a multidisciplinary assessment o f needs. This initial 
research problem mainly arose from child protection concerns, as well as from recent 
sociological writings on children’ s communicative competencies (e.g. Hutchby & 
Moran-Ellis, 1998). The idea was to explore aspects o f listening to and hearing what 
children say and/or indicate, and how constructions o f ‘ communication difficulties’ 
may affect the process o f listening.
The original research concerns sought after more in-depth sociological, rather than 
merely developmental or medical, understanding o f disability communication issues. 
The need for this research project was based on two main arguments. First, 
statistically, disabled children with little or no speech are more vulnerable to abuse 
than their able-bodied counterparts, because their communication needs are not 
understood and they do not have the means to tell o f abuse. Second, even though the
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children had speech, adults may not take their accounts or indications o f abuse 
seriously (Morris, 1999). This is against the idea o f ‘ listening to children’ , which is a 
current legal duty and ethical recommendation for ‘ good practice’ in many countries 
(see Chapter 2), including England.
The ‘Team Service’ was envisaged as an epistemologically appropriate setting for the 
research, because the ways in which health professionals assess and deal with 
children’ s communication and child protection needs could be observed there. 
However, as part o f the pilot phase o f the research, it was also suggested that before 
starting the main fieldwork with the ‘Team Service’ , I should spend some time 
familiarising myself with the everyday life o f disabled children in a day nursery 
( ‘Children’s Centre’ ). The idea was to gain further ethnographic understanding o f 
‘what was going on’ in general: how did children and workers ordinarily 
communicate, for example, with the use o f visual communication aids, in care 
settings? What was communication like in general between adults and children and 
among children? In addition, did the communication aids allow them to express their 
ideas on, for example, child abuse?
The original research proposal suggested using ethnographic methodology. This 
stemmed from an approach in the so-called ‘new paradigm for childhood sociology, 
which promotes the recognition o f children as ‘beings in their own right’ (e.g. James 
& Prout, 1997). At the same time, the aim was to understand the meanings that all the 
actors in the two settings applied to their co-actors and interactions. There was the 
expectation that a ‘ fuller picture’ about children’ s ‘ communication/difficulties’ would 
emerge from intensive observation and a prolonged stay in the field.
Unexpectedly, the observations in the nursery became crucial to the direction o f the 
research. They started to generate some other questions about the phenomenon o f 
‘ communication’ and meaning making. Does non-verbal communication follow the 
same logic as verbal communication? What kinds o f theoretical models may underlie 
the use o f augmentative communication? How may this be manifested in practical 
contexts? For example, does the provision o f picture symbols representing body parts 
necessarily enable the children to express their experiences o f abuse? These questions
6
have so far been marginal in child protection related literature that discusses disabled 
children’ s communication.
Further sociological questions in the nursery arose about the ethos o f care. What kind 
o f institutional discourses framed the principles according to which the adults 
communicated with children? What kind o f communication did these principles allow 
and/or encourage? These frameworks might not have derived directly from, for 
example, child protection concerns, but could most certainly be seen as having 
implications for those concerns, and for the understanding o f disabled children’s lives 
in general. For these reasons, it was decided that the original focus o f the research 
should be broadened.
The original questions concerning the ‘Team Service’ setting were modified as well 
after the pilot observations in both settings. There was a shift away from child 
protection concerns to a narrower exploration o f the minutiae o f the diagnostic 
processes: how did health professionals come up with definitions o f  ‘ communication 
difficulties’ in multidisciplinary interaction? A  practical reason for this shift was that 
child protection issues did not arise to the extent that the original research proposal 
expected, whereas ‘ communication difficulties’ were a frequent concern in the 
referrals. The focus o f attention o f my study thus moved to giving accounts o f 
interactional events where clinical notions o f ‘ communication’ and ‘disability’ met.
Furthermore, once I had spent some time in the field, I found out that the ‘voice’ o f 
the child was not built into the needs assessments. On the other hand, I regarded it as 
analytically necessary to search for the meaning o f the ‘voice’ - that o f the children, 
adult actors in the two settings, and my own as a researcher - in a more general way: 
What underlying assumptions did the idea o f an individual’s ‘voice’ entail in the two 
settings, i f  and when it was an object or feature o f interaction?
Another significant change to the original proposal was that I did not carry out formal 
interviews with parents or professionals. I did, at one point, prepare self-completed 
questionnaires for the ‘Team Service’ practitioners to complement my observations; 
however, the response rate was very low. Consequently, one o f the potential research 
questions was abandoned: How did health professionals view their own practices vis­
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a-vis ‘ communication/difficulty’? Therefore, in this thesis, I will remain the sole 
‘speaking subject’ (Lee, 2000).
1.2 Developing an epistemological stance
My sociological approach is fundamentally different from practice orientation in 
clinical/therapeutic settings, where the child is typically treated as a ‘case’ , or as an 
individual with specific needs. Instead o f looking at the child, I have concentrated on 
‘communication’ and ‘ communication difficulties’ as objects o f human interaction. 
For this purpose, I have adopted an interpretivist, constructionist approach (Schwandt, 
1994) in two different senses. First, in terms o f the ‘realities’ in the research settings, I 
see the meanings o f (inter)actions, ‘texts’ and objects as socially constructed. Second, 
my approach constructs accounts o f those realities, oscillating between sociological 
and clinical/therapeutic worlds.
At the same time, my attitude, to an extent, resembles the following quotation by 
Hacking. Here I conceptually replace Hacking’ s focus on ‘psychiatric disorders’ with 
‘communication difficulties’ :
“ M y  position here is rather curious. I have already made amply plain that I do not, 
myself, favour the language o f  social construction. I am discussing it in connection 
with psychopathologies because many deeply committed critics o f  psychiatric 
establishments find social construction talk helpful. It enables them to begin with a 
critique o f  practices about which they are deeply sceptical. I respect their concerns, 
and I have, I hope, represented them fairly, i f  cautiously. On the other hand, I also 
respect the b io logical program o f  research into the most troubling o f  psychiatric 
disorders. That creates a dilemma” (Hacking, 1999, p. 122).
Indeed, my personal wavering between the so-called foundationalism and anti- 
foundationalism (e.g. Prout, 2000) in relation to both notions o f ‘ Childhood’ and 
‘Disability’ , as well as between extreme and more benign versions o f ‘realism’ and 
‘anti-realism’ in sociological thought (Williams & May, 1996) has affected this 
research process to the extent that a great deal o f this thesis will describe and reflect 
on it. This is because, as I see it, there is no doubt that ‘communication difficulties’ 
are real to the children, their families and professionals, whose duties are to intervene
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in these children’s lives. For these reasons, between the lines and beyond, this thesis 
is an account o f my personal journey through the trials and tribulations o f doing a 
PhD research project.
Ironically, albeit having been keen to deconstruct social norms for ‘ good 
communication’ , I have nevertheless felt the need to conform to them. Hence this 
thesis follows established academic norms for writing and presenting results o f social 
scientific enquiry. It sets the scene, outlines the empirical evidence and draws 
conclusions based on sociological theory. Yet I want to stress that a PhD thesis, as an 
ethnographic text, is a somewhat abstract and reduced encapsulation o f something 
complex, fluid and multifaceted that took place within social interactions in the field. 
It is, like ‘communication difficulties’ , an outcome o f a social construction process.
1.3 Conclusion
The crafting o f this thesis has involved various practical hurdles, one o f which has 
been the delineation o f its scope. As for Barnes:
“ Every book, unless it is carefully controlled in the making, tends to grow  into a 
prolegomenon to a complete history o f  the universe”  (Barnes, 1979, p.9).
Instead o f trying to explain absolutely everything about human communication, I have 
focused on dimensions o f its ‘ socialness’ in the two research settings. This thesis talks 
about face-to-face communication in specific contexts, and generates sociological 
analyses o f my observations in the field. At the same time, I believe that, on a 
discursive level, my findings have significance beyond the research settings in 
question.
Another headache for me has been the ethical obligation to somehow incorporate the 
child’s ‘voice’ into the research. Indeed in academic and practice discourses about 
research on/with children, a current trend stresses that children should' not be treated 
merely as objects o f adult purposes (Beresford, 1997). On the other hand, in this 
research, I have done something else that is equally valuable: I have described 
observable action that has significant consequences to the lives o f young (disabled)
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children. In fact, the notion o f the ‘voice’ o f the child, as I will explain several times 
later on in this thesis, has become subject to deconstruction in the course o f this 
research process. This finding, I argue, has important implications for both 
sociological theorising o f communication, and for child welfare and social research 
practices.
A  further obstacle arose out o f my verbal encounters with adult non-sociologists, with 
whom I had to tackle my own ‘communication difficulties’ . This included attempts to 
translate sociology into plain English, with the added edge o f English not being my 
first language. However, I regard this as a finding in itself in that adults, as well as 
children, do not remain unaffected by dominant discourses on communication.
1.4 Overview of the chapters
Chapter 2
In child Health, Education and Welfare practice, ‘normal communication’ and 
‘communication difficulties’ are understood in certain ways. Chapter 2 provides an 
overview o f the practice context o f this research, as well as describes currently 
recommended procedures for identification o f and intervention into ‘ communication 
difficulties’ .
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 delineates a sociological challenge to the dominant understandings o f 
human communication (and thereby also those o f ‘ communication difficulties’ ). I will 
introduce and deconstruct some influential and taken-for-granted verbalist, cognition- 
based and ‘ engineering’ models o f communication. This questions the primacy o f 
abstract thought and symbolic understanding in ‘normal’ child development, as well 
as the understanding o f communication as a key skill for a good life. Instead, it is 
being proposed that communication is a social and contextual phenomenon. 
Importantly, this makes the notion o f the ‘voice’ o f the child problematic.
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C h a p te r  4
As a social construction, ‘communication difficulty’ does not stand on its own.
. Chapter 4 links it to the socially constructed aspects o f ‘ Childhood’ and ‘Disability’ . I 
will explore the ambivalences in hegemonic definitions o f these concepts, as well as 
in the recent sociological challenges to them.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 details the research process and epistemological considerations for this 
project, including descriptions o f the research settings. I will outline what I ‘ did’ in 
the field and how I analysed and wrote about the data, as well as begin to reflect on 
the research process.
Chapter 6
In Chapter 6 I will outline and discuss research ethics, including guidelines for good 
research practice and how I have attempted to apply the recommendations to this 
research project. This chapter suggests that research ethics involve various, sometimes 
contradictory, dimensions and ultimately they are questions o f contextual choices, 
morality and politics.
Chapter 7
Starting from the ‘Team Service’ data, this chapter looks at ‘ communication 
difficulty’ as an object o f rational, expert action. It describes children’s 
‘communication difficulties’ as outcomes o f social construction processes - 
professional reading and writing practices - instead o f them being matters o f 
straightforward objective facts.
Chapter 8
The specialist reading and writing practices also involved what I call the 
‘sociocultural’ dimension o f human interaction. The data analysis suggests that the
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‘Team Service’ practice routinely featured value judgments on ‘ good communication’ 
and ‘normal childhood’ in general. The notion o f ‘ sociocultural’ here is juxtaposed 
with that which is regarded as ‘ scientific’ , the former denoting personal opinions and 
the latter referring to a degree o f impersonal, rational and value-free procedures, 
which the practice was expected to derive from.
Chapter 9
Chapter 9 moves onto the ‘Children’ s Centre’ , where, in the same way as with the 
‘Team Service’ , communication was a central object o f action. It describes how 
communication was treated as a medium between minds, and the ambiguities I 
perceived being involved in this concept. My sociological ‘ gaze’ focuses on meaning 
making and what was expected o f the child in communication situations.
Chapter 10
Chapter 10 looks at communication as an educational and therapeutic objective in the 
‘Children’ s Centre’ . Again, ‘ communication difficulties’ were objects o f the so-called 
‘corrective practices’ , which derived from hegemonic developmental and linguistic 
genres. At the same time, this chapter suggests that scientific and everyday 
knowledges were not separate entities, but indeed merged together in the everyday 
nursery practice.
Chapter 11
This chapter links the findings to sociological theory. As well as discussing features 
o f communication in the two settings, I will propose some alternative ways for 
perceiving professional practice with young children, who may or may not have 
‘communication difficulties’ .
Chapter 12
Chapter 12 continues the discussion on my own communication difficulties as a 
researcher. I suggest that my reflections on my research practices can be applied to
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other contexts in terms o f the epistemological value o f sociological knowledge 
accumulation and accounts. In this chapter, I emphasise the importance o f being 
reflexive about doing research.
Chapter 13
In conclusion, I will recap the core theoretical arguments as well as propose some 
ideas for future research.
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Chapter 2.
YOUNG CHILDREN’S ‘COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES’: THE NEED 
FOR PROFESSIONAL INTERVENTION
2.1 Introduction
As stated in Chapter 1, children’ s ‘ communication/difficulties’ have exclusively been 
the business o f developmental psychology, medicine, and linguistics and o f associated 
health, welfare and educational professions. This chapter provides a broad overview 
o f how they are typically understood and dealt with in these dominant discourses, as it 
appears in the current practice oriented literature. In section 2.2, I suggest that 
dominant discourses construe a notion o f ‘ good communication’ as the child’s skill, 
right and need, and promote the need for early intervention as a matter o f urgency. 
‘Communication difficulties’ , thus, are perceived potentially not only as a risk in 
terms o f the child’ s well being but also a wider-reaching social problem.
The literature suggests that, in general, children’s ‘communication difficulties’ are 
contrasted to what is considered ‘normal’ , typically in relation to their overall 
development. In section 2.3, I will look at the clinical parameters for ‘normal’ 
development, including typical milestones in child language development, as well as 
in non-verbal development. However, not all ‘ communication difficulties’ are 
considered developmental. Section 2.4 gives examples o f ‘ cases’ , which featured 
frequently in my field data, and which are known to be particularly difficult to 
diagnose for different reasons (both developmental and non-developmental).
Section 2.5 illustrates the identification process and the subsequent intervention in 
terms o f what happens to a child who has been referred to statutory services, and 
section 2.6 talks about post-diagnostic intervention. I will review literature on the 
main purposes o f speech and language therapy, as well as the promises and pitfalls o f 
the use o f augmentative and alternative communication (AAC ).
Including some recent changes in the child law in England, ‘ listening to children’ has 
become a recognised part o f recommendations for good practice. Section 2.7 explores
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this discourse in general, as well as in terms o f the use o f alternative and augmentative 
communication (A A C ) in particular. I will highlight some o f the current tensions 
between ideals for good practice and messages from practice contexts, where 
professionals have attempted to ‘ bridge the communication gap’ with young children 
with little or no speech.
2.2 The rationale for and expectations of professional intervention
Commonplace understandings o f human (face-to-face) communication in both expert 
and lay perspectives tend to construe it as a rather straightforward activity. It is 
typically understood as a process where thought is formed, translated into a sequence 
o f words, and transferred into speech (e.g. Glennen, 1997). The important social 
function o f communication is to exchange information, make requests, socialise, and 
interact with others: communication is understood as central to the formation o f the 
social bonds that bind people to each other, their communities and their culture.
In recent educational discourses, communication is also seen as a key skill: the ability 
to create good relationships through empathy, listening and responding determines 
success in every area o f life. For Phillips (1998), there is an overwhelming consensus 
from parents, teachers and politicians that the lack o f communication skills amongst 
young people is proving to have disastrous results for them both socially and 
academically.
These discourses draw on a developmental emphasis on language as crucial for a 
child’ s inner development as well as for healthy social bonding and emotional 
stability. It is argued that a child who is hampered by a communication disorder tends 
to become marginalised in society and to suffer from a natural frustration and 
resentment. For Bogle (1994), unlike, for instance, the deaf and the blind, these 
children all too frequently slip through the early-detection net. Hence there is 
currently a heightened emphasis on targeting these children in early inteivention 
practices.
Initiatives for early intervention are supported by recent empirical studies o f children 
with specific language difficulties, which have reported a high rate o f  linguistic,
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educational and social impairment persisting many years after the language difficulty 
was first diagnosed. A  number o f retrospective studies have appeared to indicate that 
children with speech and language difficulties often develop academic problems, 
including difficulties with literacy, numeracy and attention, and lowered self-esteem 
(Dockrell & Messer, 1999). Early intervention is also perceived as a matter o f 
urgency in child protection contexts. For Morris (1999), young disabled children with 
little or no speech are particularly at risk since their communication needs are not 
fully met.
Guidelines for practice involve a number o f strategies for dealing with children’s 
communication difficulties and needs that may arise thereby. While specifically 
focused therapy for aspects o f language handicap are fruitful and essential, Haynes 
(2000), among others, proposes that equal priority and time should be devoted to 
promoting a positive self-image as an effective communicator. Well-delivered early 
intervention, o f which the facilitation o f language skills is a major component, is 
believed to have long-term effects for socially disadvantaged groups in that it reduces 
dropout from school and teenage pregnancy rates, whilst it increases the likelihood o f 
employment and decreases criminal behaviour (Glascoe & Stumer, 2000).
In short, child health, welfare and educational professionals’ decisions about 
intervention are based on whether the child is perceived as lacking ‘normal’ 
communication skills and to what extent this might be the case. Hence there has to be 
a baseline for ‘normal’ development o f communication skills in childhood. This 
baseline draws on various developmental and clinical theories. I will now review 
some recent literature on ‘normal’ communication in childhood, and illustrate how 
language learning is seen as central to the child’s development.
2.3 Children’s communication: features of normal development
In practice accounts, it is generally agreed that the development o f communication 
starts from the moment the child is bom:
“ There is now  considerable evidence that children are expressing needs from  birth
and indeed even in utero. O f  course, it is impossible to describe these early
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interactions as far as the child is concerned. Initially he or she is responding to the 
immediate physical environment, simply reacting to internal imperatives, rather than 
deliberately conveying a message. But parents often interpret such involuntary 
movements as communicative and respond accordingly” (Law, 2000, p.8).
For Law (2000), one o f the child’ s earliest skills is the capacity to attend and to listen. 
By the age o f perhaps six months, the ‘ involuntary’ movements and sounds have 
gradually developed to consistent babble. Babble primarily fulfils a motor function 
(drawing attention), but it starts to lose this function, once it becomes superseded by 
early speech.
At the end o f the child’ s first year there is typically a shift to intentional symbolic 
communication on the part o f the child: language structures follow on from this. 
Developmental psychology assumes a symbiotic relationship between play and 
language in the early years. Through play and social interaction with others, the child 
develops a working understanding that a word can stand for an object or referent and 
that this relationship is communicable, as well as an understanding o f social routines 
and physical properties o f items in his/her immediate environment.
According to Law (2000), by 18 months, nearly half o f all children are using more 
than 100 words, and by 30 months 70 % o f children are using 500 or more words. 
There are typically individual variations in terms of, for instance, learning to use the 
past tense o f verbs correctly. By 2 years, the child may have learned social 
communication skills, such as turn taking and is able to hold conversation to a certain 
extent. By 3 years, children can typically master several speech sounds (such as m, b, 
p, h, w plus vowels) and become gradually more intelligible to strangers.
A  model o f a normal progression o f the child’s language development is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Drawing on developmental psychology, language is constituted as a ‘vehicle 
for thought’ . For Cooper (1978), it develops from situational understanding and 
conceptualising to symbolic understanding, and has a directive-integrative function. 
The arrows below the main figure indicate the ‘normal’ age at which these abilities 
and functions typically develop.
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Figure 1. Processes involved in the development o f  verbal language (adapted from Cooper et al, 1978, 
p. 2 5).
Box 1.1: The tree of language
Speech --------
articulation
phonology
praxis
voice
fluency
prosody
Expression 
vocabulary 
syntax 
morphology
Comprehension ■ 
verbal 
non-verbal
Underpinning abilities 
cognitive skills 
short- and long-term memory 
listening/attention 
symbolic skills 
hearina
Figure 2. The tree o f  language (Law, 2000, p. 4).
Alternatively, the ‘tree o f language’ model illustrates more in detail the specific 
components o f language learning. In Figure 2, the roots o f the tree outline the
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u n derp in n in g  a b ili t ie s  that contribute to the child’s learning o f language: these 
include cognitive skills, as well as memory, listening, symbolic, hearing and 
motivation related skills. The trunk o f the tree represents the child’ s v e rb a l a n d  non­
v e rb a l co m preh en sion . For Law (2000), verbal comprehension can be context free, 
but non-verbal comprehension is context-dependent.
E x p ressio n  can be seen as being about the formal aspects o f language, as well as 
about the ‘ semantics’ : the child’s intended meaning. The ways in which people 
interact and share meaning with one another may be illustrated with a metaphor: 
water flowing through the roots, trunk and branches o f the tree. This aspect o f 
communication is called ‘pragmatics’ : it refers to the skills necessaiy to interact 
effectively, to interpret what the speaker is meaning to say, or to read between the 
lines o f  the more obvious structural aspects o f communication. The ‘ social aspects o f 
communication involve ‘keeping up with’ peers and learning the social functions o f 
communication, such as telling jokes.
Law (2000) sees communication as being made up o f a web o f intersecting skills o f 
which speech is but one. Fundamentally, separating out communication skills in this 
way helps to identify the child’s strengths and weaknesses across a range o f skills and 
this is important for the purposes o f both diagnosis and treatment. For example, 
vocabulary and sp e e c h  is often overemphasised as a measure o f communication skill: 
it is only one part o f the overall picture and research shows considerable variation 
within the normal range. Furthermore, children’ s communication skills should always 
be judged in the context o f what would be expected for the child’ s age. In other 
words, they should not be simply compared to the adult model o f speech.
The tree o f language model suggests that since communication is made up o f a range 
o f identifiable components, no observation is complete without consideration o f all 
these. This has implications for child assessment practice and subsequent intervention 
in several ways. For example, it is not simply a matter o f assessing a child on a single 
occasion: each one o f these components has its own developmental progression and 
they interact differently across time. Therefore, any assessment or intervention must 
also include careful analysis o f the child’ s communication environment because each
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child develops his or her communication skills in the context o f the home, the school 
and, as they get older, their peer groups (Dockrell & Messer, 1999).
2.4 Guidelines for identification of ‘communication difficulties’
In the professional vocabulary, the term ‘assessment’ usually refers to a detailed and 
systematic set o f investigations that attempt to specify the nature o f the child’s 
language and other difficulties and possibly identify factors that may have caused the 
problems. In section 2.4.1 I will look at recent recommendations for multidisciplinary 
practice in terms o f assessing children’ s needs as a whole. Section 2.4.2 illustrates 
how communication difficulties are addressed, as part o f general needs assessment, 
often prior to school entry age. The use o f tests within assessments will be discussed 
in section 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Needs assessment and multidisciplinary practice
In the past two decades multidisciplinary and multiagency child assessment, instead 
o f single practitioner or single agency assessment, has become recommended as good 
practice (McConachie et al, 1999)2. In the current legal literature on the care o f 
disabled children, needs-led approaches to assessment and integrated family service 
provision is being promoted. This means that disabled children and their families are 
seen to have diverse needs, and hence flexibility by agencies providing services is 
needed.
‘Good practice’ in this area (Read and Clements, 2001) entails that together with the 
children and the adults concerned, practitioners consider the needs which have to be 
met in their daily lives, plan an individualised package o f provision that addresses 
those needs, as well as monitor and review how it is working at agreed intervals and 
modify it as needs and circumstances change. A  needs-led approach starts by 
assuming that disabled children have the same basic needs as all children, but because 
they are living with impairments some may require additional support, assistance and 
intervention.
2 This recommendation was applied to practice in both research settings in this research (see Chapter 
1).
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The essence o f the needs-led approach has now been identified: how to make service 
provision more responsive to the individual needs o f families and children? 
According to the recent fG u idan ce  F ra m e w o rk  f o r  A sse ss in g  C h ild ren  in N e e d ’ (DoH, 
DfEE and Home Office, 2000), and ‘P ra c tic e  G u id a n c e ’ (DoH, 2000), the 
practitioner is required to look at any child in the context o f the whole family and 
local community in terms o f three domains. Domain A  -  c h i ld ’s  d eve lo p m en ta l 
n eed s  -  includes health, education, emotional and behavioural development, identity, 
family and social relationships, social presentation and self-care skills; domain B -  
p a re n tin g  c a p a c ity  -  involves basic care, ensuring safety, stimulation, guidance and 
boundaries and stability; and domain C — fa m ily  a n d  en v iro n m en ta l f a c to r s  — includes 
family histoiy and functioning, housing, employment, income, family’ s social 
integration, community resources, as well as involving disabled children in the 
assessment process (Read & Clements, 2001). In terms o f ‘normal functioning’ in 
school, the assessments are meant to measure physical health and function, 
communication skills, perceptual and motor skills, self-help skills, social skills, 
emotional and behavioural development and responses to learning experience (Friel, 
1997).
Various ideas on improving processes have been proposed and evaluated; however, 
the structures and resources required to underpin those ways o f working remain rather 
poorly defined (McConachie et al, 1999). Since there are few models for how to 
manage complex specialist multidisciplinary and multiagency teams and since there 
are no clear guidelines on operation and management for child disability services, the 
commissioners o f children’ s services are left to pick their way through the relevant 
parts o f legislation. Moreover, there is a need to consider the nature o f appropriate 
evidence, but there is not very much evidence available to suggest whether therapy 
approach A  is better than therapy approach B or than no specific therapy at all. They 
urge service providers to address the question o f effectiveness, which is the extent to 
which specific clinical interventions do what they are intended to do (McConachie, 
1999).
Cass et al (1999) argue that assessment o f children with complex disabilities is 
notoriously difficult, and there is frequently uncertainty about the accuracy o f clinical 
findings, with reports o f better performance in informal situations. The unfamiliar
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setting may inhibit children, by having demands placed on them to respond, or by the 
challenge o f interacting with unfamiliar people. In the assessment situation, the 
child’s motivational factors, or the presence o f parents, may affect the outcome. These 
writers suggest that assessments should involve ‘ non-standardised ’ elements such as 
giving children control, interesting toys and games, humour, and spending enough 
time with the child.
2.4.2 ‘ Communication difficulties’ as a part o f needs assessment
Professional intervention into young children’ s lives may take place because o f a 
variety o f needs, sometimes including communication needs. Sometimes the child’ s 
perceived communication is seen as the child’s main problem; at other times as part o f 
a wider range o f difficulties that require intervention.
Identifying and meeting any special needs often becomes pivotal at school entry age. 
At the moment, in the UK, there are two different paths to identifying the child’s 
educational needs: firstly, an attempt to screen for specific complex developmental 
disorders; and secondly, a general screening o f the whole year groups at school, such 
as a baseline assessment for school entry (Cass et al, 1999). The assessment process 
for communication difficulties is illustrated in Figure 3 (Parkinson & Pate, 2000).
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No evidence of Discharge
communication p option to
disorder re-refer
Parental report
Observation
- —
Complex
developmental
Assessment
- ip-
disorder
formal
informal
Complex
communication
disorder
Typical but Parents/SLT
slow w agree targets
development and progress
Parent reports
SLT reviews
Multi-agency
assessment
CDC/community
based
Significant speech 
and/or language 
impairment Second SLT opinion
Indirect and/or direct 
intervention
Figure 3. Describing the communicative need (adapted from Parkinson & Pate, 2000, p. 92; SLT 
stands fo r  speech and language therapist).
The figure illustrates the range o f potential outcomes o f a referral and the subsequent 
action. A  speech therapist’s initial assessment may indicate that the child does not 
have a communication disorder, or that the child has got either a developmental or a
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non-developmental disorder or impairment. When the child is perceived to have 
multiple needs, he/she is typically referred to a multidisciplinary child assessment 
team. The parents are usually involved in all the stages o f the assessment, review and 
intervention process.
2.4.3 The place o f testing within assessments
Within the developmental perspective, there appears to be a consensus that child 
assessments need to be based on sound judgments, which reflect the essential 
components o f language and offer fair comparisons with peers (Dockrell & Messer, 
1999; Law, 2000). In general, whether somebody’ s judgments about the child’s 
communication competence can be accepted depends on the following factors: how 
long he/she has known the child; his/her professional experience; other factors that 
influence the child’s behaviour; what the professional means by certain descriptive 
words, such as ‘mild’ or ‘moderate’ difficulties; whether the child’s behaviour is 
typical or unusual; and the demands o f the particular environment, such as the 
assessment room.
A  wide variety o f assessment devices are now available for the evaluation and 
diagnosis o f school age children. The situation with younger children is different with 
fewer valid instruments available from birth to three years; at the same time, some 
assessment tools are more commonly used than some others (Dockrell & Messer, 
1999). As indicated in Figure 3, initial assessments may involve either formal or 
informal tests, the latter being more typically used with younger children.
Standardised developmental screening tests have been used to overcome the potential 
bias o f professional judgment. It is stressed that screening tests should be as accurate 
as possible, although acknowledging that they cannot be error-free. For a test to be 
valid, sensitive and specific, they have to be standardised, which means that measures 
must include a sufficiently clear set o f directions so that they can be administered in 
exactly the same way by different examiners working in different settings (Glascoe & 
Sturner, 2000). However, messages from research have indicated that tests too are 
problematic in practice: they may be too long for routine use; there is little time to 
administer them; trying to manage the child’s behaviour during the testing can be
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difficult;' and the accuracy o f the tests is questionable. For this reason, parental 
questionnaires have increasingly been used as an important supplement.
Dockrell and Messer (1999) stress that language is a multidimensional phenomenon 
and as such does not easily lend itself to single unitary measures. There is much 
variation in normal patterns o f development and this makes it difficult to draw precise 
boundaries between typical and atypical development. For this reason, they 
recommend a combination o f formal and less formal tests. In other words, quantitative 
measures o f language performance can be useful when combined with some 
qualitative methods. Standardised measures alone may fail to address the nature o f 
poor scores and individual problems (see Appendix 2 for Reynell Scale III). The 
literature also suggests that children manifest language and behaviour that can be 
highly context dependent and this may be particularly relevant in more formal, 
unfamiliar situations such as those in which a child is being tested. For example, 
children may be fearful, or extremely co-operative or well behaved in the assessment 
setting, and quite the opposite at home (Gardner, 1998).
Moreover, children with communication and other developmental problems are often 
aware o f their difficulties. Since they are often given tasks which are too difficult for 
their level o f skill development, they may be inherently frustrated, anxious about the 
effectiveness o f their communication attempts or excessively dependent on those who 
understand them best, such as the primary carer. Many writers now believe that there 
is a need to consider a wide range o f factors that might impinge on the child’s 
performance, such as the appropriateness o f materials, cultural factors, attention and 
motivation (Dockrell & Messer, 1999).
2.5 Distinguishing between different types of ‘communication difficulties’: 
examples
When children are referred for needs assessment because o f potential ‘ communication 
difficulties’ , the next step is, as illustrated in Figure 3, to distinguish between different 
categories o f problems. Basically, the task o f assessment is to identify whether the 
child has, for instance, special educational needs, what these may be and how they 
could best met. Sometimes the identification process is fairly straightforward.
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However, sometimes distinguishing between a child whose development is ‘ slow but 
typical’ and a child who has a specific disability, and how ‘communication 
difficulties’ may feature in the two instances, is tricky both philosophically and 
. practically (McMillan, 1994).
I will now provide three different examples o f ‘ communication difficulties’ , which 
have been recognised as particularly hard to diagnose and ‘treat’ . I have chosen these 
examples because they featured frequently in my field data3 (see Figure 8, p. 77). 
Section 2.5.1 looks first at non-developmental speech and language impairments 
(SLI). According to Rice (2000), children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI) 
do not show other developmental delays, and their ‘ immature language’ could be 
attributed to a simple delay in onset, which they will subsequently ‘outgrow’ . Another 
challenge for practitioners is bilingual and multilingual children. It is not always easy 
to determine as to whether these children’s perceived difficulties may stem from 
developmental or language disabilities/delays, and/or cultural differences (e.g. Martin, 
2000).
Section 2.5.2 outlines a clinical criteria and the diagnostic procedure for Asperger’s 
Syndrome, which is a complex developmental disorder (see Figure 4, p. 29) and may 
involve ‘communication difficulties’ . Although there is increasing pressure to detect 
children with disorders o f this kind as early as possible, there are a number o f 
ambiguities involved in diagnosing it. This, as I will later illustrate in my data 
analysis, is problematic both practically and sociologically.
2.5.1 Non-developmental language difficulties: SLI and bilingual children
Most accounts o f SLI stress the disproportionate difficulties seen with specific aspects 
o f language structure. However, some authors suggest that some children have a 
rather different clinical picture. One explanation is to regard the child’ s pragmatic 
difficulties as secondaiy to the structural language difficulties. An alternative view is 
to regard pragmatic difficulties as an indication that the child has autism or an autistic
3 Some ‘communication difficulties’ are easier to diagnose, because they are statistically more 
commonplace and/or due to a particular type of impairment. For Bogle (1994), this is the case, for 
instance, with children who are deaf and the blind. In my observations of the ‘Team Service’, however, 
‘communication difficulty’ cases were more complex. Hence this section looks at these ‘grey areas’ of 
the diagnostic process.
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spectrum disorder, and should therefore be classified as a case o f pervasive rather than 
specific developmental disorder -  or the child’s difficulty may stem from both 
(Bishop, 2000).
One pervasive problem that affects the identification process is the theoretical 
uncertainties about children’ s language acquisition. There is no universal consensus 
on how children, for example, learn how words represent items (Messer, 1994). 
However, instead o f locating language acquisition merely in the period o f early 
childhood, this process can be seen as continuous throughout the lifespan. For 
Tomasello (2000), it can be defined as a process by which:
“Human beings acquire the productive use of the linguistic constructions used by 
those around them, generalise the use of these constructions in novel ways, and 
combine these constructions creatively in discourse interactions with others” 
(Tomasello, 2000, p .13).
Assessment procedures face further obstacles when the children in question are bi- or 
multilingual. Many writers now stress that bilingualism is a linguistic, sociocultural 
and cognitive phenomenon, which is not language pathology (Martin, 2000). As 
against some past beliefs, there is no longer substantial evidence that becoming 
bilingual is disadvantageous for the children. Furthermore, the growing understanding 
is that being bilingual is not like being monolingual twice over: the languages are not 
completely separate but are inter-related and bilingual speakers and listeners draw on 
both. This means that being bilingual is the child’s language. Legally, it is today a 
recognised human right that bilinguals have the opportunity to maintain their 
languages.
Thus the professionals are required to clarify whether or not the language delay or 
difficulty solely concerns the later developing language, which will be English in 
most English speaking countries, or whether it concerns both (all) the child’s 
languages. Sometimes English might be these children’ s third or fourth language, and 
they may have a preferred language. Quantitative assessment o f language skills may 
not give the full picture o f a bilingual child’ s abilities in both languages. Indeed
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comparisons ought not to be made with monolingual speakers’ language skills, but 
rather but more appropriately with other bilinguals’ performance.
Martin (2000) stresses that the aim for practitioners working with potentially bilingual 
children is not necessarily to work towards developing a ‘balanced’ bilingual, in 
essence someone who is equally fluent in two languages across various contexts. 
However, ‘ semi-lingual’ as an alternative term is controversial because it may be 
associated with low expectations and underachievement, and suggests that poor 
language development may be due to within-child factors rather than being due to 
social factors. It also overlooks the fact that language skills may be context 
dependent.
The implications for the assessment o f language and communication skills, therefore, 
are that assessment needs to be culturally embedded. Martin (2000) argues that, in 
many cases, practitioners aim to find assessment approaches and materials, which are 
acultural. On the contrary, with bilingual or multilingual children standardised tests 
could be done in a non-standardised manner, such as allowing the child a bit more 
response time. Also caution needs to be taken in the appropriateness o f age-stage 
information. For example, language mixing is typical for these children -  not a matter 
o f disability.
2.5.2 Complex developmental disorder: Asperger’ s Syndrome (AS)
Figure 4 outlines the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’ s Syndrome, which belongs to 
the so-called ‘autistic spectrum’ , and which sometimes involves ‘ communication 
difficulties’ . This criteria are frequently referred to in current literature on the topic, as 
well as on websites for people with AS.
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The "official" definition of Asperger's in the U.S. from the DSM-IV 
(Diagnostic And Statistical Manual Of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, 
1994)
Diagnostic Criteria for Asperger’s Disorder
A. Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least 
two of the following:
1. Marked impairments in the use of multiple non-verbal behaviours such 
as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to 
regulate social interaction
2. Failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental 
level
3. A lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or 
achievements with other people (e.g. by a lack of showing, bringing, or 
pointing out objects of interest to other people)
4. Lack of social or emotional reciprocity
B. Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, 
and activities, as manifested by at least one of the following:
1. Encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and 
restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
2. Apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or 
rituals
3. Stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger 
flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
4. Persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
C. The disturbance causes clinically significant impairments in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning
D. There is no clinically significant general delay in language (e.g., single 
words used by age 2 years, communicative phrases used by age 3 years)
E. There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development or in 
the development of age-appropriate self-help skills, adaptive behaviour 
(other than social interaction), and curiosity about the environment in 
childhood
F. Criteria are not met for another specific Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder or Schizophrenia
Figure 4. Diagnostic criteria fo r  Asperger’s Disorder (adapted from Attwood, 1998, Appendix 3, 
198-9).
The syndrome was originally described by Hans Asperger (and Leo Kanner) in the 
1940s, but it did not achieve international recognition until the 1990s (Wing, 2002). 
At present, practitioners have a choice o f several sets o f diagnostic criteria. For this 
reason, the actual diagnostic process is recognised as being ‘notoriously difficult’ .
For Attwood (1998), there can be two stages leading to a diagnosis o f AS. The first 
involves parents or teachers completing a questionnaire or a rating scale. The second 
stage would be a clinical assessment by experienced practitioners. The diagnostic 
assessment takes at least an hour, and consists o f an examination o f specific aspects of 
social, language, cognitive and movement skills as well as qualitative aspects o f the 
child’s interests. There may also be some formal testing using a range o f 
psychological tests. Time is also spent with the parents to obtain information 
regarding developmental history and behaviour in specific situations. Another source 
o f information is reports from teachers and speech and occupational therapists.
During the diagnostic assessment, the clinician engineers situations to draw out 
specific behaviour and makes notes on a checklist o f diagnostic signs. For example, 
when examining social behaviour a record is made o f the quality o f reciprocity, how 
the other person is included in the conversation or play, when eye contact would be 
anticipated, and range o f facial expression and body language. The child is asked 
questions on the concept o f friendship and to identify and express a range o f 
emotions. Parents are asked about the child’ s understanding o f the Codes o f social 
conduct, response to peer pressure, degree o f competitiveness, and their abilities when 
playing with other children. In a clinical environment it is usually not possible to 
observe the child’s interactions with children o f their age so a visit may be arranged to 
observe the child in their classroom and playground.
Furthermore, during the diagnostic assessment, a record is made o f errors in the 
pragmatic aspect o f language, in terms o f how language is used in the social context. 
Records are made o f how the child replies to adults’ questions, and possible 
anomalies in their vocabulary, choice or words, enunciation, as well as o f incidents o f 
the misuse o f personal pronouns, literal interpretation, and whether they vocalise their 
thoughts on occasions where they would be expected not to talk.
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The diagnosis relies on observational and verbal (spoken or textual) data. Cognitive 
abilities, special interests and movement skills are also assessed. Attwood (1998) 
stresses that none o f the diagnostic characteristics o f AS are unique and it is unusual 
. to find a child who has a severe expression o f every characteristic: each child is an 
individual in terms o f the degree o f expression in each o f the areas. Therefore, for the 
practitioner, it is essential to consider alternative diagnoses and explanations.
Indeed, the literature suggests that, particularly with ‘ communication difficulties’ that 
are hard to diagnose, such as the ones along the so-called autistic spectrum, 
continuous monitoring and reviews o f the child’ s development are necessary 
(Parkinson & Pate, 2000). I will now turn to what typically happens to the child in the 
intervention process after the diagnosis/decision has been made.
2.6 Post-diagnostic intervention
The key target in working with children with any type o f ‘ communication difficulty’ 
is how professionals and parents can most effectively enhance or improve the 
children’s ability to communicate. Current recommendations for good practice 
suggest that, to be effective, intervention strategies must be geared to the needs o f the 
individual child and therefore must be closely integrated with thorough, ongoing 
assessment procedures. For Donaldson and Reid (1994), few would disagree with this 
statement, although there is less agreement about exactly how information from 
diagnostic assessments should be translated into intervention strategies; there is 
variation in the goals o f intervention, in techniques to achieve these goals and in 
settings where intervention takes place.
Speech and language therapy is a central part o f assessment and post-diagnosis 
intervention. Section 2.6.1 describes, according to guidelines for practice, what is 
typically involved in it in terms o f young children with little or no speech. Here I will 
mention the speech and language therapist’ s role in multidisciplinary teams and in day 
centre based individual intervention, since these roles are relevant to this research.
Alternative and augmentative communication (A A C ) can be a significant component 
o f post-diagnostic intervention with children with little or no speech. In section 2.6.2 I
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will describe what AAC  may typically comprise, particularly in terms o f working 
with young children. The literature suggests that although the use o f A AC  promises to 
open up new communicative avenues for the clients, there are also a variety o f 
complexities involved.
2.6.1 Speech and language therapy (SLT)
The following quotation captures the basic rationale for SLT:
“Since speech is the preferred method of communication in our society, those who 
cannot use it easily are handicapped. For most of us speech, in the sense of spoken 
language, is a convenient, flexible, and straightforward way of conveying 
information or exchanging thoughts and feelings. For the unfortunate exceptions, 
speech therapy exists to amend and develop the means by which language is 
conveyed” (Byers Brown, 1981, p.3).
SLT comprises a variety o f forms o f speech and language intervention, guidance and 
support. In a multidisciplinary team, the speech and language therapist’ s role typically 
involves the provision o f a specialist assessment and diagnostic service for children 
with difficulties in a variety o f areas including communication, and the provision o f a 
service within a multidisciplinary model o f care. This includes coordinating 
intervention with other team members, and involving the parents in the process. SLT 
intervention may be carried out either individually or in groups. Speech and language 
therapists are expected to monitor the child’s progress on a regular basis and update 
goals accordingly (Van der Gaag, 1996).
In day centres, the aims and principles o f SLT service delivery involve the following: 
to maximise the communicative potential o f each client attending the centre; to 
facilitate an understanding o f the client’ s needs; to assist the centre staff to build up an 
appropriate communicative environment, in terms o f the client’ s skills, and o f 
communicative participation and self advocacy. Sometimes this involves promoting 
and facilitating the use o f AAC  (ibid).
Speech and language therapists use models (and equipment and materials based on 
these models) that have been developed by doctors, psychologists and linguists: the
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medical, the developmental and the language models. First, within the medical model, 
the procedure starts by observing the symptom and then seeks to trace it to a cause: it 
attempts to identify any disease o f physical abnormality and then to consider the 
extent to which this can account for the symptom. From identification o f the disease 
process it will move to consideration o f attitude and environment. Physical 
examination is an essential part o f this procedure (Byers Brown, 1981).
Second, the developmental model assumes that normal children move through stages 
o f development in more or less the same way and acquire skills at more or less the 
same time. According to Byers Brown (1981), these stages and skills are well 
documented and the outside limits o f normality defined. A  child whose development 
in any area is causing concern may be placed within this framework and his progress 
charted. Third, the language model can be used to provide a check on procedure 
generated by other models. The language model looks at physical and psychological 
processes involved in the normal use o f language, and is concerned with symbolic 
understanding and its functioning.
Some writers suggest that -  in addition to dealing with the child’s speech and 
language problems -  speech therapists have an important educational role to play by 
promoting reading and spelling skills (Stackhouse, 1992). They may also teach 
children non-verbal methods o f communication, such as signing or picture symbols, 
which I will turn to next.
2.6.2 Augmentative and alternative communication (A A C )
This section now looks at what is meant by AA C  and how it may or may not ‘work’ 
for ‘ listening to children’ in either everyday or specialist contexts. Acknowledging 
that there are a wide variety o f methods o f AAC , I have mainly visual, object-like 
communication aids in mind, since I frequently came across such during my 
fieldwork in the nursery (see Chapter 1 for the ‘Children’s Centre’ ).
The practice literature suggests that early intervention AAC  is critical for the 
development o f communication and social interaction skills in children with physical 
disabilities in order to facilitate active communication exchange and to prevent
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passivity (DeCoste, 1997). Figure 5 below illustrates the target areas in therapeutic 
intervention where AAC  is being used, and which aims to enhance the child’s 
‘ communicative competence’ .
LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE -----------  OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE
Language development Vocal, visual and manual
Knowledge and skill in use o f tools o f communication
COMMUNICATIVE
COMPETENCE
Functional knowledge and judgement in interaction
SOCIAL COMPETENCE
Power o f communication, eye contact 
Turn taking, greeting 
Yes/no signalling, responding 
Requesting object/action
STRATEGIC COMPETENCE 
Modality, flexibility 
Initiating strategies 
Signalling breakdown 
Contradiction 
Providing clarification
Figure 5. Early steps towards communicative competence (adapted from MacDonald & Rendle, 1994, 
P- 72).
Augmentative communication means any method o f communicating that supplements 
the ordinary methods o f speech and handwriting, where these are impaired (Millar & 
Scott, 2001). Most AAC  users use a mixture o f unaided (such as signing) and aided 
communication (physical objects such as symbol charts or books), and a mixture o f 
low tech and high tech aids, depending on the situation. Typically, the choice o f each 
form o f aid depends on the person’s disability, skills and the practical demands o f the 
communication situation.
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For Millar and Scott (2001), the biggest advantages o f aided communication are the 
flexibility and richness o f communication that can be achieved by creating and/or 
customising vocabulary sets; employing sophisticated methods o f storage and 
retrieval; and providing users with special means o f accessing them, i f  necessary. 
Some types o f A A C  can be used by very young children, non-readers, and individuals 
with severe intellectual and sensory disabilities, since many are based on simple 
pictures and symbols (see Appendix 2). For example, low tech aids can be quick and 
simple to use (e.g. eye-pointing); high tech aids (e.g. computers), on the other hand, 
may be easier to use for people with severe physical impairments.
Millar and Scott (2001) stress that communication through the use o f A AC  needs to 
be learned by communicating in meaningful situations, particularly in the case o f 
young children. For instance, provision o f an expensive communication aid will not 
ensure that it is used in a versatile and truly interactive way under all circumstances. 
However, the use o f low-tech symbol systems, which often consist o f representational 
sets, such as picture cards, does not necessarily guarantee effortless communication. 
Scott (2001) suggests that for younger children it is sometimes hard to make the 
representational leap from understanding an object or activity itself to understanding 
the meaning o f a two-dimensional symbol referring to that activity. Thus they may 
need to use real objects.
One message from the AAC  developers is that it is not just the user, but also the 
people who deal with the input from the communication aids, and with whom the user 
communicates that need training, including both low tech and high tech aids (Millar & 
Scott, 2001). Augmentative communication does not occur in isolation: each person 
using AAC  will have a network o f people around them, consisting o f both ‘ experts’ 
and ‘ laypeople’ . It is suggested that the user needs to be part o f the decision making 
process where the most appropriate communication medium is chosen -  relying solely 
on speech and language therapy is not enough. It is also noted that people’s needs and 
abilities change over time.
Furthermore, learning to communicate by some augmentative means can be at least as 
difficult as learning to speak a foreign language -  however, this is rarely 
acknowledged (ibid). In the case o f children, because care workers and teachers
35
change, there is a need for continual training o f the staff as well. In addition, parents 
and other family members need training to understand that the flow o f ‘ conversation’ 
will be different when using AAC  -  any technology (at the moment) cannot simply 
replace ‘natural’ speech, or ‘remove’ the impairment.
Sometimes the use o f AAC  is connected to communication as children’s legal right to 
have access to means o f communication and thereby being able to express 
him/herself. The next section talks about the notion o f ‘ listening to children’ as it is 
currently addressed in literature on practice with children in general, and where 
disabled children are categorised as having ‘ special needs’ .
2.7 ‘Listening to children’
For Aitken and Millar (2002), the last two decades or so in the UK have witnessed the 
rise o f a ‘ culture o f consultation’ . This means that individuals are increasingly being 
supported to make their own decisions rather than having others make decisions for 
them. Notions such as ‘personal choice’ and ‘ control’ now lie at the core o f 
developments in services and opportunities. Increasingly, there have been campaigns 
to support disabled people as well, in order to have their views listened to and acted 
on.
Aitken and Millar have suggested that, given these cultural changes that have affected 
all citizens it was only a matter o f time before the effects would begin to be seen in 
children. They argue that changes in UK child law have been a significant factor in 
this development. In child welfare literature, the ‘UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989’ is frequently referred to as the legal impetus in the Western world for 
‘ listening to children’ (Bayefsky, 2000; Middleton, 1999). In the Convention, Article 
12 stated the right o f the child to express an opinion and to have that opinion taken 
into account and Article 13 introduced the child’s right to information and to freedom 
o f expression.
In the UK, the ‘Children Act 1989’ in England and Wales, and the ‘Code of Practice 
1994 on the Identification and Assessment o f Special Educational Needs ’ (DFE, 1994) 
are also frequently referred to in practice literature as sharing the idea o f ‘ listening to
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children’ . The basic principle in the Children Act 1989, alongside duties, rights and 
responsibilities o f parents and local authorities, was that the child's welfare is 
paramount. The Act required that important decisions to be made about the children 
concerned, for example by courts, would need to take into account “the ascertainable 
wishes and feelings of the child concerned”, considered in the light o f his/her age and 
understanding (Children Act, 1989, S I7).
Discussions about the child’ s ‘voice’ within the child welfare arena have typically 
revolved around whether adult professionals are willing to listen to children, and how 
listening could be done successfully. These discussions have drawn on complex 
debates having to do with children’s competencies, age and maturity, and the 
credibility o f their statements (Davie et al, 1996); in effect saying whether children’s 
‘voices’ could be taken seriously, and at what age this might be possible. In recent 
years, the ‘voice’ o f the disabled child has increasingly been included in the 
discussions (Middleton, 1999; Morris, 1999). A  core value within these discussions 
about ‘ opening up communication channels’ between disabled children and their 
carers is that it is perceived to give children choices, in other words, allowing them to 
exert some control over their lives.
In parallel within child protection, there has been a discursive move to overcome the 
low value generally attached to children and their views. It has been argued that any 
failure to hear and validate what children say is a denial o f their basic human rights 
(Bannister et al, 1990): the nature o f communication must change from ‘advising, 
interpreting and controlling’ to ‘ listening, hearing and validating children’ s 
experience’ (Wells, 1989). For Wells, this would start with allowing children access 
to the language that would help them to disclose abuse, despite the fact that a child 
speaking about sex explicitly is a cultural taboo. This includes access to vocabulary or 
communication aids for articulating what has happened to the child. There would also 
be a need for empathy and respect for children’s views: adults should never assume 
that a child’s associations simply correspond to their own.
At the same time, it has been recognised that listening to the ‘voice’ o f the child in 
child protection is not an easy task to fulfil. In the Department o f Health 1999 
publication ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children', it was noted that listening to
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children and hearing their messages requires training and special skills, including the 
ability to win their trust and promote a sense o f safety. For example, children may feel 
loyalty towards their carers, not wish to share confidences or may not have the 
language or concepts to describe what has happened to them. It was also stressed that 
i f  a child and/or family member had specific communication needs, because o f 
language or disability, it might be necessary to use the services o f an interpreter or 
specialist worker, or to make use o f other aids to communication (DoH, 1999).
There have been attempts to ‘bridge the communication gap’ between adults and non­
verbal children, for example, by using play materials. In this context, it has been 
suggested that it is easier for a child to communicate information in a representational 
way using toys, rather than in words. For example, the disclosure o f sexual abuse may 
be facilitated by the use o f anatomically correct dolls, pens, paper and paints, activity 
based work, life story books, as well as by adequate talking and reading. Listening 
may involve learning to read between the lines, or seeing, smelling and feeling as well 
as hearing; also getting the setting right matters, such as the adult’ s appearance, age­
appropriateness o f toys, the number o f people in the room, and so forth (Ross, 1990).
2.7.1 Using AAC  for ‘ listening to children’
For Aitken and Millar (2002), the current legal context in the UK seems, on the one 
hand, to demand that children be involved in decisions that affect them. On the other 
hand, there remains a major difficulty around the concept o f legal capacity. Be it in 
health, education, justice or social care, age and ability limit or enhance the degree to 
which the child can participate, be listened to and consulted about matters that affect 
them. I f  the child is ‘ too young’ or ‘too disabled’ , someone else will make decisions 
on his/her behalf.
These writers point out that, despite examples o f good practice in consulting children, 
the reality is that they are not consulted as a matter o f routine. One result may be that 
it then becomes more difficult for a child to know how to respond on the rare 
occasions when invited to express views. Furthermore, Aitken and Millar (2002) have 
found that the child’s views are generally not reported i f  the child has a severe 
communication impairment. Typically, the term ‘view ’ conveys some formal
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understanding o f abstract language: words, phrases, sentences and grammar, to which 
these children do not have access.
The pressure to ‘ give children choices’ may lead to unrealistic expectations o f the use 
o f AAC. For instance, in many care settings, ‘Yes and N o ’ methods are used with 
children and they are believed to be the first and easiest step in choice making. 
However, Millar and Scott (2001) have found that understanding ‘Yes and N o ’ is not 
the first but one o f the later stages in the development o f choice making skill. Instead, 
it is an abstract level o f function, and depends on some linguistic understanding. 
Many children may not have understanding at this abstract level: even simple 
questions, such as ‘Do you want a banana?’ may well make the child confused. In 
fact, the child’ s signals may actually relate to immediate and basic meanings linked to 
the sight, sound, touch, taste or smell o f a concrete object or familiar action, not to a 
spoken question. In addition, the child’s signal may indicate ‘ I like it’ rather than 
straightforward ‘Yes’ ; sometimes children may answer ‘Yes’ to everything, regardless 
o f the content o f the question.
The same ambiguities may apply to dealing with more sensitive issues, such as child 
abuse. There is now research evidence to show that many communication aids lack 
acceptable validity and reliability for the ways in which they are used (Wakefield & 
Underwager, 1998). The adult interpretations o f children’s reactions and play with, 
for example, anatomically detailed dolls vary and are too often based on assumptions. 
It can be too easy to take children’ s play as a reflection o f actual events that have 
taken place in their lives, such as potential abuse. Besides, the lack o f standardisation 
o f communication aids makes every investigation situation unique.
In a study by Oosterhoom and Kendrick (2001), it was found that professionals who 
work with disabled children were unsure about the usefulness o f AAC  in child abuse 
investigations. The professionals indicated ambiguities in how the appropriate 
vocabulary could be introduced in a natural way and how links could be made 
between the signs and their meanings. The staff saw themselves as those most able to 
protect the children, but it was felt that discoveiy o f abuse was more likely to come 
from them noticing physical signs, behaviour or mood changes than from the child 
communicating explicitly about abuse. This study also suggests that respondents
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found teaching abstract concepts o f sexuality to children ambiguous, i f  they still had 
difficulty in grasping more concrete examples.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed practice oriented literature in terms o f the rationale for and 
expectations o f professional intervention. Enabling children to access ‘good 
communication’ has been described mostly as a societal concern, when it is adult 
practitioners’ legal and ethical duty to do so. I have pointed out the increasing concern 
for the specific vulnerability o f young disabled children with little or no speech, and 
some difficulties in ‘bridging the gap’ , despite the professional awareness o f this 
vulnerability.
The practice literature on ‘communication difficulties’ appears to draw on mostly 
developmental, medical, psychological and linguistic models o f communication. By 
this I mean that, in general, language and the child’s cognitive development (such as 
symbolic understanding) is perceived as central to good communication skills. At the 
same time, recent debates suggest that communication is a complex phenomenon, 
which should not be reduced merely to the ability to speak: this has implications 
particularly for the understanding o f very young children’ s communication.
Although many writers stress the importance o f incorporating the views o f  the parents 
in the process o f painting a picture o f the child’s problems, the professional expertise 
is taken as vital for making fair judgments and appropriate intervention. There are 
now plenty o f guidelines in the English speaking world for identifying specific 
‘communication difficulties’ . Yet it is acknowledged that making diagnoses is not an 
easy task, since there are not necessarily any universal clinical criteria for certain 
‘conditions’ . This is particularly apparent in the case o f complex developmental 
disorders, such as Asperger’s Syndrome. Furthermore, developmental models may not 
apply to all ‘ cases’ : in this chapter I have mentioned speech and language impaired 
and bilingual or multilingual children.
The purpose o f professional intervention is to open up o f channels for ‘ good 
communication’ , or at least for what is realistically possible (Parkinson & Pate, 2000;
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Millar & Scott, 2001). Speech and language therapy as an expert specialism aims at 
helping children with both verbal and non-verbal methods o f communication. The less 
children have speech, the more need there is for AAC. Many writers, however, point 
out that mediated communication has both advantages and disadvantages, and that 
persistent efforts from both adults and children are required for success.
In Chapter 3, I will make a move away from the practice view o f ‘ communication 
difficulties’ . I will review sociological literature on human communication in terms o f 
how it is understood, in general, in social sciences, and what implications this may 
have for the understandings o f children’ s communication. The focus shifts from 
impairment to dynamics o f social interaction, and from models o f ‘normal’ 
communication to alternative perspectives on human connections.
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Chapter 3.
HOW DO WE KNOW THAT WE HAVE REALLY COMMUNICATED?
SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1 Introduction
What can sociology say about children’ s ‘communication/difficulties’ that other 
theories have not already said? I attempt to answer to this question by posing some 
counter questions to ‘problems’ that I introduced in the previous chapter. Rather than 
focusing on ‘ communication difficulty’ as the source o f the child’ s problem, I want to 
explore what is meant, implicitly or explicitly, by ‘good communication’ . This is a 
move away from hegemonic, cognition and impairment focused practice models 
towards dynamics o f human interaction and the ‘ socialness’ o f human 
communication. Over the course o f this chapter, I intend to explain why and how I 
think this move is important.
To date, across various disciplines within the human sciences, children’s 
communication is typically constituted as a matter o f ‘development’ and ‘ language 
acquisition’ . Traditionally, philosophers, developmental psychologists and social 
scientists have regarded children’ s speech both/either as an inferior form o f adult 
speech, and/or an object o f adult correction through therapy and education. For 
example, within the so-called ‘Communication Theory’ , which attempts to encompass 
the whole array o f possibilities for human communication (Cobley, 1996), children’s 
communication is given marginal attention. Until quite recently, certain ‘ adult’ 
models and theories have dominated our everyday and scientific understandings o f 
‘ good communication’ : I will give examples o f these in section 3.2.1.
The previous chapter talked about ‘ good communication’ and its achievement as an 
individual’s basic skill, need and right. In the so-called age o f ‘ late modernity’ , we 
may ask whose job it is to decide who is a good communicator and what is, in the end, 
important to say (Cameron, 2000; Giddens, 1991). For example, there are long 
standing debates in English speaking countries about what might constitute ‘standard
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English’ and ‘ appropriate’ speech and language skills (Trudgill, 1999), and what 
implications this may have for different groups o f people in society.
We may also question how and why language plays such a central role within 
hegemonic understandings o f communication. This is apparent in both developmental 
psychology and mainstream Communication Theoiy, which, for a large part, draws on 
linguistics (Messer, 1994; Cobley, 1996). It appears that language based models o f 
communication privilege speech and writing over non-verbal communication, the 
latter sometimes being regarded as, in an evolutionary sense, ‘pre-human‘ , or ‘non­
human’ (Finnegan, 2002). Furthermore, theories o f non-verbal communication 
typically draw on behaviouristic notions o f ‘ signals’ , in other words, they treat 
gestures, for instance, as i f  they were words (Harris, 1996).
The previous chapter explored the notion o f the child’s ‘voice’ . Section 3.4 continues 
from it, introducing alternative, sociological perspectives to children’ s and adults’ 
communication. Within the ‘new sociology o f childhood’ , for instance, it has been 
suggested that abstract thought, speech and literacy are a particularly western ideal, 
something that children are expected to strive towards (Jenks, 1996). Drawing on the 
Bakhtinian perspective, this chapter introduces the notions o f ‘mutuality’ and 
‘multivoicedness’ as alternatives to a unitary, atomistic understanding o f an 
individual’s ‘voice’ (Wertsch, 1991).
3.2 Communication as a cognitive process of exchanging messages
Communication is typically understood as a process o f exchanging messages, which 
takes place between ‘minds’ , and is ideally mediated by words or other abstract 
symbols (Finnegan, 2002). This suggests that a somewhat ‘ standardised’ process o f 
exchange can take place between communicators, i f  there are not intervening factors, 
such as a physical or cognitive ‘ impairment’ or external ‘noise’ . Several theoretical 
models support this idea: in this section I will have a look at the ones that have been 
influential over the years across various academic disciplines.
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Communication is often presented as being essentially o f the mind (Finnegan 2002; 
Harris, 1996). The view that the ‘mind’ is the site, origin and definition o f purposive 
human action shapes cognitivist approaches to communication, and is a long standing 
tradition in the western world. This idea is sometimes referred to as a ‘mentalistic’ 
approach, in which communication is a matter o f mental representations, internal 
states or mental concepts. As an analogy to recent technological innovations, the 
‘mind’ is also often conceived in terms o f information processing, such as in 
computer systems, referring to the operations o f the brain (Finnegan, 2002).
Odgen and Richards’ theory o f communication is one example o f a ‘mentalistic’ 
approach (Durham Peters, 1999). In The Meaning o f Meaning (original version 
published in 1923) -  communication was viewed as accurate sharing o f consciousness 
and a path to more rational social relations (Odgen & Richards, 1985). For Durham 
Peters (1999), these writers called for an educated public, taught by experts to 
understand communication better, since communication for them was about matching 
the minds, and psychology would the best science to study it.
Another frequently cited view within Communication Theory is that communication 
is initiated by a sender ‘encoding’ a ‘message’ and transmitting this via a medium to a 
receiver. Having survived more or less accurately depending on the distortions 
( ‘noise’ ) on the way, the message reaches the ‘receiver’ who ‘decodes’ it at the other 
end: the linear process is concluded with the successful receipt o f the message. This 
idea is commonly illustrated by Shannon & Weaver’s model (1964; see Figure 6, p. 
45), which was formulated in an engineering context in the mid twentieth century 
(Finnegan, 2002, pp. 13-15).
3 .2 .1  ‘M e n t a l i s t i c ’ a n d  ‘ c o n d u it ’ m o d e ls  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n
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Figure 6. Shannon & Weaver’s model o f communication (adaptedfrom Finnegan, 2002, p.9).
In recent literature for speech and language therapists, a working definition o f 
communication is very much in line with this model:
“ Communication itself may be defined as the transmission and reception o f  meaning 
between one individual and another, or between an individual and a group -  where 
‘meaning’ is taken to include social and a ffective intentions and reactions, as w e ll as 
prepositional content. The m ode or medium o f  the exchange (speech, non-verbal 
signals, symbols, signs, writing, electronic code etc.) do not alter this definition o f  
the central essence o f  communication”  (V an  Der Gaag, 1996, p. 88).
The ordinary image o f the interpreter/translator is also very much influenced by a 
‘transfer’ model o f communication. Thinking o f human interaction as a unidirectional 
process o f transfer from one person to another is sometimes called the ‘conduit’ 
model o f communication. For Wadensjo (1998), the conduit model is monological: 
the language use is viewed from the perspective o f the speaker. The meaning o f words 
and utterances are seen as resulting from the speaker’ s intentions or strategies alone, 
while co-present people are seen as recipients o f the units o f information prepared by 
the speaker. The monological view o f language conceptualises languages in terms o f 
morphemes, words, sentences and other textual structures as ‘carrying’ certain 
straightforward meanings. Standardised grammars and lexical provide a strong 
support to this model o f thought. I propose that the monological view also underlies 
current approaches to the development o f children’ s ‘symbolic understanding’ and I 
will turn to this in the next section.
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3 .2 .2  A b s t r a c t  th o u g h t  a n d  s y m b o lic  u n d e r s ta n d in g
The use o f symbol systems for communication, language being typically held as the 
most important, is sometimes thought o f as the core o f human nature (Finnegan, 
2002). Within Communication Theory, discussions have revolved around whether 
language is a result o f brain functions or whether language actually determines our 
thinking (Cobley, 1996).
Throughout western literary history, humanistic scholars and social and behavioural 
scientists have attempted to make links between the human mind, symbols and reality; 
in other words, how symbols gain their meanings in communication (Rosengren, 
2000). For instance, some symbolic interactionist perspectives have stressed the 
importance o f symbols simply because they replace physical reality: human beings 
label objects with symbols. In this line o f thought, human society is seen as depending 
on ongoing symbolic communication, which constitutes the basis for human 
cooperation and the cohesiveness o f human groups in terms o f shared knowledge o f 
their identities, history and so forth. Further, symbol usage enables the individual to 
categorise and thereby make sense o f his environment; to adopt perspectives on the 
world; to think and solve problems; to transcend space, time, and one’ s own person; 
to imagine and perceive reality beyond the concrete; and to be creative and self- 
determined (Charon, 2001).
The attainment o f human language is sometimes portrayed as the crucial evolutionary 
step by which humans became differentiated from animals. The emphasis here is on 
our becoming intelligent beings capable o f symbolic and rational thinking, leaving 
behind the emotional, gestural, non-rational and non-verbal forms o f animal 
communication. Verbal language as a symbol system is seen as the necessary divide 
between objectivity, science, individual enlightenment, rational thought and literacy 
as against less ‘ developed’ ways o f communication (Finnegan, 2002).
Preference for symbol usage is apparent, for instance, in early symbolic 
interactionism. G.H. Mead labelled ‘pre-symbolic’ infants and nonhuman animals 
(such as chimpanzees or dogs) as ‘ infra-humans’ , who do not define social objects in 
interaction, do not use language in an ‘adult’ human way, and do not use perspectives
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to define the reality they respond to. There may be communication among many infra­
humans, but it is what might be called a conversation o f ‘non-meaningful gestures’ , 
where the act o f one organism becomes a stimulus for a response in the other. Infra­
humans have a passive relationship with their environment and their behaviour is 
usually ‘biologically programmed’ or learned through imitation and experience 
(Charon, 2001).
In a similar vein, as the previous chapter suggested, in developmental accounts, 
‘ symbolic understanding’ (Cooper, 1978; see Figure 1, p. 18) is seen as central to 
children’s language acquisition. Symbolic understanding is connected to the child’s 
overall cognitive competencies, and delays in it are seen as resulting in difficulties 
with literacy. In developmental psychology, symbolic understanding and cognitive 
competencies are typically connected to the capacity for abstract thinking: the child’s 
move from ‘ immediate experience’ and contextually based communication to the use 
o f language and abstract concepts is regarded as a major developmental milestone 
(ibid).
This idea draws on Jean Piaget’ s theory o f the development o f cognitive 
competencies, which has had a global impact on paediatric care and practice and on 
educational practice. For Jenlcs (1996), Piaget looked at a child to understand adult 
psychological operations better. Piaget formulated his theoiy o f child development in 
terms o f a cumulative transformation towards rational, intelligent adulthood. In terms 
o f language learning, he emphasised its individual, cognitive aspect: the child leams 
to speak once he/she is at a relevant stage (Messer, 1994).
Piaget introduced the idea o f chronologically ordered and hierarchically arranged 
stages in cognitive development where individuals move from low status, infantile, 
‘ figurative’ thought to higher status, adult, ‘ operative’ intelligence. In the figurative 
stage, the child is instanced by particularistic activity, concentrated on the here and 
now, and therefore unable to transfer experience from one situation to another. Adult 
operative intelligence is seen as an ideal because it exemplifies logical process and 
freedom from domination by immediate experience (Jenlcs, 1996).
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The idea o f ‘adult rationality’ also underlies the thought o f  Chomsky, whose theory o f 
language has significantly shaped professional understandings o f children’ s language 
impairments (Bishop & Leonard, 2000). Chomsky’s theory treats language as a 
system, and focuses on its structure, i.e. grammar. He describes the concerns o f 
linguistic theory as follows:
“ Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a 
com pletely homogenous speech community, who knows its language perfectly and is 
unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as m em oiy limitations, 
distractions, shifts or attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in 
applying his know ledge o f  the language in actual performance”  (Chom sky cited in 
Harris, 1996, p. 146).
In conclusion, literature suggests that in various human scientific accounts there are 
and have been, in varying degrees, preferences for speech and abstract thought. The 
centrality o f language and symbolic understanding is typically taken for granted. On 
the other hand, recent sociological literature suggests that communication in general, 
including children’s communication, could be approached from a different theoretical 
angle. Here I attempt to go beyond the definition o f  communication as predominantly 
a ‘skill’ . Drawing on what are sometimes called ‘anti-cognitivist’ stances to human 
interaction, I will now begin to make a move towards understanding face-to-face 
communication as a social and contextually shaped activity.
3.3 Communication as a ‘key skill for good life’
In practice literature, communication is frequently referred to as a skill, right and 
need. The moral character o f this framework -  in terms o f what constitutes a ‘good 
life’ -  is now facing increasing challenges in social scientific writing. This challenge 
is not new. For example, over three decades ago, Goffman wrote:
“ The moralistic language in the social sciences is built around the incredible notion 
that persons should be in good, clear, direct or open communication with one another 
is, i f  anything, worse -  as i f  communication were a pill one ought to swallow  
because it was good for the tummy”  (G offm an, 1967, p. 13 8).
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In this section I will look at how hegemonic understandings o f good communication 
and its importance to everyday life have been deconstructed in recent social scientific 
accounts.
3.3.1 The technical and therapeutic discourses on communication
Despite the assertion that communication has been a subject o f scholarly debates for 
millennia (Rosengren, 2000), Durham Peters (1999) argues that only since the late 
nineteenth century have we defined ourselves in terms o f our ability to communicate 
with one another: ‘ communication’ has become central to reflections on democracy, 
love, and our changing times. His question is why such a rich meaning is attached to 
the notion.
For Durham Peters, the two dominant discourses on ‘ communication’ o f our time are 
a technical one about information theory, and a therapeutic one about communication
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as cure and disease. Around the mid 20 century, the former was explicitly a theory o f 
‘ signals’ and not ‘ significance’ , as in Shannon & Weaver’ s model. In this context, 
communication as a person-to-person activity was overshadowed by mediated 
communication, in other words, mass communication technologies. The latter -  a 
person centred approach -  has arisen mostly within humanistic psychology and 
psychotherapy.
Both the above discourses claim that the obstacles and troubles involved in human 
contact can be solved, whether by better technologies or better techniques o f relating. 
The problem is that ‘communication’ has been ‘hijacked’ by experts, such as 
politicians and bureaucrats, technologists and therapists. A t the same time, 
communication has become disembodied from interaction: the therapists (who want to 
build better relationships) and the technocrats (who want to build better systems) have 
done their best to suppress the truth that communication has become somewhat 
‘nonhuman’ in itself.
In terms o f the ontology o f ‘ good communication’ , Durham Peters warns that the 
therapists run the risk o f missing the eccentricity o f the self to its ‘ owner’ , and the 
public character o f signs: they imagine the self as a holder o f private experiential
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property and language as a courier o f its messages. Therapeutic discourses perceive 
the alleged components o f ‘good communication’ -  understanding, cooperation, 
community or love -  as genuine human goods. However, the attainment o f these 
goods tends to overlook the circumstantial character o f human communication. For 
example, too often the label ‘ failing to communicate’ might be attached to persons 
when they are actually opting out o f the game. He also points out that discourses on 
communication are essentially moral in character. Communication is envisaged as the 
great solution to human ills; yet most troubles in human relationships do not come 
from a failure to match signs and meanings. Rather, communication is more basically 
a political and ethical problem than a semantic and psychological one.
3.3.2 Communication as a ‘ skill’ in late modernity
For Cameron (2000), ‘ communication’ is another area in which expert systems are 
asserting themselves over more traditional, informal and diffuse ways o f organizing 
knowledge and practice and that this has implications for the way we experience, 
understand and conduct spoken interaction. This resonates with what Giddens (1991) 
would describe as individuals’ lives becoming colonised by expert systems in late 
modernity.
An example o f an ‘ expert systems’ is education. For Fairclough (1995), during the 
1980s and 1990s, competence based views o f language and language education 
started to dominate educational thinking in the UK. There was a general shift towards 
seeing knowledge operationally, in terms o f competence, what people can do, and 
towards seeing education as training in skills. Language and communicative 
competence as skills have become items in a list, which includes scientific, 
technological, practical and social competence and skills. Typically, communication 
skills are divided into the five aims o f listening, speaking, reading, writing and 
interpretation, each o f which is further broken down into more specific skills. For 
instance, ‘ speaking’ involves five skills, including: talking effectively in a variety o f 
styles and range o f contexts; formulating and conveying requests and instructions 
clearly and concisely; initiating and sustaining conversations in a range o f contexts 
(ibid).
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Fairclough (1995) argues that competence based models in education incorporate a 
particular vision o f a social subject and o f the educability o f the subject. They may be 
held as democratic in their view o f subjects in that they imply that everyone has the 
capacity to learn, dependent only on training. Yet they are simultaneously 
normalising. They lay down common target behaviours, knowledges and 
understandings for all individual learners. Also they are individualising: they focus on 
each separate individual as housing a configuration o f skills, which can be worked 
upon and improved, and thereby urge the contemporary ‘se lf to become more 
autonomous, and more ‘ self-steering’ . For Fairclough, these ‘ ideologies’ can be traced 
back to, for instance, Chomsky’s grammar based notion o f ‘ communicative 
competence’ .
Cameron (2000) suggests that the discourse o f ‘ teaching communication skills’ is a 
rhetorical feature o f today’ s enterprise culture. Although this enterprise philosophy 
involves goals rather than rigid rules for action, it is, at the same time, distinct from 
‘bureaucracy’ in that it also has a focus on serving the needs o f the customer. The 
managerial approach within this philosophy claims that it ‘empowers people’ . This 
entails ‘workers’ being made responsible for motivating, disciplining and directing 
themselves and that their personal goals and objectives match those o f the 
organisation. Increasingly, oral communication has become the key skill and 
educational objective in today’ s working culture.
It appears, then, that in western societies at large, communication is still an emergent 
field o f expertise. A t the same time, the inevitable question arises: where does it 
emerge? Further questions may be asked: how are people being required to talk in 
contemporary society? What linguistic norms define good and bad communication? 
By whom, and for whom, are the norms constructed, and how are they enforced? 
What motivates the belief that communication is both the cause o f all problems and 
the cure for all ills (ibid)?
Mainly referring to the current communication culture in the US, Cameron (2000) has 
observed two communication models that underlie objectives for teaching children. 
The ‘oracy model’ stresses intellectual functions, such as discussing and thinking. The 
‘ life skills’ model, for its part, emphasises self-discipline, in essence, listening,
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concentrating, controlling anger and resisting antisocial behaviour. For Cameron, 
these elements reflect somebody’ s values for social competence. ‘ Circle time’ in 
schools is a practice example o f this: the object is to provide a safe environment 
. where everyone has an equal opportunity to speak and to be listened. During circle 
times, children are encouraged to talk about their feelings and their problems: there is 
a strong emphasis on empathy.
In some contexts, concerning both adults and children, communication skills involve 
the ability to be interesting and entertaining, being ‘proper’ , polite, eloquent and 
witty. In popular manuals for ‘ good communication’ , there is an emphasis on 
emotional articulacy (recognising emotions; classifying, understanding and dealing 
with people) and/or interactive skills (being assertive; asking the right kinds o f 
questions; being an ‘active listener’ ). Cameron (2000) connects these norms to the 
‘scientific’ models for successful communication that were discussed earlier in this 
chapter. These norms draw on the idea o f standardisation in the sense o f uniform 
performance.
In some instructional material, ‘good communication’ is also a gender issue. Cameron 
sees connections between allegedly communication skills based ‘disruptive disorders’ 
and the prevalence o f these in boys. The therapeutic approach holds that gender based 
‘communication difficulties’ could be both genetically determined and learned, and, 
either way, controlled by therapy. This might ultimately lead to the question o f what 
exactly constitutes a ‘ skill’ in communication, and whether women, predominantly, 
have it and men do not.
3.4 Communication as a social and contextual phenomenon
“ H ow  can w e know that w e have really communicated? There is no ultimate answer 
besides a pragmatic one that our subsequent actions seem to act in some kind o f  
concert...m eaning is an incomplete project, open ended and subject to radical 
revision by later events”  (Durham Peters, 1999, p.267).
This citation captures an important sociological puzzle in this thesis: how can we 
know that we have really communicated -  with or without ‘communication
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difficulties’ ? As I interpret it, this question fundamentally challenges the common 
idea o f ‘ good communication’ as a relatively standardised exchange o f messages, 
based on shared understandings o f symbols. This idea steers the attention away from 
cognition based, decontextualised and passive models o f human life towards 
emphasising the complex creative processes through which human beings actively 
interact (Finnegan, 2002). The argument proposed here is that meanings are context- 
bound in that they arise from situational interaction and interpretations, but are at the 
same time framed by influential discourses and the practices that sustain those 
discourses in society (Foucault, 1973).
3.4.1 Criticisms o f ‘mentalistic’ and ‘ conduit’ models o f communication
For Finnegan (2002), Shannon & Weaver’ s model (see Figure 6, p. 45) fits certain 
aspects o f human communication, especially the transmission o f messages at a 
distance through electrical/electronic media. The problem lies, however, in how it has 
been generalised and interpreted in other contexts. As a result, a narrow, mechanistic 
and ultimately unrealistic view o f what is involved in communication prevails within 
the everyday, professional and academic use o f the word.
The prime emphasis in Shannon & Weaver’s model is on transporting ‘the message’ . 
This presumes that a ‘message’ retains some objective independent existence in its 
initial formulation, as well as in the ‘transmission process’ , as i f  it was a distinct 
entity, which can be analysed separately from author and/or audience. It also appears 
to presume that the ‘ exact transmission o f message’ is always either people’ s prime 
aim in communicating, and/or practically attainable in everyday life situations (ibid).
For Wertsch (1991), the transmission model is ambiguous above all because o f the 
inherently monological assumptions that underlie it. The assumption that is it possible 
to speak o f a single, unaltered meaning or message is problematic: the conduit 
metaphor assumes that the sender encodes a single meaning and transmits it to the 
receiver, who passively decodes or fails to decode it. In contrast, in human 
interaction, the message dissolves into a fluid, situational and multiplex process. It is a 
process through time, where mutual understanding and influence may eventuate 
during the interaction, and continue after ‘destination’ ; however, this should not be
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reduced to ‘noise’ but held as an essential component o f communication (such as in 
the children’ s game o f ‘Chinese Whispers’). In the communicative process, the 
audience is simultaneously a co-author. Indeed, the problem with the Sender-Receiver 
model is the assumption that there are always these two parties, although there can 
actually be more, and that ‘turn taking’ in conversation -  including both verbal and 
non-verbal elements - does not necessarily happen in a clear cut manner (Finnegan, 
2002).
In a similar vein, Aronsson et al (1995) argue that this so-called ‘conduit metaphor’ o f 
communication is so much part and parcel o f our understanding that it is often 
difficult to see what is problematic about it. One o f the most problematic aspects o f 
this attitude, and o f rationalist, Cartesian, conception o f language, thought and human 
action as a whole, is that the interplay o f signs is not treated as a reality in its own 
right. Human communication is thus construed as a second order phenomenon, as 
merely an abstract version o f the ‘ objective’ world in which people have their ‘real’ 
interests, projects and commitments.
The Balchtinian dialogical model4, as a contrast to the monological view, implies that 
meanings conveyed in and by talk are partly a joint product, where sense is made 
through common activity. In this view, communication, as well as miscommunication, 
presupposes certain reciprocity between the people involved, as well as multiple 
functions o f words and utterances in layers o f social contexts (Wadensjo, 1998). The 
dialogical model, among other things, rejects a ‘disengaged image o f the se lf and the 
‘ atomism’ associated with it and the notion o f literal meaning as the starting point for 
a theory o f meaning (Wertsch, 1991). This idea is also apparent in Harris’ (1996) 
notion o f the ‘ fallacy o f verbalism’ , which, in his view, tends to dominate western 
notions o f ideal communication,
3.4.2 ‘The fallacy o f verbalism’
The above views o f language argue that the cognitivist, mentalistic and grammar 
based views o f communication treat word meanings as ‘ fixed’ ; that is to say, they
4 Note: The dialogical m odel should not be confused with ‘ d ialogue’ , i.e. this model can be applied to 
studies o f  situations with several communicators (W adensjo, 1998).
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assume that language is representational o f reality and words act as indexes of 
meaning (Harris, 1996; Hodge & Kress, 1988). This approach perceives using ‘code’ 
and ‘sign’ in all forms o f communicating as losing the distinction between the more 
explicit systems and the less standardised conventions, giving the misleading 
impression that all human communicating belongs to the former type. The problem is 
compounded by the primacy given to systems o f signs and codes (Finnegan, 2002). 
Harris (1996) characterises as ‘ segregationist’ the structural-linguistic view, which 
presupposes the autonomy o f the sign in relation to its users and uses. Instead, taking 
on an ‘ intergrationist’ stance, he argues that signs are created in and by the act of 
communication.
Harris suggests that non-linguistic signs, such as gestures, have not been codified as 
rigorously as words even though their importance in face-to-face communication has 
been recognised. Hence problems arise when all symbol systems come to be treated as 
a substitute for spoken or written language, involving the assumption that signs in all 
forms o f communication must somehow operate like words; that they must be units 
with a form and a meaning. This is what Hams calls a ‘ fallacy o f verbalism’ .
In addition, many traditional communication theories see verbal discourse as a 
substitute for physical actions or mental discourse. In these models, signification is 
seen as representation, imitation, association, or just as convention. These models 
treat the ‘ fixed code’ as an ideal towards which our imperfect systems o f human 
communication should aspire, or in terms o f which they can and should be described. 
An example o f a ‘ fixed code’ approach could be the ongoing ‘ standard English’ 
debate in the English speaking countries5. One currently held view is that 
standardisation consists o f processes o f language determination, codification and 
stabilisation, which, for Trudgill (1999), have been done for particular, for example: 
nationalistic purposes. As a consequence, by codification language acquires a publicly 
recognised and fixed form, usually enshrined in dictionaries and grammar books.
Cheshire (1999) argues that the notion o f ‘ standard English’ has been heavily 
influenced by written English. This is widely known and its guardians are those who
5 Note: The standardisation debate is not confined to English speaking countries alone.
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are highly educated. Literacy is central to the maintenance o f this standard. This 
involves the assumption that one written form o f a word or idiom will have one 
meaning or at least the most accurate one. However, this assumption does not 
necessarily apply to spoken English, since people adapt commonly accepted forms to 
the circumstances o f use.
Indeed when ‘meanings’ are taken to be context dependent, subject to interpretation 
and involving more than a person’s verbal ‘ output’ , we are faced with a problem in 
defining an individual’ s ‘voice’ . Are there any unequivocal linguistic signs or 
symptoms that may be taken as proof o f understanding? Can we ever be sure o f the 
level o f mutual understanding that prevails between interlocutors? What is the 
relationship between understanding and agreement (Foppa, 1995)?
3.4.3 The problematic nature o f ‘voices’
Bakhtin’s dialogical model focuses on ‘utterances’ , which are produced by a ‘voice’ , 
a point o f view. However, for Bakhtin, ‘voices’ are processes rather than locations: 
they never exist in social isolation. ‘Meanings’ come into existence when two or more 
voices come into contact: there has to be a speaker and a listener, the ‘ addresser’ and 
‘ addressee’ (Wertsch, 1991). The speaker always invokes social language in 
producing an utterance, and this social language shapes what the speaker’s individual 
voice can say. This process involves a specific kind o f ‘multivoicedness’ ; the process 
whereby one voice speaks through another voice or voice type in a social language.
In terms o f verbal communication, Wadensjo (1998) stresses that language is a 
historical and social phenomenon, continuously reproduced and recreated through 
use: ‘meaning’ cannot be described entirely in terms o f an individual’ s intentions, nor 
as properties o f languages or words. Instead, the meaning(s) individuals ascribe to 
words and phrases can be matched to time, place, and social situations and thereby 
associative communicative genres.
In the Bakhtinian perspective, ‘mutuality’ is the central issue in the study o f social life 
(Graumann, 1995) and communication. Here the notion o f ‘reciprocity’ is envisaged 
as a moral principle, rather than a technical term. The argument follows that social
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actions and interactions (including dialogue) are frequently initiated and maintained in 
cognitive environments or contexts in which it is taken for granted that they are 
common to or shared by the actors. In this respect, mutuality is a probabilistic term. 
Hence, interpersonal communication can never be fail-safe, and the frequent 
misunderstandings in human interactions are probably attributable to unfounded 
assumptions o f mutuality.
An important feature o f ‘voices’ in this perspective is that utterances take place in 
specific contexts (spheres), where relatively stable types o f utterances - ‘ speech 
genres’ - develop. There is an extreme heterogeneity o f speech genres. Some o f them 
feature in ordinary everyday conversations (such as parents conversing with their 
children at home or teachers talking to pupils at school) and some may be very 
specific (for example, occupational jargon). An individual may be confident in one 
but not in another (Bakhtin in Emerson & Holquist, 1986): it is the speech situation 
and the make up o f the group o f people within that guides the flow o f utterances.
In the context o f disability, communication aids could be another example o f a 
‘ speech genre’ . This can be problematic in terms o f ‘voices’ . In this respect, for 
Moser and Law (2001), the paradox o f ‘ giving someone a voice’ is that voices do not 
exist in isolation; they don't simply reflect something that is pre-existing. Giving 
'voices' may involve the risk o f limiting articulation to that which is verbal, textual or 
linguistic. In the context o f the ‘communication difficulties’ o f disabled children, 
voices that are non-verbal are simply not recognised or are disqualified, even though, 
sometimes, physical movements (actions) are obviously more important than the use 
o f words.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have started to develop a form o f social constructionist view 
according to which human life is ",simultaneously social, discursive and natural ” 
(Burkitt, 1998, p. 128). I have attempted to apply this in conceptualising 
communication, including both children and adults, in face-to-face encounters. This 
reflects a general trend within social sciences over the past few decades, where there
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has been a shift from structure to context, from cognition to interaction, and from 
fixed meanings to multiple voices.
In the 1950s and 1960s, linguistics had gone through the so-called ‘cognitive 
revolution’ , which purported to make ‘mind’ and ‘meaning’ a central concern of 
human sciences in general, and o f linguistics in particular (Wierzbicka, 1996). This 
‘revolution’ claimed to reject certain traditional psychological concepts, such as 
stimulus-response models, overtly observable behaviour or biological drives. 
However, it has lately been criticised for not actually having dealt with ‘meaning’ but 
rather having switched to the study o f ‘ information processing and computation’ . 
What was missing, for the critics, was basically the study o f how meanings come to 
be constructed in the human mind and/or interaction, and how meanings underlie 
human cognition, communication and culture.
As for Bakhtin:
“ Language and words are almost everything in human life. But one must not think 
that this all-embracing and multifaceted reality can be the subject o f  only one 
science, linguistics, or that it can be understood by linguistic methods alone. The 
subject o f  linguistics is only the material, on ly the means o f  speech communication, 
and not speech communication itself, not utterances in their essence and not the 
relationships among them (d ia log ic ), not the forms o f  speech communication, and 
not speech genres”  (Bakhtin in Emerson &  Holquist, 1986, p. 118).
Mainstream approaches to communication within human sciences often overlook the 
fact that face-to-face human interaction takes place in specific contexts, which define 
the possibilities for communicative events (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992). Central to this 
thesis are the ways in which human actors engage in meaning making in different 
contexts: how they arrive (or not) at understandings o f each other’ s definitions o f the 
situations.
Contextualist approaches to communication incorporate the notion o f ‘ social 
construction’ . What they have in common is the interactionist perspective on language 
and communication where the focus is on the ‘ communicative act’ (Farr & 
Rommetveit, 1995): the meaning o f an act is in the nature o f the response it elicits
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from others. Similarly, central to the Bakhtinian dialogical model is the concept o f 
‘mutualities’ , which, in face-to-face vocal and gestural communications are only 
intelligible in the context o f interaction.
Farr and Rommetveit (1995) stress that non-verbal behaviour is not the same as verbal 
communication, and it need not to be theorised in terms o f a ‘ system’ . In their view, 
when definitions o f ‘ communication’ are equated with ‘ encoding’ and ‘decoding’, one 
has brought into play the language o f a telecommunication engineer. In this respect, 
the Bakhtinian view o f face-to-face communication is distinct from cognitive 
psychology, which has individualised the ‘ social’ and places the emphasis on the 
‘mind’ . ‘Understanding’ , in this view, has to do with A  and B who speak and listen, 
the utterance and the ‘world’ . It implies connecting the utterance with a context where 
it is embedded. The contexts involve the concrete setting, knowledges and attributes 
o f people involved, their beliefs, experiences and expectations, the institutional or 
other framework for action, relevances and what is known o f all o f these factors. In 
this respect, understanding is related to ‘ responding’ in that one (may) take time in 
thinking how to react, what stance to take, i.e. there will never be complete 
understanding in terms o f ‘absolute match’ (Linell, 1995).
With its emphasis on interaction and context, this perspective challenges certain 
assumptions in developmental psychology. For Wertsch (1991), American 
psychology certainly dominates studies o f children’s development. Drawing on a 
Piagetian framework, it manifests itself in theories o f children’s intellectual 
milestones, IQ, memory strategies, and grammatical skills. For Wertsch, however, 
psychology has become increasingly less capable o f providing insights into major 
social issues. He argues that it might be useful for the study o f specific clinical 
syndrome or brain dysfunction, but not issues such as educational failure. 
Psychological research is often based on the assumption that it is possible and 
desirable to study specific areas o f mental functioning in the individual in isolation. 
Instead, Wertsch suggests that psychology needs to come to terms with how 
individuals are culturally, historically and institutionally situated before it can 
understand mental functioning.
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In this chapter, I have intended to explore what discourses o f ‘ good communication’ 
may underlie current child welfare practice in the western world when it comes to 
considering ‘ communication difficulties’ . This is not to ignore the personal 
experience or physical/cognitive aspects o f disability. Since I believe that a lot has 
been written about children’ s communicative impairments in practice literature, this 
thesis does not need to do that. Nonetheless, what this chapter aims to do is to bring 
out perspectives that embrace the socially constructed character o f ‘ communication’ 
and thereby ‘ communication difficulty’ . This is a previously more or less unexplored 
area in Communication Theoiy, developmental psychology, linguistics and Disability 
Studies.
For this research, Durham Peters’ (1999) question -  ‘how do we know that we have 
really communicated?’ - opens up new avenues. First, I argue that before we can ‘ give 
a voice’ to children, we need to understand the ambiguities that are involved in human 
communication. As this chapter has attempted to prove, as long as abstractions and 
‘ adult’ skills are held as ideals, children’ s voices are in danger o f remaining marginal. 
Second, before we teach children certain skills, we ought to understand why certain 
skills are preferred to others and with what implications.
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Chapter 4.
DISCOURSES ON ‘CHILDHOOD’ AND ‘DISABILITY’ AND THE 
PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES
4.1 Introduction
In this Chapter I intend to illustrate h o w  discourses on children as communicators are 
related to various contested meanings of ‘Childhood’ and ‘Disability’. In the last 
fifteen years or so, alongside the changes in child law and in the legislation on 
disabled people’s rights, childhood sociology and disability theory have generated a 
range of deconstructions and reconstructions of the two notions. A  typical feature of 
these debates, and what is particularly visible in child protection, is the positioning of 
young (disabled) children as both dependent, vulnerable objects and ‘agentic’ subjects 
with distinct ‘voices’ (Middleton, 1999; Morris, 1999).
A s  previous Chapters have indicated, child welfare practice literature usually 
emphasises rights- and needs-led approaches as necessary starting points for the 
provision of good quality services (e.g. Horwath, 2001; Read &  Clements, 2001). At 
the same time, one tension between conventional and their constructionist challenges, 
having to do with individual rights and needs, lies in ontological considerations: What 
is a ‘child’? W h o  is a ‘disabled’ person? Another tension, that also has to do with 
someone’s decision making power over other peoples’ status, is epistemological: W h o  
has the right to k n o w  about children and disabilities?
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 look separately at deconstructions of ‘Childhood’ and 
‘Disability’ in recent sociological theory. I will pay particular attention to the 
similarities between childhood sociology and Disability Studies in their recognition of 
children’s and disabled people’s ‘agency’ or ‘subjecthood’ in society (Lee, 2000). In 
this context, m a n y  writers in Disability Studies have particularly resisted the power of 
Medicine to determine disabled people’s needs and rights (Oliver, 1990). In this 
thesis, this is an important consideration because interventions into children’s
61
‘communication difficulties’, as illustrated in Chapter 2, are primarily the business of 
medical professions6.
In section 4.4 I will then introduce recent sociological arguments that have pointed 
out ambiguities in constructionist approaches to both ‘Childhood’ and ‘Disability’. I 
will draw attention to the so-called foundationalist and anti-foundationalist (Prout, 
2000) understandings of the two concepts, and to attempts to overcome their 
dichotomisation.
4.2 Deconstructing and reconstructing ‘Childhood’
Over the last decade or two there have been some discursive changes in h o w  children 
are viewed in society in the western world. For example, Chapter 2 referred to the rise 
in the ‘culture of consultation’ and the changes in child law as push factors for the 
recognition of children’s ‘voices’. In parallel to this development, childhood 
sociology has emerged as a distinct subdiscipline, challenging conventional 
understandings and representations of childhood. Within the ‘n e w  paradigm for 
childhood sociology’, ‘Childhood’ is defined as a legitimate and problematic concern 
for research in sociology and cognate disciplines as against traditional sociological 
treatment of children simply as objects of socialisation processes (James &  Prout, 
1997). Instead, children are viewed as social actors with rights regarding their 
participation in society (Holland, 2001).
For James et al (1998), during the last three centuries, a particular Western vision of 
‘Childhood’ has been that:
1) children are seen as different, through the calculation of age
2) they have a special nature, determined by biology
3) they are innocent
4) and therefore vulnerable and dependent.
6 By ‘medical professions’, I refer loosely to persons such as medical doctors, nursery nurses, clinical 
psychologists, speech and language therapists and/or occupational therapists. The relevance to this 
thesis lies in that these occupations featured in one or both research settings.
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Issues such as rates of mortality and life expectancy, organisation of family life and 
structure, kinship patterns and different ideologies of care and philosophies of need 
and dependency have defined childhood, including medical, educational, parental and 
other adult discourses (James &  Prout, 1997). Within the ‘emergent paradigm’, on 
the other hand, ‘Childhood’ is seen as distinct from biological immaturity, appearing 
as a specific structural and cultural component of m a n y  societies in terms of socially 
constructed meanings of age, class, gender and race (Prout &  James, 1997).
Central to the ‘n e w  paradigm’ has been the question of power relations between 
children and the social structural aspects of their relationships with adults. Drawing 
on the Foucauldian line of thought, James et al (1998) have argued that the modern 
conception of childhood has fundamentally to do with modern social control:
“Childhood is the most intensively governed sector of personal existence. In 
different ways, at different times, and by many different routes varying from one 
section of society to another, the health, welfare, and rearing of children have been 
linked in thought and practice to the destiny of the nation and the responsibilities of 
the state. The modern child has become the focus of innumerable projects that 
purport to safeguard it from physical, sexual and moral danger, to ensure its ‘normal’ 
development, to actively promote certain capacities of attributes such as intelligence, 
educability and emotional stability” (James et al, 1998, p.68).
In addition, sociology of childhood has recently m ad e  efforts to document not only 
h o w  children are shaped by society but also h o w  they shape it (Prout, 2000). In this 
view, children are positioned as a political minority, excluded from society’s decision 
making processes m u c h  in the same w a y  that (western) w o m e n  have been in the past 
(Alanen, 1994). For example, where children are the subjects of professional and 
judicial activity, which is concerned with their welfare needs, their rights are eroded 
by assumptions about their lack of cognitive, emotional and experiential competence 
to mak e  decisions in their o w n  best interests (Parton &  Wattam, 1999). In short, 
children are often denied ‘agency’ and subjecthood because they are deemed 
vulnerable and incompetent.
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4 .2 .1  A g e n c y ,  c o m p e te n c e  a n d  v u ln e r a b i l i t y
Childhood sociology’s argument is that the dominant framework of knowledge about 
children in general makes us fail to recognise them as fully human. Dominant 
discourses position children as trajectories, w h o  go through a step by step 
development towards becoming more ‘cultural’ and ‘rational’ actors, away from 
‘natural’ and ‘irrational’ states of being. Different h u m a n  scientific accounts have 
emphasised different ‘deficiencies’ that children m a y  have; nevertheless, children’s 
competencies are seen as inferior to those of adults. For instance, conventional 
sociology has highlighted children’s lack of mental contents, and psychology the lack 
of mental processes (Lee, 2001).
The ‘n e w  paradigm’ has sought to challenge pervasive developmental preoccupations 
with children’s biological age and associated abilities. The notion of the ‘social 
competence’ of children has been introduced as an alternative to conventional views 
of children’s ‘skills’ or ‘achievements’ (Hutchby &  Moran-Ellis, 1998). ‘Social 
competence’ is seen as an active practical accomplishment. It has to do with 
children’s ability to manage their social surroundings and to engage in meaningful 
social action within given interactional contexts; and h o w  children manipulate 
material and cultural resources in order to engage in contextually appropriate 
behaviour.
The notion of ‘social competence’ constitutes children as having a potential to act 
agentically (ibid). B y  contrast, in practice contexts, such as in child protection, 
disability or childhood illness, this assertion appears controversial. In contexts like 
this, children are typically perceived as being in need of adult help. For Christensen 
(2000), most discussions in the western cultural perspective, particularly those using a 
psychological approach, focus on understanding of the child as dependent on others. 
This is a negative attribute in relation to the dominant cultural ideal of the individual 
as autonomous, responsible and mature. For instance, discourses on ‘special needs’ 
aim to detect factors in children’s physical environments that m a y  cause pathological 
conditions or developmental problems in children’s lives (see Chapter 2). In this 
sense, ‘Childhood’, is associated with weakness, innocence and that which requires 
nurturing and protection.
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Agency, competence and dependency have also been central concerns in Disability 
Studies. The next section will look at them in terms of both adults and children. 
‘Disabled childhoods’ will be specifically addressed in section 4.3.1. Since this 
research project took place in clinical/therapeutic settings, there is a particular focus 
on the ‘Medicalisation’ argument within disability theory.
4.3 The ‘Medicalisation’ of ‘Disability’
“In popular imagery disability continues to be perceived as being about specific 
impairments (such as blindness and paralysis) or forms of assistance and 
technologies (such as guide-dogs and wheelchairs). Such a ‘model’ of disability 
assumes that disability is a tragic aberration which afflicts a minority of people. This 
common-sense assumption is pervasive. It shapes much of the medical, social and 
educational treatment of disabled people (Marks, 1999, p. ix).
F ro m  a disability theory point of view, the above quotation represents a so-called 
essentialist perspective of ‘disability’. It supports the belief that ‘disability’ or 
‘impairment’ is inherent within an individual and is likely to have biological causes. 
From a practice point of view, it assumes that once the individual’s problems are 
identified, appropriate medical and educational provision can be m a d e  (Riddell,
1996).
In contrast, since the 1980s, a number of disability scholars and activists in the U K  
have developed a ‘social model of disability’, which sees disability as the effect of an 
environment which discriminates against and disables certain ‘impaired’ individuals. 
These writers have typically highlighted the ‘medicalisation’ of disability as a 
significant contributor to disabled people’s invisibility in society (e.g. Barnes et al, 
1999; Oliver, 1996). This is because the medical ‘gaze’ has been used to regulate 
disabled people, treat them as patients and label them, often with stigmatising and 
physically and emotionally damaging consequences (Oliver, 1990; Priestley, 1998).
S o m e  writers understand Medicalisation as a particular feature of m o d e m  times. 
Oliver (1996), for instance, has associated ‘Medicine’ with the modern concept of 
‘progress’. In late industrial societies, medical intervention has shifted from cure to 
rehabilitation, and rehabilitation philosophy emphasises physical normality (‘living as
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close to normality as possible’), in other words, close to able-bodied behaviour. The 
problem emerges w h e n  medical facts determine not only the form of treatment, but 
also the form of life for the disabled person. For Oliver, it is not immediately obvious 
that medical training and qualifications m a k e  doctors, for example, the most 
appropriate persons to be so involved, nor some other related professions such as 
speech or occupational therapy, which draw upon the same framework of knowledge. 
For Oliver, the latter are ‘pseudo-professions’ that Medicine has created in its o w n  
image.
Other writers point out that since some disabled people are more likely to be subjected 
to unwanted medical interventions than others, they are not a homogenous group. 
According to Gillman et al (1997), case histories of people with learning difficulties, 
for instance, tend to privilege such information that is useful to professionals, for 
instance, IQ and medical diagnosis. Such information allows professionals to 
categorise people for the purposes of ‘treatment’ and prognosis. Case records, as they 
are currently constructed, m a y  further silence an already oppressed group of people, 
especially w h e n  they do not contain information about their lived experiences. 
Gillman et al (1997) consider this a dehumanising practice, which allows 
professionals to psychologically distance themselves from their patients, and to treat 
people as objects that can be controlled through ‘respectable’ professional theories 
and their discursive practices.
4.3.1 Medicine as a ‘regime of truth’ in relation to disabled childhoods
For Prout (2000), the development of paediatrics as a distinct medical discipline, at 
first as a speciality concerned with the diseases of children, and later attempting to 
claim a concern with the health and development of children as a whole, has produced 
an array of categorisations and classifications of children. In paediatric practice, 
children are identified, counted, surveyed and contrasted to the ‘normal’. Various 
standardised administrative procedures, such as the medical discourse of examination, 
questioning, diagnosis and prescription are involved in the classification process 
(Foucault, 1973). In this view, Medicine has become an institutionalised discourse, 
where ‘experts’ are produced as subjects with particular authority, knowledge and 
skills that are superior to those of lay people. For instance, since the impaired body is
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not always fully visible (Corker &  French, 1999), special training and experience are 
needed for ‘seeing the problem’.
O n  the other hand, for Middleton (1999), disabled children in particular are 
marginalised, because the medicalisation of disability creates ‘special needs’. Because 
of the medical hegemony, parents and members of multidisciplinary teams that work 
with disabled children often rely on medical expertise, or comply with it. Yet medical 
experts are k n o w n  to not always have ‘k n o w n ’. For instance, in child welfare 
contexts, uprisings against the power of medical professionals have tended to emerge 
in situations where their decision making has been perceived as inaccurate. A  vivid 
example of these was the 1987 Cleveland Crisis in England, where 125 children were 
diagnosed by local paediatricians as sexually abused. A s  the number of diagnoses 
increased, questions were raised about their accuracy by other agencies, such as 
Social W o r k  and Police (Lee, 2000).
The fact that children were not consulted during the diagnostic process in the 
Cleveland cases became thereafter an important consideration for child protection 
work. Recently, the same concern, as indicated in the previous Chapters of this thesis, 
has been increasingly extended to disabled children. For Morris (1999), there are 
widespread assumptions that disabled children lack the skills, not just to act in their 
o w n  best interests, but also to m ake their views k n o w n  in a comprehensible way. One 
thing is that the child and his/her physical disability are seen as the source of the 
communication difficulty, rather than the adults w h o  are not familiar with, for 
example, methods of augmentative and alternative communication. Another problem 
is that needs assessments tend to be presented as if they were value free and based 
purely on objective evaluation of the clients (Marks, 1999).
In disability theory, the power of professionals over individuals’ lives is often referred 
to as the ‘colonisation of the life-world’, which ignores the disabled person’s o w n  
constructions of what is important in life (Gillman et al, 1997). Yet w e  m a y  ask: H o w  
can people and organisations in positions of power and privilege care without 
colonising? For Code (1994), this question is epistemological in that it often means: 
‘W h o  knows?’
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Code argues:
“To my mind, the very possibility that caring can be practiced universally and 
‘objectively’, by invoking a set of value-free ideals that, at best, pay lip service to 
principles of liberal tolerance, is a product of the empiricist-positivist epistemoiogies 
that underwrite the conviction that knowing p e o p l e  is no different, in its methods and 
formal structures, from knowing physical objects. Those epistemoiogies inform the 
utilitarian instrumental moralities and political theories that govern social welfare 
policy-making in most liberal democratic societies” (Code, 1994, p. 183).
For Code, the epistemological power of carers as ‘knowers’ is a moral and political 
matter. Lee (2000) has also raised this question of medical epistemoiogies, for
example, in the case of the Cleveland Crisis. His point is that it would be easy to
blame the paediatricians simply for being wrong in their diagnoses because they 
believed that child sexual abuse was widespread. However, perhaps a more central 
consideration could be the paediatricians’ epistemological stance, which treated 
bodily traces as causal agents. For Lee:
“Physical traces never speak directly for themselves, they can only be made to
appear to do so [ . . . ]  The paediatricians’ only problem was their faith in the
possibility of reaching pure unmediatedness, their failure to recognise that mediation 
cannot be avoided, and is essential to the production of credible evidence” (Lee,
2000, p .166).
In addition, diagnosing children with, as in this research, communication difficulties 
pose a further challenge, because not only is ‘seeing’ (Fox, 1994) but also the clinical 
criteria for certain ‘conditions’ characterised by uncertainties. Consequently, an 
ethical problem arises from the societal pressures on child welfare professionals - 
such as paediatricians, social workers and the police -  to fulfil their duties towards 
individuals ‘in need’. Therefore, since values play a central role in sustaining 
disabling social relations, it is necessary to ask where these values c o m e  from, w h y  
certain values are dominant over others and whose interests would be threatened if 
they were challenged (Priestley, 1998).
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4.4 Disabled childhoods dichotomised: some ambiguities
The key difficulty in challenging Medical hegemony over disabled people’s lives - 
whether they are adults or children —  is the problem of multiple perspectives. H o w  
can one distinguish between the ‘bodily reality’ of impairment and its effect on an 
individual’s life, and socially constructed aspects of ‘Disability’? Is this, indeed, a 
necessary distinction for understanding lived experiences of disabled people, where 
efforts are mad e  to promote their rights and meet their needs? The same argument can 
be considered in terms of ‘Childhood’. Although ‘Childhood’ can be defined as a 
structural concept in relation to ‘Adulthood’, h o w  useful is it to categorise children as 
an equivalent to a ‘political minority’ and/or a class of their own? Furthermore, h o w  
can w e  understand and distinguish between c o m m o n  and individual experiences of 
childhood/disability at the same time?
According to Corker and French (1999), the ‘social model of disability’ distinguishes 
between ‘disability’, which is socially created, and ‘impairment’, which is referred to 
as a physical attribute of the body. The distinctions can be seen as equivalent to those 
of sex/gender and race/ethnicity. Nonetheless, despite the political significance of the 
‘social model’ theory for disabled people, Corker &  French find the dichotomisation 
of disability and impairment -  one part of which (disability) tends to be valorised and 
the other part (impairment) marginalised or silenced -  as a potentially discriminating 
approach.
These writers stress the importance of ‘reclaiming discourse’ in the study of disabled 
people’s lives and social change. Approaches to ‘Disability’ that avoid being 
reductionist by resorting to neither ‘social model’ nor impairment-centred 
explanations are promoted for understanding the interplay between discourse and 
lived experience. In a similar vein, Priestley (1998) has suggested that disability 
theory7 requires more than a distinction between individual and social model 
approaches, or materialist and idealist explanations. For Priestley, these models are 
best understood as ideal types. A s  for Corker and French (1999), m u c h  more varied
7 In my understanding, ‘disability theory’ is an umbrella term, incorporating, for example, the UK and 
the US theories of disability. In the UK there is an academic discipline called Disability Studies, of 
which the ‘social model of disability’ is one part (Corker & French, 1999).
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and multifaceted descriptions can be found in disabled people’s accounts of their o w n  
lives.
The same can be argued about ‘Childhood’. For Prout (2000), social constructionist 
accounts of ‘Childhood’ and the body tend to underplay the possibility that social life 
has a material as well as discursive (or representational) components. The so-called 
‘anti-foundationalists’ are unwilling to distinguish between the body and its 
representations. In contrast, ‘foundationalists’ view the body as a real, material entity, 
which functions independently of its social contexts, although it bears upon itself 
m a n y  different frameworks of meaning. The emphasis of this phenomenological 
perspective is on the lived experience of ‘being inside one’s body’.
Within childhood sociology, anti-foundationalist approaches to ‘Childhood’ have also 
been critiqued on a more general level. For Qvortrup (1994), for instance, relativist 
constructionism tends to underline what is unique over what is common. The problem 
is that in practice contexts, professionals are expected to bring together the general 
and the particular. Decisions have to be mad e  about what the law should allow for 
different children, such as verbal and non-verbal children, and h o w  these allowances 
could be realised in practice.
In the case of disabled children, inclusion has been an increasing trend in 
recommendations for good practice (Read &  Clements, 2001). A s  indicated in the 
previous Chapters, practice and research literatures pinpoint listening to children’s 
‘voices’, because they have been ignored for a very long time and even though there 
m a y  be significant barriers to communication due to a profound impairment, one 
should not assume that disabled children ‘have nothing to say’ (Beresford, 1997).
O n  the other hand, it has been argued that (disabled) children’s needs and rights are 
also social constructs and that these constructs are interrelated and often contradictory 
(e.g. Doyal &  Gough, 1991). For W o o d h e a d  (1997), conceptualising ‘Childhood’ in 
terms of ‘needs’ reflects the distinctive status accorded to young humanity in 
contemporary western societies. It is commonplace to regard the needs-led approach 
as a progressive and enlightened framework for working with children, by contrast 
with former times and other societies. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘need’ conceals in
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practice a complex of latent cultural and personal assumptions and judgments about 
children, which are not attributable to children’s ‘innate’ nature as such. In this 
respect, the ambiguity of ‘Disabled Childhoods’ is an essentialist one.
Lee (2000) has proposed that the rights and needs discourses have, particularly in 
child protection, disability and childhood sociology contexts, constructed an 
autonomous ‘subjecthood’, incorporating a particular understanding of the child’s 
‘voice’. Hence ‘agency’, both in relation to ‘Childhood’ and ‘Disability’, becomes a 
problematic issue. The question arises whether it is an empowering or a rhetorical 
device. Is it simply one that attempts to furnish (disabled) children with a western 
value of competence, while at the same time, paradoxically, purporting to undermine 
hegemonic notions of a ‘skill’?
For Prout (2000), however, the observation that children can exercise agency should 
be a point of analytical embarkation and not a terminus. In other words, merely 
replacing one essentialist argument (that children are incompetent) with another (that 
they are competent) appears unsatisfactory. It is possible that disabled children can be, 
at the same time, vulnerable and competent; however, their positioning in this respect 
tends to be in the hands of adults. A s  for Wyness:
“The more we talk about children, the less likely children themselves seem to be part
of these dialogues” (Wyness, 2000, p. 29).
4.5 Conclusion
This Chapter started from the assertion that definitions of ‘Childhood’ and 
‘Disability’ are numerous and that there is a tension between the so-called essentialist 
and social constructionist approaches to the two notions. Indeed, the two constructs 
are a contested terrain (Wyness, 2000) both in child welfare practice and sociological 
arenas. The nature of this contest, as I interpret it, is inherently of moral-pragmatic 
and political character, where the meeting of individual rights and needs plays a 
central role.
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The above arguments gain further depth w h e n  located in their historical contexts. For 
example, m a n y  western accounts suggest that in the ‘bad old days’ - whether it was by 
the Ancient Greeks, the R o m a n  Catholic Church or Victorian eugenicists - disabled 
. people (including children) were treated with remarkable cruelty (Marks, 1999). In 
these accounts, the contemporary, ‘civilised world’ is associated with progress: thanks 
to medicine, welfare and enlightenment, disabled people are nowadays treated with 
greater humanity and respect.
However, drawing on Foucauldian thought (Lindgren, 2000), both childhood 
sociology and disability theory have critiqued the particularly m o d e m ,  pathologising 
nature of conceptualising Disabled Childhoods in the contemporary western world. 
As section 4.3 indicated, m a n y  disabled people today do not feel that, for example, 
medical interventions into their lives are particularly humanising (e.g. Gillman et al,
1997). Furthermore, in the U K ,  events such as the Cleveland Crisis stirred opposition 
to medical professionals’ decision making power. Obviously, this poses a problem for 
professionals whose duty is to provide services. The literature that I have reviewed in 
this Chapter and in Chapter 2 indicates that there is indeed a lack of clarity in the w ay  
adults are supposed to relate to children or to each other in practice contexts (Wyness, 
2000). It seems obvious that in addressing children’s ‘communication/difficulties’, w e  
cannot escape these practical and theoretical ambiguities.
However, some writers have pointed out that m a n y  accounts of Disabled Childhoods 
often appear rather pessimistic (Barnes et al, 2000). For instance, protectionist 
arguments continue to construe disabled children as vulnerable victims (Morris, 
1999), and typically de-emphasise the ‘other side of the story’. A n  example of an 
optimistic account could be the following:
“Disabled children, even those with the most severe impairments, are able to 
communicate their feelings about their lives and the treatment which they receive.
Disabled children are not passive victims -  many are happy and feel successful”
“Disabled children are not powerless: oppressive individuals, cultures and structures 
do not damage disabled children beyond repair. To suggest this would be to 
subscribe to the notion of disabled children as being ‘tragic but brave’ victims’
(Barnes et al, 2000, pp. 1-4).
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Consequently, in the study of disabled childhoods, the researcher is also faced with 
this plethora of perspectives of ‘Disabled Childhoods’ and (disabled) children’s 
positioning as communicators. This makes social research on this topic, on different 
levels, a challenging task. The next two Chapters will n o w  turn to the methodological 
and ethical choices that I m ade in the field. They will be further discussed and 
reflected upon in Chapter 12.
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PART 2: METHODS AND ETHICS
This thesis does not only adopt a social constructionist perspective vis-a-vis 
‘communication/difficulties’, but also in relation to my own qualitative research 
practices. My chosen methods will be described and discussed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 talks about research ethics, and questions of morality and politics in 
this research. This includes, for example, a critical appraisal of the social 
researcher’s right to ‘know’. Furthermore, the attention is drawn to ambiguities 
within qualitative sociology and its ‘use value’ in other than sociological arenas.
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Chapter 5.
METHODS: CRAFTING A SOCIOLOGICAL ‘TEXT’ OUT OF THE TWO
RESEARCH SETTINGS
5.1 Introduction
Bearing in mind what has been said so far in this thesis, I a m  n o w  asking: what and 
h o w  can I as a social researcher k n o w  and talk about children’s 
‘communication/difficulties’ in clinical/therapeutic settings? I intend to answer this 
question by detailing the methodological choices and their theoretical sources. This 
chapter describes what I did in the field and h o w  I turned those ‘realities’ into a 
sociological text.
Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 are descriptive. I will first talk about the ‘T e a m  Service’ and 
the ‘Children’s Centre’ as research settings. This involves details of what they were 
like as physical spaces, as well as of the actors as research subjects8.1 will also define 
the scope of the study, which came to be different from the original design for this 
research project (see Appendix 1 and Chapter 1). I will then outline the chosen 
methods and the qualitative data analysis process, and highlight the theoretical 
premises for the ways in which this research project is ethnographic.
Section 5.5 makes a m o v e  towards a destabilisation of the ‘solidity’ of m y  research 
approach. Drawing on the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz (1982), I will discuss the 
philosophical roots of m y  epistemological stance. This makes a case for a reflexive 
account of m y  o w n  research practices, which I will formulate in section 5.6. M y  
intention is to explain w h y  and h o w  I, as a social researcher, have experienced an 
‘epistemological crisis’ during this research project, and h o w  I have subsequently 
sought to come out of it and re-stabilise m y  approach.
8 I have intended to describe the research settings without compromising the children’s, their parents 
and the staffs anonymity.
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5.2 Descriptions of the research settings, actors in the field and the scope of the 
study
In Chapter 1, I introduced the two research settings, as they were described in 
promotional publications for parents. This section continues from that. I will first 
describe the use of space in the two arenas for action. For confidentiality reasons, I 
cannot provide photographs of either of the settings. I will then describe the actors in 
the field and the nature of m y  encounters with them. This includes the children, the 
staff and the parents of the children. Finally, I will explain the scope of the study in 
terms of the number of m y  observations and the time spent in the field. M or e  detailed 
descriptions of the (interactions in the two settings will be provided in the data 
analysis Chapters (7-10). I will further discuss m y  o w n  research conduct in Chapter 
12.
5.2.1 The ‘T e a m  Service’
Small
assessment room
Qhiseryattoii 
rddni
Figure 7. The physical layout o f the 'Team Service ’ setting
Figure 7 illustrates h o w  the observation room, which had one w a y  screens on both 
sides, was located in between two assessment rooms. The assessments usually took 
place in the large assessment room; the smaller one was used w h e n  the practitioner 
wanted to do one-to-one assessment with the child. In the large assessment room there 
were a lot of assessment related toys and equipment, as well as a seating area for the
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parents. There was room for the child to run around and, for example, ride a toy car. 
In the small assessment room there were only a table and a couple of chairs, that is to 
say, as few stimuli as possible any other than what the practitioner would bring in for 
, a particular test.
In Chapter 1 I explained the reasons for selecting and obtaining access to the ‘T e a m  
Service’ setting: ‘communication difficulties’ were a frequent reason for referring 
children there. Children would visit the setting on an individual basis, typically twice. 
Figure 8 describes profiles of children w h o  were referred for the service.
N u m b e r  of observations 25
N u m b e r  of children observed and/or planned 28
Gender
- Boys 25
Girls 3
Ages in years
- 2 5
- 3 4. 4 4
- 5 2
- 6 1
- 7 1
- 8 1
- not k n o w n  (under 5) 10
Reasons for referral (sometimes in combination)
- Speech, language and social interaction 16
(possibly autistic) difficulties
Other communication/language 11
difficulties
- Behaviour (e.g. aggression; attention 6
problems)
- Motor 4
- Severe developmental disability 3
Developmental delay 5
- Psychological difficulty 2
Child protection needs 2
Ethnicity/language
- British English speakers 20
- Non-British English speakers 4
- Multicultural, including English language 3
- Non-British with no English language 1
Figure 8. Profiles o f children in the 'Team Service ’ assessments.
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In m y  observations, the ‘core’ T e a m  typically consisted of at least six members, 
including the co-ordinator, a paediatrician, a nurseiy nurse, a speech therapist, an 
occupational therapist and a physiotherapist. Sometimes a social worker or a clinical 
psychologist would take part in decision making as well. Occasionally, observers such 
as health visitors, medical students or primary school teachers would attend the 
assessments, usually one or two at the time.
In the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting, I conducted 25 observations over nine months. I would 
usually stay in the setting for half a day per visit; in other words, for the length of the 
assessment and T e a m  meetings. Because I conducted observations on varying days, I 
would meet different members of staff. I also encountered different practitioners, 
because there were some changes in staffing during m y  fieldwork period.
The T e a m  members would either assess the child in one of the rooms and observe in 
the observation room, or spend some time in the staff office. I always remained 
behind a one w a y  screen, which somewhat limited the scope of observation and 
participation. Otherwise I was free to come and go, as long as it was not inconvenient 
for anyone else in the setting, for privacy, confidentiality or other reasons. There were 
some conversations with the staff members; however, interview-like conversations 
would have disturbed the assessments too much.
I occasionally encountered parents of the children, particularly if they were seated in 
the observation room. Sometimes they asked questions about m y  research project on 
the basis of the information leaflet that I had given to them. I then explained that m y  
research was confidential and that I was a student and would not take part in the 
decision making. Therefore, I avoided making any comments about the children in the 
presence of their parents.
5 .2 .2  T h e  ‘ C h i ld r e n ’ s C e n t r e ’
Figure 9. The physical layout o f the 'Children’s Centre ’
Figure 9 illustrates a larger space -  ‘general area’ - where most joint activities took 
place, such as meal times, circle times and some other activity times. In this thesis, I 
call this area ‘nursery’. The ‘floor corner’ in the nursery was a designated place for 
children w h o  could lie on the floor instead of sitting in a wheelchair. Sometimes all 
the children watched television there. Free play would often stretch over all the areas. 
Play and education related materials were scattered all over the room, including the 
walls. Therapy rooms for one-to-one sessions were located outside the main nursery 
area: they were not, however, as stimulus-controlled as the small assessment room in 
Figure 7.
I had regular contact with the same children in the ‘Children’s Centre’. There were up 
to 15 children together per day in the Centre. All the children were under 6 years old. 
They were all British and predominantly of white ethnic background. They had been
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diagnosed with a disability, which involved a range of physical and cognitive 
impairments. D u e  to their impairments, most children in the nursery had little or no 
speech, and were receiving speech and language therapy.
In m y  observations, there were typically one adult per child working in the nursery, 
particularly in the case of children with gross motor impairments. The therapists 
would work in the ‘therapy rooms’ with individual children, but would sometime take 
part in, for instance, helping out at mealtimes in the nursery, or lead group activity 
sessions. Other actors in the setting involved qualified nursery nurses, child care 
workers, volunteers and sometimes student nurses.
I spent about nine months observing the ‘Children’s Centre’, visiting twice a week on 
average, for half a day each time. I would go in on varying days and at different times 
of the day. I did not only observe the main nursery area, but also individual therapy 
sessions with children. I conducted some video recordings9, which allowed for 
detailed data analysis. Furthermore, a couple of times during m y  first year, I went out 
with health professionals to the community to observe what was involved in their 
work outside the ‘Children’s Centre’. This enabled m e  to learn about the 
interventionist process beyond child assessments and the nursery work with ‘special 
needs’ children.
Unlike with the ‘T e a m  Service’, in the ‘Children’s Centre’, it was possible to m ov e  
about and interact with children, and to find different locations for conducting 
observations. W h e n  an opportunity arose in the ‘Children’s Centre’, I had informal 
discussions with members of staff about children’s communication. A s  previously 
mentioned, these discussions were helpful in that I thereby gained a comprehensive 
understanding of the aims and objectives of practice, with particular focus on 
children’s communication. I did not encounter any parents of the children. For 
example, obtaining consent forms from the parents was dealt with by a m e m b e r  of 
staff.
9 Prior to video-recordings, I had obtained informed consent from the parents of the children. I agreed 
with the staff that after I have finished the analysis, I will return the videotapes to them, and will not 
keep any other copies of it myself.
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5.3 Methods
In this section, I will detail the ways in which I drew on sociological research 
‘manuals’ for conducting qualitative research. I will first talk about observation, since 
it was the main method of enquiry in the two settings. Section 5.3.2 describes the data 
generation phase, and section 5.3.3 the qualitative data analysis process.
5.3.1 The starting points
Strauss and Corbin (1998) have suggested that before beginning a project, a 
researcher m a y  review the literature to formulate questions that act as a stepping off 
point during initial observations. The researcher will then turn to questions and 
concepts that emerge from the analysis of the data. A s  intended in the original 
research design for this project (see Appendix 1), asking the research question started 
from a broad, in some ways novel ‘problem’ which then became more specific in the 
course of the research process. In both settings, m y  descriptions were meant to 
provide detailed accounts of ‘what was going o n ’ in general that affected the 
children’s experiences in the setting. During m y  pilot observations, m y  fieldwork 
relied on the Geertzian (1999) concept of ‘thick description’ and on the sociological 
‘manual’ guidelines for doing ethnography and participant observation in particular 
(Berg, 1995; Mason, 1996; Morse, 1994).
Later on I discovered that m y  research strategy could also be described as 
‘constructivist Grounded Theory’ (Charmaz, 2002). This approach involved a 
phenomenological understanding of ‘reality’ (Berger &  Luckmann, 1991) as well as 
the following principles of Glaser’s (1992, p. 16) version of Grounded Theory:
1) The need to get out in the field to understand ‘what is going on’
2) The importance of theory, grounded in reality
3) A n  understanding of the nature of experience in the field for the 
subjects and researcher as continually evolving
4) The active role of persons in shaping the worlds they live in through 
the processes of interaction
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5) A n  emphasis on change and processes, and the variability of and 
complexity of life; and
6) The interrelationship between meaning in the perception of the 
subjects and their action.
As for Gubrium and Holstein (2000, p.487): “qualitative enquiry’s analytic pendulum 
is constantly in motion”. A s  the fieldwork progressed, I became interested in what 
was being accomplished, under what conditions, and out of what resources. I then 
combined Geertzian and Grounded Theory approaches with ethnomethodological and 
Foucauldian concerns (Silverman, 1987; Potter, 1996), focusing on h o w  members put 
discourses to work as they constitute their social realities: the ‘analytic bracketing’ 
started from ‘whats’ and m o v e d  on to ‘h o w s ’ (Gubrium &  Holstein, 2000).
5.3.2 ‘Being’ and ‘doing’ in the field
In order to learn ‘what was going on’ in the field, observation was an obvious starting 
point. Observation allowed m e  to look at the m embers’ interactions, their verbalised 
interpretations of what was going on, in the ‘here and n o w ’ of the daily contexts for 
communication (Mason, 1996). Sometimes I enhanced m y  observations by making 
video recordings, sometimes I simply asked questions w h e n  opportunities for that 
arose. Ideally, observation as a method allows the researcher access to the ‘natural 
setting’. For M a y s  and Pope (1996), observational methods are particularly well 
suited to the study of the workings of organisations and h o w  people within them 
perform their functions -  indeed it is becoming more and more c o m m o n  to use 
observational methods in health care settings.
The w a y  in which I conducted observations is best described as a process. First there 
was descriptive observation where I wrote d o w n  ‘everything’. Then I m ade a m o v e  to 
a more focused observation that involved asking questions (informal interviews) and 
concentrating on particular types of group activities. After a while I was ready to 
conduct systematic selective observation, focusing on the attributes of different types 
of activities (see Angrosino &  M a y s  de Perez, 2000). The moves from one stage to 
another were not clear cut. Instead it was a matter of feeling that I had ‘seen enough’
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to be able to do so (Gubrium &  Holstein, 2000), or that I simply wanted to ask 
questions to complement or clarify what I had seen earlier.
In both settings, m y  sociological gaze tracked d o w n  the following components: 
‘space’ (what it allowed the actors to do), ‘actors’ (adults and children in differing 
‘roles’), ‘activities’ (recurrent interactive activities in the setting, such as meetings), 
‘objects’ (e.g. communication aids), ‘acts’ (specific individual actions, such as 
feeding a child), ‘events’ (particular occasions, such as Christmas party), ‘time’ (the 
sequence and duration of acts, activities or events), ‘goals’ (explicit purposes of the 
actors) and ‘feelings’ (apparent emotions in particular contexts, including m y  own) 
(Burgess, 1984). These starting points allowed m e  to create initial codes and 
categories for the subsequent analysis of the data.
For Geertz, culture is a context that has to be ‘thickly described’ (Schwandt, 1994). 
The ethnographer describes language and symbols, as well as the actions of the 
members of the culture (including the researcher’s own), since these both construct 
and signify meaning. He/she generates a reading of the meaning making processes of 
the people he/she studies. In this reading, the resulting text, one creates accounts of 
‘passing m o m en t s ’ rather than claiming to describe the ‘souls of the mem be r s ’ (ibid). 
The data extracts, as I intend them to be, in this thesis are descriptive examples of 
these ‘passing mom en t s ’.
5.3.3 Analysis: conceptualisation and writing processes
During this research process it has come clear to m e  that data analysis is a far more 
complex and long lasting activity than what typically comes across in qualitative 
research manuals. M y  analysis first started to evolve simultaneously with observation 
and note taking. I started to sketch some preliminary codes at the early stages of the 
fieldwork: with Atlas.ti, the computer software, I arranged them in ‘code families’ 
and displayed them as ‘conceptual m a p s ’. These were then subject to change as n e w  
concepts came along. Using Glaser’s (1992) notion of the ‘constant comparative 
method’, I searched for concepts in the literature, then in the data, and then again in 
the literature. The fieldnotes of the two settings were coded with different sets of 
codes, although there was some conceptual overlap in the end (Morse, 1994).
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I agree with Strauss and Corbin (1998) in that analysis draws on both critical and 
creative thinking: it is the interplay between researchers and data. I began with a 
‘working hypothesis’, expecting that ‘communication difficulties’ could be 
understood as a sociological problem. Since neither of the settings was familiar to me, 
however, I was open to whatever might come: it was obvious that the theory would, 
for the most part, emerge from the data.
Coding (both manual and computerised) enabled m e  to identify patterns in the data 
and to start producing stories from it. This synthesizing process decontextualised the 
description: it m o v e d  from an individual level to a more abstract, generalised level. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) have distinguished ‘open’, ‘axial’ or ‘selective’ coding; 
coding for process (as well as for structure); and developing a 
conditional/consequential matrix for concepts. They have also suggested the use of 
the following analytic tools: 1) asking questions about the data 2) focusing on a word, 
phrase or sentence 3) making comparisons 4) and ‘waving the red flag’. These are 
meant to steer the researcher’s thinking away from the confines of both the technical 
literature and personal experience or standard ways of thinking about phenomena; 
stimulate the inductive process and focus on what is in the data; listen to what people 
are saying and doing, and spot ‘diamonds in the rough’ (ibid); as well as to discover 
categories, labels and concepts. The software package that I used -  Atlas ti. - was 
based on this version of Grounded Theory by Strauss and Corbin.
In short, the theorising phase involves ‘cutting d o w n  the ‘noise’ in the data so that the 
c o m m o n  and relevant issues (to the research question) remain. A s  for Morse (1994, 
p.33), the process of data collection and analysis "should not be forced and cannot be 
rushed”. This ongoing character of theorising can be seen as typical of ethnographic 
research. Thus, I will n o w  turn to what I consider as particularly ethnographic in m y  
chosen methodology. This is important for the justification of observation as a useful 
method, as well as of the ways in which I have collected, analysed and written about 
the data.
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5.4 Doing ethnographic research
Since ethnography can be conducted in different ways, I want to specify the 
theoretical underpinnings for the approach that I have adopted in this research. M y  
methodological approach can be characterised as what Smith (2002) calls 
‘institutional ethnography’, with a particular focus on what was ‘social’ in the two 
settings.
5.4.1 Institutional ethnography and the focus on the ‘social’
For Smith (2002), the object of institutional ethnography’s attention is the ‘social’, 
which is conceived of as arising in peoples’ activities (what they do, say, write and so 
on) in particular local settings at particular times. A s  a study of the ‘social’ and 
interaction, institutional ethnography relies on the language in which people speak of 
what they k n o w  h o w  to do, of their experience, and h o w  they get things done.
Institutional ethnography takes it for granted that people experience and perceive 
things differently. Institutions, as generalising and objectifying forms of concerting 
peoples’ activities, are distinctive in that they construct forms of consciousness - 
knowledge, information, facts, administrative and legal rules, and so on -  that 
override individual’s perspectives. In this respect, institutional ethnography 
incorporates the Foucauldian understanding of the interplay between discourse and 
practice.
H o w  can an ethnographer talk about the institutional world? W h a t  should he/she focus 
on and why? Smith proposes that institutional ethnography begins with some issues, 
concerns or problems that are real for the people in the setting. These problems will 
give direction and focus to the research. The specialized theories, used by the 
researcher, recognise and analyse different levels or aspects of the social:
“Disciplinary concepts and theories function to regulate sociological discourse [ . . .]  
out of the primary dialogue with people who constitute both the resources for the 
accounts to be written and their ultimate users, we fashion a secondary dialogue 
within the sociological discourse, constrained by its conventions, methodologies,
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rules of evidence, discursive objects and other aspects of the ‘order of discourse’
(Smith, 2002, p.20)”.
The aim of institutional ethnography is to produce accounts of the social relations that 
will enlarge individuals’ perspectives beyond what they can learn directly from their 
participation in everyday life. Since it will involve discoveries and learning, it will 
never be completed. O n  the other hand, it recognises that institutional forms and 
relations are always being produced by individuals at work, and yet that they are 
generalised and standardised. In this way, institutional ethnography opens up into 
larger social relations, exploring the institutional order.
Smith (2002) highlights the role of ‘texts’ in the study of social interaction. B y  ‘texts’ 
she means printed, computerized or otherwise replicated material, which are written 
and read in the everyday practice of peoples’ work, and which coordinate what people 
do in one local setting with work done by others elsewhere or at different times. The 
significance of texts lies in that they concert activities. They produce stability and 
replicability of organisation or institution: the materiality of them is important in 
terms of h o w  they join everyday activities and social relations in settings. For Smith, 
‘ruling relations’ are based in texts and manifest themselves within institutions.
Institutional ethnography recognises both the local sites of action and the wider 
network of institutional order. Power is the key to sociological analysis; however, as 
for Foucault (McHoul &  Grace, 1983) it is not a monolithic notion: it is rather seen as 
dispersed and discursive, yet stabilised by texts, talk and interaction in specific 
contexts. The researcher can try to m ak e  sense of those contexts with the help of 
specialised theories, translating the language of ‘everyday/everynight world’ of the 
setting to a sociological one. The starting and finishing points of enquiry will, 
nonetheless, always be what the research subjects treat as ‘real’ (Smith, 2002).
There are, obviously, other ways of researching clinical/therapeutic settings. For 
example, ethnographic methodology is sometimes set against the conversation 
analysis approach. Studies within the conversation analysis tradition have focused on 
h o w  participants organise their communicative conduct so as to display and realise 
their subjective experience of the current social activity, and h o w  they perceive their
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o w n  and others’ roles in it. The proponents of this approach stress that their analysis is 
based on only what is explicit in the data rather than on categories imposed by the 
researcher (Wadensjo, 1998).
Ethnographically orientated studies, on the other hand, have a different kind of 
interest in patterns of social organisation. In a study of institutional spoken discourse, 
for instance, this means that the researcher has reasons to obtain a thorough insight 
into peoples’ long-term or short-term relations and social networks; and into the rules 
and customs of the institutions where data is collected. M a n y  ethnographers also 
emphasise the necessity of describing the circumstances in which research takes 
place, and the researcher’s role in creating these circumstances (ibid).
Both conversation analysis and ethnography share the idea that meaning is the topic 
rather than resource of analysis. Then again, coming from the so-called ‘linguistic 
turn’ in sociological writing, conversation analysis is interested in the linguistic (or 
non-verbal but language-like) meaning (Williams &  May, 1996). A s  explained in 
Chapter 3 (see Harris, 1996), m y  understanding of ‘communication’ in this thesis is 
not limited to the purely linguistic in the two settings. Like Schutz (1982) has 
suggested, I have focused on ‘action’, and I have openly imposed m y  inteipretations 
on what I have seen. For this reason, in section 5.5 I will outline in more detail h o w  I 
have adopted aspects of Schutz’ phenomenology in this research. Moreover, m y  
interest in ‘action’ in the two settings has included the minutiae of social construction 
processes in the generation and consumption of ‘scientific’ knowledge. This will be 
addressed in the next subsection.
5.4.2 Doing ethnography in ‘scientific’ settings
Woolgar (1988) has suggested that in situ observation of scientific activity gives the 
benefit of the experiences of an observer undergoing prolonged immersion in the 
culture being studied. This makes it possible to ‘retrieve’ some of the craft character 
of science. Typically, the focus of interest in the field, as in ethnographic studies on 
laboratory work, has been the process of transcription.
Ethnographies of laboratories have aimed to deconstruct. A s  for Knorr-Cetina:
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“Within laboratory studies, the insistence on direct observation and detailed 
description has consistently served as a device that calls forth and sustains the 
constructionist attitude”; “Detailed description deconstructs - not out of an interest in 
critique but because it cannot but observe the intricate labour that goes into the 
creation of a solid entity, the countless non-solid ingredients from which it derives, 
the confusion and negotiation that often lie at its origin, and the continued necessity 
of stabilizing and congealing (Knorr-Cetina, 1995, pp. 147-8).
The deconstruction performed by constructionist studies is a method of observing the 
real time mechanisms at work in knowledge production. For Knorr-Cetina (1995), 
they question the idea that laws and propositions of science provide literal 
descriptions of material reality, and therefore can be accounted for in terms of this 
reality rather than in terms of the mechanisms and processes of construction.
In light of this, I a m  n o w  facing fundamental epistemological questions of the nature 
of sociological knowledge production and its relation to ‘reality’. If I regard actions in 
the two clinical/therapeutic settings as social construction processes, what can be 
mad e  of m y  o w n  research practices? Drawing on the phenomenology of Alfred 
Schutz and some subsequent use of his thought in sociological writing, I n o w  intend 
to clarify m y  epistemological position.
5.5 The sociological epistemology in this research: considerations o f reality  and 
knowledge
Definitions of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ have behind them a long history of 
philosophical enquiry. The problem for a sociologist is that, in the same w a y  as was 
described in the previous Chapter, there is a range of definitions. Yet the choice of 
any particular research question, subjects, settings and methods will fundamentally 
rely on assumptions of aspects of social reality and what can be k n o w n  about it.
M y  sociological epistemology and methodology in this research stem from what are 
broadly called ‘interpretivist’ and ‘constructivist’ perspectives within the social 
sciences. I have adopted a stance, which combines what these two ‘traditions’ share:
“The constructivist or interpretivist believes that to understand this world of meaning 
one must interpret it. The inquirer must elucidate the process of meaning 
construction and clarify what and how meanings are embodied in the language and 
actions of social actors. To prepare an interpretation is itself to construct a reading of 
these meanings; it is to offer the inquirer’s construction of the constructions of the 
actors one studies” (Schwandt, 1994, p. 118).
I will n o w  turn to the philosophical background to these perspectives.
5.5.1 Phenomenological epistemology
The ontological starting point for m y  research can be formulated more or less along 
the lines of Berger and Luckmann:
“It is our contention, then, that the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with 
whatever passes for ‘knowledge’ in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or 
invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such ‘knowledge’. And insofar as all human 
‘knowledge’ is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the 
sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is done 
in such a way that a taken-for-granted ‘reality’ congeals for the man in the street 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p. 13).
Berger and L u c k m a n n ’s treatise on sociological knowledge draws on the thought of 
phenomenologist Alfred Schutz. For Schutz (Natanson, 1982), the ‘c o m m o n  sense’ 
world is characterised by taken-for-grantedness. W e  tend to take our everyday lives 
and their components for granted, without particularly questioning all the time w h y  or 
h o w  w e  are doing what w e  do. The attitude of ‘taken-for-grantedness’ consists of a 
person’s a) biographical situation; b) stock of knowledge at hand (typifications, i.e. 
classification of things ‘as something’); and c) the co-ordinates of the social matrix 
(intersubjectivity). The goal for a social scientist is to see beyond this taken-for- 
grantedness and generate sociological constructions of the social world.
W hat ought a social scientist to focus on in the study of the social world? For 
Natanson, traditionally, ‘perception’ has been taken as the decisive issue for 
philosophical orientation and appraisal. The full impact of Schutz’ work, however,
leads to the denial of the validity of this starting point for any philosophy concerned 
with social reality. Instead, ‘action’ becomes a dominant theme.
For Schutz (1982), h u m a n  actions are purposive, projective and conscious. The goal 
of sociological enquiry is, then, the understanding of social action as the meanings, 
which the actors bestow upon their o w n  actions. Schutz called the actors’ meanings 
‘first order constructs’ and the philosophical/sociological meanings of them ‘second 
order constructs’. Importantly, taken that the Lebenswelt (inner world) of each actor is 
different, varying interpretations of the same situations can be made: there are no 
‘objective’ situations. Furthermore, actions are never isolated, unrelated to other 
actions, or divorced from the world.
Central to Schutzian phenomenology is the idea of ‘multiple realities’ (Natanson, 
1982). H e  was interested in the meanings of our experiences (sub-universes), not in 
the ontological structure of objects. A s  ‘everyday’ actors, or as social researchers, w e  
typify and describe these objects from our o w n  vantage points. Therefore, a 
fundamental question arises: can a social researcher m ak e  an epistemological ‘leap’ 
from his/her world to that of the others?
Schutz (1982) suggested that since a social scientist is a ‘disinterested observer’, 
he/she can go beyond the ‘biographical situation’ and analyse situations with logical 
and consistent ways and adequately enough so that the actors can understand his 
interpretation of it. Yet the scientist’s versions cannot be regarded as more correct 
than anyone else’s since there are no such things as ‘facts’. For Schutz, all facts are 
from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of the mind. 
They are always interpreted facts, either abstracted or situated. This does not mean 
that, in daily life or in science, w e  are unable to grasp the reality of the world: it 
means, instead, that w e  grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are 
relevant to us either in everyday life or scientific thinking with its o w n  rules of 
procedure.
W e  n o w  need to consider what implications the phenomenologically based 
epistemology m a y  have on the usefulness of m y  accounts of the two research settings. 
In the next section, I will reflect on the research process in terms of both practical and
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theoretical problems that I have encountered, and h o w  I have sought to overcome 
those problems.
5.6 Reflections
In any research project, unexpected problems m a y  occasionally arise. Chapter 1 
detailed h o w  the first major shift in this research stemmed from the fact that child 
protection issues were not as frequent a concern in the field as was expected in the 
research design phase. In Chapter 1, I also described h o w  other significant societal 
and practice concerns around ‘communication’ and ‘communication difficulties’ 
(which I regarded as consequential to child protection contexts as well), and 
sociological questions about them, started to emerge from the fieldwork experience. 
With this shift of focus, instead of being merely an ‘analytical tool’, social 
constructionism and the process of oscillating between ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ 
became a central consideration in m y  research approach. This section gives an 
account of the oscillation process. The key element of m y  discussion is power and the 
ways in which it is a matter of concern in terms of every encounter in the field.
T o  begin with, the researcher’s role in studying children’s lives is today a m uc h  
debated topic (Alderson, 1995). I will refer to some of the ambiguities of this debate 
in section 5.6.1 in the context of m y  fieldwork experience. Furthermore, m y  role, 
particularly in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting, was greatly affected by the different 
discipline based ways of ‘seeing’: section 5.6.2. talks about the theoretical and 
practical dimensions of this epistemological clash. In section 5.6.3,1 will then reflect 
on h o w  I have constructed a sociological text (this thesis) from the data. The 
reflections in the following subsections are important in terms of the data analysis 
later on in this thesis.
5.6.1 The researcher’s role: some ambiguities
Discussions on the researcher’s role in sociological research manuals often revolve 
around the degree of participation of the researcher in the activities in the field 
(Bryman &  Burgess, 1999; Mason, 1996; Robson, 1993). These accounts typically 
address the impact of the researcher’s participation on the setting, what roles are
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available for any particular researcher in the settings and ethical issues having to do 
with the chosen role.
M y  participation in activities in the field varied depending on the setting and the 
situation. With the ‘T e a m  Service’, it was m ade clear to m e  from the beginning that it 
was not appropriate for m e  to take part in the action. Thus I always remained behind 
the one w a y  screen, and did not initiate conversations with the parents w hen they 
were in the observation room. In the ‘Children’s Centre’, on the other hand, I was 
encouraged to ‘socialise’ with children, and even help out, if feasible. At the same 
time, I had to m a k e  contextual judgments about whether m y  participation in activities, 
where I did not have a ‘specialist’ part to play, was in any w a y  beneficial for the 
children or the staff. Therefore, m y  role in the two settings required adaptability.
The personal attributes of the researcher are another factor that affects the 
development of his/her role in the field. O ne  constant feature of m y  role in both 
settings was that I clearly felt like a cultural ‘outsider’. Denzin and Lincoln have 
written:
“The bricoleur understands that research is an interactive process shaped by his or 
her personal history, biography, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity, and those of 
the people in the setting. The bricoleur knows that science is power, for all research 
findings have political implications: there is no value-free science” (Denzin &
Lincoln, 1998, p.4).
In addition, because I was a foreigner, I tended to pay attention to issues that I thought 
of as being particular to British culture, or at least different from the c o m m o n  sense 
‘norms’ of m y  o w n  culture.
Furthermore, m y  background in sociology turned out to be an obstacle to developing a 
rapport with the staff. First of all, m y  role in the field seemed vague for all concerned, 
particularly in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting. This m a y  stem partly from the fact that 
often researchers in health settings aim to evaluate the quality the service. I soon 
realised that I was suspected of doing evaluation as well. Hence, m y  attempts to 
explain what m y  research was about, and what I was doing in the field, were 
sometimes strongly questioned. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that since I
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had no background in the health professions, I sometimes struggled to find the 
appropriate vocabulary to explain m y  objectives.
Another problem had to do with the manner in which I collected the data. The staff 
members once called m e  to reintroduce the research, because they were worried about 
what exactly I was writing down. I then attended a staff meeting and talked about m y  
research: about its purpose, qualitative aspects, confidentiality issues, and so forth. It 
appeared that m y  academic world -  particularly qualitative research methods and 
social constructionist theories -  was poles apart from the medical ‘realities’, and that a 
shared understanding could not be achieved.
In other words, the ‘communication difficulties’ between m y  role and theirs seemed 
to create a barrier to the study of the children’s communication. Because I still had to 
solve this problem in order to continue with m y  fieldwork, I ended up emphasising 
that m y  research will describe, not criticise, the practitioners’ work, and that the data 
will not be compared to other settings or published in a w a y  that the staff, children 
and their families involved could be identified. I will n o w  further explore this matter 
in terms of its implications for the perceived validity of sociological research in 
clinical/therapeutic settings.
5.6.2 Differing ‘gazes’ and the validity question
Belgrave et al have noted:
“The growth of qualitative research holds the potential for vastly enriching our 
understanding of phenomena in the health sciences. However, the potential of this 
trend is hampered by a widespread inability of quantitative and qualitative 
researchers to talk to each other” (Belgrave et al, 2002, p.1427).
O ne of the grave problems of this research has been the definition of what exactly has 
been the nature of m y  sociological gaze, and explaining it to audiences, w h o  are more 
familiar with quantitative than qualitative research methodologies. The most severe 
clash between sociological and medical epistemologies happened at the Medical 
Research Ethics Committee ( M R E C )  meeting, where the usefulness of qualitative
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research methods was attacked. The Committee members -  all being medical 
professionals -  compared m y  research to natural scientific norms, which are based on 
quantification or predetermined variables and the use of strict measurement scales for 
analysis (Silverman, 2001). Practitioners in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting were worried 
about m y  data collection methods, because they could not establish a link between 
‘writing d o w n ’ fieldnotes and rigorous data analysis. This became clear in some 
(albeit rare) conversations with the T e a m  members, w h o  expressed concerns about m y  
presence in the field.
However, I have found explaining m y  ‘gaze’ as a difficult task in more ways than 
one. Obviously it has been hard to explain to medical professionals or any other non­
sociologists, whose disciplinary view of the world is different. M or e  distressing at the 
time, though, was the fact that I was unsure about the sociological gaze myself. This 
was because I had been reading some philosophical discussions on the so-called 
‘triple crisis’ of representation, legitimation and praxis that, for some people, face 
qualitative researchers in the h u m a n  disciplines (Denzin, 1997).
The representational crisis deems all ethnographic writing to be narrative production. 
Critical post-structuralism challenges the assumption that an author of a text can be a 
mirror to the world under analysis: there can never be a final, accurate representation 
of what is meant and said, only different textual representations of different 
experiences. Geertz’s (1999) idea of ethnographic writing is an example of this kind 
of approach; Smith’s (2002) institutional ethnography talks about ‘texts’ in a similar 
fashion. In terms of ‘legitimation crisis’, the notion of ‘epistemological certainty’ is 
being challenged by various discourses, such as post-structuralism, feminism, or 
constructivism. In these discourses, a text’s authority cannot rely on the assumption 
the ‘world out there’ is truthfully captured by the researcher’s methods. Validity 
claims become the researcher’s ‘mas k  of authority’ that allows a particular regime of 
truth within a particular text to influence the reader (who are typically other scholars). 
The first two crises shape the third (praxis), which questions: “Is it possible to effect 
change in the world, if  society is only and always a text? ” (Denzin, 1997, p.4)
While I was observing observations and describing descriptions, I found myself 
asking the question: is this merely a relativist/rhetorical chain of interpretative
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practices? Throughout the most part of this research project I was puzzled by ‘post­
sociology’s’ requirements for being reflexive about one’s o w n  work (Sanchez- 
Jankowski, 2002; Coffey, 2002), while the same rules did not seem to apply to the 
medical-scientific discourses and practices that I came across with in the two settings.
I searched for solutions to this dilemma and in the end found some reassurance. For 
example, according to Silverman (2001), the validity of a research project is identified 
with confidence in our knowledge but not the certainty of its truth, whereas reality is 
assumed to be independent of the claims that researchers m ak e  about it: it is always 
viewed through the particular. Hence our accounts are best described as 
representations -  they do not reproduce reality.
What w e  actually do with our sociological representations is an important question 
(Potter, 1996). For M a s o n  (1996), research data can be read literally, interpretatively 
and/or reflexively. The explanatory logic m a y  stem from, for example, theory based 
descriptions, comparisons between different variables, or extracts from the data that 
are used to illustrate key points. The last example has sometimes been criticised as 
‘anecdotalism’ (Silverman, 2001) because the extracts m a y  not be representative of 
the whole dataset as such (Mason, 1996). This attitude was something that I 
encountered both in the M R E C  meeting and in the field. H o w  could I overcome this 
obstacle?
I suggest that issues that increase ‘validity’ and ‘credibility’ in m y  research involve 
the following factors: prolonged engagement; persistent observation; negotiation with 
both academics and field setting staff; thick description; and reflexivity, as far as it is 
possible (see Lincoln &  Guba, 1999). A s  it seems to me, this position is ultimately a 
matter of drawing a line between what is possible and what is not. This raises some 
fundamental research ethics related questions, which I will discuss in Chapter 6.
5.6.3 Analysis as translation: from fieldnotes to a ‘text’
W ha t  happens to accounts after the fieldwork is problematic to the same extent as data 
collection. Typically, sociological research guidelines for rigorous social research 
offer strategies by which data can be sorted, categorised and indexed and then
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‘communicated’ to one or more audiences (Mason, 1996). A s  a result, as a 
postgraduate student, I have had the impression that analysis is a somewhat separate 
process from data collection and writing about the research. I have believed that, for 
example, by using qualitative software it is possible to mak e  relatively smooth moves 
from fieldnotes to codes to themes.
Wha t  qualitative research manuals do not stress all that often, however, is the 
analytical significance of the process of writing up -  in this case, a P h D  thesis. In m y  
experience, which, of course, m a y  be different to other P h D  students, m y  findings 
really only took their final shape towards the end of the writing up period. S ome 
might argue that this is inevitably a weakness in m y  capacity as a researcher. O n  the 
other hand, Geertz has observed:
“This backward order of things -  first you write and then you figure out what you are 
writing about -  may seem odd, or even perverse, but it is, I think, at least most of the 
time, standard procedure in cultural anthropology” (Geertz quoted in Wolcott, 2001, 
p.77).
I n o w  understand that comprehending m y  o w n  data has required a lot more than an 
ability to apply apparently logical categories to sections of data. Indeed, the agony of 
translating ‘thick description’ into readable text -  whether for academics or health 
professionals -  is a challenge in itself: no computer software can do that job for the 
qualitative researcher.
Therefore, I regard ‘bricolage’ as a useful analogy for describing the end product of 
the research, in that it refers to h o w  a \whole’ consists of parts, and that these parts 
have to be assembled together for a meaningful end result. These parts m a y  consist of 
multiple methods and theories, which are all meant to lead to a complete, convincing 
‘story’ (Denzin &  Lincoln, 1998). The key argument here is that labelling a P h D  
thesis as a ‘story’ needs not be associated with insincerity or fabrication.
Reiterating M a s o n  (1996): research data can be written in different ways but also read 
in different ways. I also agree with Geertz (1988), for w h o m  good ethnographic texts 
are plain and unpretentious, which neither invite nor reward a close, literary-critical
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reading. Although I have assumed an authorial role in this thesis, and I have been the 
bricoleur going along a learning curve, I have believed that the outcome will be 
coherent in the end. Indeed, I associate the patience and endurance that is required for 
this construction work with the ‘ rigour’ and ‘quality’ o f qualitative enquiry.
Smith’s (2002) recommendation for keeping in mind what the research subjects treat 
as ‘real’ has been my guiding light: it has kept my feet on the ground, so to speak. The 
writing process has helped my sociological learning process; it has been a research 
tool as much as observation. Moreover, writing separate reports for practitioners has 
forced me to think what their point o f view might be, and how this research could 
generate something that they regard as helpful for practice. I will return to this aspect 
o f research process in Chapter 6.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the epistemological dimensions o f social constructionist 
research: what it makes o f ‘reality’ and the generating o f sociologically sound 
accounts o f it. The discussion has stressed the difficulty o f doing this kind o f research 
in settings, where the premises for ‘knowing’ are different and how unexpected 
‘communication difficulties’ arose in my attempts to translate between the 
sociological and practitioner worlds. In addition, I have destabilised sociological 
justifications for ‘knowing’ and struggled to find solutions to the emerging 
epistemological dilemmas.
I have come up with a number o f solutions. First, Janesick (1998) uses the term 
‘methodolatry’ , a combination o f method and idolatry, to describe a preoccupation 
with selecting and defending methods to the exclusion o f the actual substance o f the 
story being told. In this view, qualitative research does not have to comply with 
‘quantitative’ demands for validity, reliability and generalisability’ : the aims o f 
qualitative research projects maybe different but equally or more valuable.
Second, for Denzin (1997), ethnographic research has gone through -  or is still in the 
midst o f - a ‘ representational crisis’ . In this research, one o f the main headaches has 
been the criticism o f qualitative methods by non-sociological audiences. At the same
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time, some writers have questioned the ‘ crisis’ scenario (Snow, 2002) in terms o f its 
political connotations. Others have talked about similar kind o f situation within 
constructionism and its place within sociology. According to Maines:
“ There is no defin itive body o f  knowledge that I  know o f  called the ‘ social 
construction o f  meaning’ . Y e t  no practicing sociologist can avoid this topic, and all 
level-headed ones realise that their subject matter is composed exactly o f  various 
degrees, kinds and situations and structures o f  meaning and absurdity”  [ . . . ]  ’ ’The 
implication here is that there does not exist some deep and enduring fault line 
between constructionists and non-constructionists, which is a fiction that sociologists 
tend to perpetuate among themselves”  (Maines, 2000, p .5 8 l).
Where to go from here? In terms o f the so-called realism/anti-realism dichotomy in 
sociological theory (Williams & May, 1996), I consider that this research is connected 
to everyday lived experience, which is shaped by various discourses. Ontologically, I 
assume that some ‘ realities’ in research settings, such as what is perceived as ‘normal’ 
communication, are socially constructed rather than based on indisputable facts 
(Burkitt, 1998), and this has had a significant impact on the ways in which I have 
thought about my own research practices.
Third, Wolcott has usefully pointed out that qualitative researchers are often tempted 
to rely too heavily on the sanctity o f the method, and especially on fieldwork 
techniques, to validate their research (Wolcott, 2001). I have tried to avoid this, 
placing the emphasis on the ‘construction’ o f a text (the assembling o f a bricolage). I 
regard the concepts o f ‘ interpretation’ and ‘construction’ as denoting the same 
activity. The inquirer makes- cognitive, subjective and discipline specific 
interpretations out o f it, and then constructs ‘texts’ out o f those interpretations. At the 
same time, I maintain that writing about constructed meanings, whether they are mine 
or somebody else’s, can make a difference, since once meanings become incorporated 
into the ongoing cultural and social structural arrangements o f a society, they can be 
highly consequential (Maines, 2000).
Epistemologically, I assume that the study o f ‘ texts’ and interactional events using 
qualitative methods can combine discursive and material aspects o f human 
experience. Therefore purposeful descriptions o f this experience can be generated:
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instead o f claiming to simply produce ‘alternative truths’ about the research settings, 
this research focuses on describing observable action that has significant 
consequences for the lives o f (disabled) children.
As I have pointed out several times in this chapter, this research project involves a 
number o f important ethical considerations, which will be addressed next. In Chapter 
6, I will discuss the ways in which studying (disabled) children’ s lives and 
‘communication/difficulties’ is a moral and political enterprise.
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Chapter 6.
RESEARCH ETHICS: QUESTIONS OF MORALITY AND POLITICS
6.1 Introduction
Questions about research ethics have significantly affected every stage o f this 
research process. This chapter talks about the practical steps I had to take to cany out 
the research, as well as the theoretical issues, which arose both from the literature and 
the research experience. I suggest that although there are plenty o f guidelines 
available for a social researcher, the decisions o f what ultimately constitutes good 
research practice ought to remain contextual. This may appear to be a controversial 
statement, especially when it is applied to research practice in clinical/therapeutic 
settings. Hence this chapter is built on my efforts to justify it.
The key ethical issues in this research have revolved around the ‘validity’ o f non- 
clinical research on disabled children, the protection o f research subjects (children, 
their families and the staff in the two settings) from harm or undue intrusion by 
research, and informed consent. My route to unravelling the ambiguities regarding 
these issues starts from introducing official academic guidelines for ethical social 
research. Section 6.2 draws on guidelines by Social Research Association (SRA). I 
have chosen this example since the document in question is recent and well 
recognised within British sociology.
Section 6.3, focusing on research on/with children, challenges some aspects o f 
‘official standards’ , such as SRA guidelines. This is since recent trends in literature 
concerned with children’s welfare and/or rights have called for more child centred 
research. An important consideration in this context is with the notion o f the child’ s 
‘voice’ . In section 6.4 I will then demonstrate how I have applied the above guidelines 
in my research and what problems I have faced in doing so. There is a special focus 
on studying children’ s lives in clinical settings. Requirements for reflexivity and 
ambiguities in achieving a morally and politically coherent attitude to research will be 
specifically addressed in section 6.4.3.
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6.2 Guidelines for ethical social research
The ethics o f social research can be articulated in terms o f the researcher’ s 
‘obligations’ to all those parties that will be, directly or indirectly, affected by the 
research. According to a recent sociological publication by SRA in Britain, the 
researcher has obligations to society, funders/employers, colleagues and research 
subjects (SRA, 2002).
In terms o f the researcher’ s obligations to society, the SRA guidelines (2002, Ch. 1) 
consider responsible professional practice for social researchers to balance a concern 
for individual rights with the greater benefits to society o f their research activity. It is 
recommended that social researchers should use the possibilities open to them to 
extend the scope o f social enquiry and communicate their findings, for the benefit o f 
the widest possible community (Section 1.1). This also involves considering 
conflicting interests:
“ Social researchers must be sensitive to the possible consequences o f  their work and 
should as far as possible, guard against predictably harmful effects”  (S R A , 2002,
Section 1.2).
‘Pursuing objectivity’ may be kept in mind as a goal; on the other hand, it may be 
argued that research can never be entirely objective, and social research is no 
exception (Section 1.3).
Obligations to funders and employers include clarifying each party’ s obligations and 
roles in advance (Section 2.1); assessing alternatives (in terms o f theory and method) 
impartially and explaining these to all parties (Section 2.2); and guarding privileged 
and confidential information. The ‘ confidentiality rule’ excludes methods and 
procedures that have been utilised to produce published data (Section 2.3).
Obligations to colleagues involve a number o f factors. For example, maintaining 
confidence in research, although without exaggerating the accuracy or explanatory 
power o f their findings (Section 3.1); peer reviews within the limits o f confidentiality 
(Section 3.2); and communicating ethical principles to all parties. This will also
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contribute to the reputation o f social research, which, at the end o f the day, depends 
on the actual conduct o f individual researchers.
. The researchers should leave a research field in a state which permits further access 
by researchers in the future and ensure that social enquiries are conducted within an 
agreed ethical framework, perhaps incorporating principles or conventions from other 
disciplines (Section 3.3). Furthermore, (while understanding that ‘ risk’ is a part o f 
everyday life), it should be acknowledged that some research activities may place the 
researcher in the field in some degree o f extra risk o f physical/mental harm (Section 
3.4).
The notion o f obligations to subjects, first and the foremost, means avoiding undue 
intrusion:
“ Social researchers [ . . . ]  have no special entitlement to study all phenomena. The 
advancement o f  knowledge and the pursuit o f  information are not themselves 
sufficient justifications for overriding other social and cultural values”  (S R A , 2002,
Section 4.1).
On the one hand, undue intrusion may cause distress to the subjects. On the other, 
people can feel wronged without being harmed by research: they may feel they have 
been treated as objects o f measurement without respect for their individual values and 
sense o f privacy.
Secondly, ‘ obligations to subjects’ involve typically obtaining informed consent. For 
SRA, gaining informed consent is a procedure for ensuring that research subjects 
understand what is being done to them, the limits to their participation and awareness 
o f any potential risks they incur (SRA, 2002, Section 4.2). At the same time, it is 
being acknowledged that the principle o f informed consent from subjects is 
necessarily vague, since it depends for its interpretations on assumptions about the 
amount o f information and the nature o f consent required for constituting acceptable 
practice: no universal rules can be framed.
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Sometimes it is inappropriate to overwhelm potential subjects with unwanted and 
incomprehensible details about the origin and content o f a social enquiry. Yet it is 
ethical to inform subjects o f their right to information and detail their degree o f 
control:
“A  subject’ s participation in a study may be based on reluctant acquiescence rather
than on enthusiastic co-operation”  (S R A , 2002, Section 4.2).
Sometimes the researcher-researched relationship is mediated by a gatekeeper, which 
involves a further set o f ethical considerations. This is particularly urgent in the case 
o f ‘vulnerable’ populations (typically disabled children are classified as such). In 
recent years, consent forms have become more or less standard. The SRA 
recommends that, at minimum, there should be information about opt in- or opt out 
arrangements, the length and degree o f commitment required o f respondents, the 
precise goals o f the research, plus debriefing o f subjects (Section 4.2). Respecting 
rights in observation studies should involve post hoc consent at the very least (Section 
4.3).
SRA guidelines assert that social researchers should help subjects to protect their own 
interests by giving them prior information about the consequences o f participating, in 
terms o f psychological, material or other harm caused by the research, predictable or 
not, and about being member o f a group (Section 4.4). Social researchers also have a 
responsibility to ensure the participation in research o f those people who might like to 
take part, by dealing with potential barriers o f communication, understanding, access 
or financial expense (Section 4.5). Moreover, social researchers should maintain the 
confidentiality o f records, even though the research data were unconcerned with 
individual identities. The best means for this are safe storage o f data and restricted 
access to it (Section 4.6). One may prevent disclosure o f identities by using 
pseudonyms (Section 4.7).
In the context o f this research project, the ethics o f research on/with children is an 
additional consideration. Although SRA does not omit children from its 
recommendations for ethical research, the guidelines do not particularly address this 
aspect either. Thus I will now provide a brief overview o f literature that does.
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6.3. The move to ‘listening to children’ in social research
The UN Convention on the Rights o f the Child 1989, the Children Act 1989 and their 
. concept o f ‘ listening to the ascertainable wishes and feelings o f the child’ (see 
Chapter 1) have affected recent social research ethics discussions. For Morrow & 
Richards (1996), while there are plenty o f sociologically ‘relevant’ discussions o f 
children’ s problems and ‘problem children’ , there are few sociological studies based 
on children’ s accounts o f their everyday lives and experiences. Sociologists and 
anthropologists are increasingly asserting that sociological research (as opposed to 
psychological, behavioural, medical research) with children is underdeveloped.
As indicated in Chapter 4, childhood sociology has shifted the focus o f socialisation 
and child development to a sociology which attempts to take children seriously as 
they experience their lives as children in the here and now. Morrow and Richards 
argue that the absence o f any discussion, within sociology, o f the practicalities and 
ethics o f carrying out research with children is hardly surprising, because sociology as 
a discipline has tended to ignore children, and left them to psychologists to study. For 
example, a lot o f research has been done on children in educational settings or as part 
o f their families but not about their experiences per se.
Can general ethical guidelines for research, such as those mentioned above plus those 
o f BSA, MRC or NCB10 be useful for researching children? According to Alderson 
(1995), agreed ethical standards for research have mainly been developed in medical, 
rather than social research. She argues that the three frameworks in professional ethics 
- duty, rights and harm, and benefit - are based on centuries o f patriarchal law and 
philosophy. Doing ‘ good’ and feeling ‘ good’ might provide the motivation for 
studying children but the question remains o f who is ultimately going to benefit from 
the research. For many people, to be a professional/expert means to be the best judge 
o f what is good -  however, there is no clear consensus about what is good in the end.
10 B SA : British Sociological Association ‘ Statement o f  Ethical Practice’ (n.d.) ‘ Statement o f  Ethical 
Practice’ ; M R C : M edical Research Council (1991) ‘The Ethical Conduct o f  Research on Children’ 
London: M R C ; N C B : National Children’ s Bureau (1993) ‘ Guidelines for Research’ London: N CB .
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Alderson has suggested ten ethics topics that should be taken into account in research 
with children: the purpose o f the research; risks or costs; privacy and confidentiality; 
selection criteria; funding; research review; information for participants; consent; 
dissemination o f results; and impact on children. These address more or less the same 
ethics issues as the SRA guidelines, but from a child centred point o f view.
Morrow and Richards (1996) claim that general research ethics guidelines are centred 
around two key preoccupations: informed consent and protection o f research 
respondents, both o f which are problematic in research with children in several ways. 
Usually research on children involves adult gatekeepers and parental consent. There is 
also a tendency to focus on the age o f the child, and little attention is paid to ethnicity 
and gender, the child’ s competence or the researcher-researched relationship. Thus 
ethical choices should ultimately depend on the researcher and therefore be context- 
specific and situational. Furthermore, it is hard to bring about changes in practices 
when there is no ‘ culture o f listening to children’ . When ‘ childhood’ is seen as a 
period o f powerlessness and irresponsibility, and children are seen as weak, passive 
and open to abuse, their dependence on adults is explained by their physical weakness 
and lack o f experience. This is used to justify their lack o f political, economic power 
and civil rights.
For Christensen & James (2000), only through listening and hearing what children say 
and paying attention to the ways in which they communicate with researchers will 
progress be made towards the conduction o f research with, rather than simply about 
children. The main epistemological questions, then, address how a researcher may 
gain access to the children’s perspective, or participate in children’s worlds. It is 
suggested that this can be done, for example, by paying attention to children’ s use o f 
language, their conceptual meanings and their actions to understand social 
interactions. James (cited in Morrow & Richards, 1996, p. 100) suggests that children 
have different abilities, and are encouraged to be skilled in different communication 
media (drawings, stories, written work and so on); but are nonetheless competent and 
confident in them, and so as researchers, we need to draw on these. This would take 
into account the fact that neither children nor researchers are homogenous groups.
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6 .3 .1  E th ic s  o f  re s e a rc h  o n /w i t h  y o u n g  d is a b le d  c h i ld r e n  in  c l in ic a l  s e tt in g s
In clinical settings, a different set o f ethical guidelines apply from those o f the SRA. 
Disabled people’s lives, including children, are often studied in environments that are 
categorised as clinical: once a setting is deemed as such, social researchers do not 
have powers over the medical ethics criteria. Typically, in clinical settings, social 
research proposals are formally reviewed by ethics committees, whose rationale for 
this practice lies in standardisation.
Within social research, challenges to the hegemony o f medical ethics have been 
attempted. Ethics committees, for example, have been criticised for promoting 
institutional protection rather than operating in the interests o f subjects o f researchers. 
It has been recognised that biomedical models can be inappropriate in social settings. 
Furthermore, i f  the social research ethics are not really understood by medical 
specialists, the competence and knowledge o f the committees becomes questionable 
(SRA, 2002, Section 5). Another area o f resistance has been developed within the 
Disability Studies paradigm, where it has been argued that the purpose o f research -  
clinical or not - must be o f direct benefit to the participants:
“ What w ill the research achieve in terms o f  improving the lives o f  those whose selves 
become ‘ sources’ and whose meaning becomes ‘material’ ? W ill it achieve any more 
than furthering academic careers and publication lists?”  (Stone &  Priestley, 1996, p.
703).
The emancipatory research paradigm objects to the ‘use’ o f ‘passive research 
subjects’ , urges researchers to recognise both commonality and difference in the 
experience o f disablement, and reminds us that a plurality o f methods may be needed 
to capture different aspects o f disablement (Stone & Priestley, 1996). When it comes 
to disabled children: researchers must avoid pathologising them and understand the 
socially constructed nature o f the notions o f ‘ childhood’ and ‘disability’ (Moore et al, 
1998).
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Drawing on recent medical ethics literature, it appears that disabled children’ s rights 
are by no means ignored in medical academic writing (Koch, 2001). On the other 
hand, despite the changes in the ‘ esoteric circle’ , it is not necessarily guaranteed that 
the ‘ social model o f disability’ is taken into account in the everyday practices o f 
medical professionals. The same, o f course, may apply to social researchers. Studying 
aspects o f children’ s lives is now increasingly being seen as posing additional 
challenges to social researchers.
Recent trends within the social sciences have involved a movement away from 
traditional experimental and interview methods o f hypothesis testing in research on 
children’s linguistic, communicative and socio-cognitive development towards 
participation in the children’s culture. In the early literature o f this kind (Corsaro & 
Sfreeck, 1986), entering directly into children’ s worlds was recommended to establish 
how the development o f children’s ‘ social competence’ is embedded in social 
contexts. In many subsequent studies o f ‘ children’s cultures’ there has been an 
emphasis on how children acquire, use, and refine social knowledge and discourse 
skills in their everyday interactions with peers and adults and on the communicative 
procedures by which they structure the interpersonal world around them. This may be 
achieved either by direct observation or by micro-ethnographies in institutions 
(Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998).
In addition, some writers have promoted a phenomenological research approach that 
may help in getting into ‘ children’s worlds’ , including young disabled children: this 
involves very detailed in-depth observations and prolonged interaction where the 
child ‘ allows’ the adult to take part, or the child leads (Goode, 1991). The ethical aim 
here is to promote equality in research relationships, and to give children a ‘voice’ .
On the other hand, it has been noted that participant observation with preschool 
children is not the same as with those who are older (Fine & Sandstrom, 1988). One 
o f the points made is that the meanings o f children o f this age are not always apparent 
to adult researchers, the interpretations become problematic and there may be a 
temptation to assign one’ s own meanings to the child’ s talk and activity. Although the 
goal o f participant observational research is to establish equal status contact with
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one’ s informants, this may not be entirely possible with preschool children. The so- 
called Teast-adult’ role (Mandell, 1991) where the adult attempts to be part o f the 
children’s peer group, for instance, may not work for establishing trust with children 
(Fine & Sandstrom, 1988). Furthermore, researchers ought to bear in mind their ‘ adult 
responsibilities’ towards children as well.
As already described in Chapters 1 and 2, the message put forward in children’s rights 
legislation is that children’ s ‘voices’ should be listened to by adults who make 
decisions concerning children’s lives -  this involves research on/with children. Yet, a 
question arises: what are children’ s voices and how should we listen to them? Davis 
(1998) suggests that there are a variety o f children’ s voices and that it may be possible 
to attribute equal value to these voices by employing techniques, which enable 
researchers to reflexively question their presence in children’ s worlds.
6.4 Applying the guidelines to this research project
In my case, research ethics considerations in terms o f Alderson’ s ten ethical points (in 
section 6.4.1) satisfied the funders and the Medical Research Ethics Committee 
(MREC) and granted me access to the ‘Team Service’ setting. However, in the course 
o f doing the research, I encountered some other ethical considerations that are not 
often discussed in sociological or other ethics manuals. The first concern deals with 
the epistemology o f observational research in a medical setting, as discussed in 
section 6.4.2. I mainly have the ‘ Team Service’ data in mind, the analysis o f which 
will be the topic o f Chapters 7 and 8. In section 6.4.3, my second concern has to do 
with the notion o f the sociologist’ s ‘reflexivity’ and its moral and political 
dimensions.
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6.4.1 Alderson’ s ‘ten commandments’
I will now begin to describe the ethics related choices that I made in relation to both 
settings, in part paraphrasing Alderson’s ten points for ethical research with children 
(Alderson, 1995). Although Alderson’s points steer the attention to children, I will 
include adults as well because my research involved data on health specialists as 
anonymous adult experts, who interacted with children.
1) The purpose of the research has been to understand the 
phenomenon o f ‘ communication/difficulties’ . It has been expected 
that new insights in this area, which have not yet been researched 
sociologically would contribute to the sociology o f childhood, 
communication and disability, as well as provide discussion points 
for professional practice.
This research has been meant to serve the interests o f disabled 
children: for example, in terms o f child protection, in-depth 
understandings o f social processes o f communication are vital in 
order to safeguard children’ s human rights and well being. Letters, 
information leaflets and interim reports for professionals in the two 
settings have involved statements o f hoped for benefits: i.e. what can 
be gained through a greater understanding o f children’s 
communication and ‘ communication difficulties’ .
The thesis and any intended academic publications extracted from 
the thesis are meant to point out some theoretical and 
methodological ambiguities that prevail in the existing literature. It 
seems that existing theories and texts on face-to-face communication 
have been more or less exclusively been formulated in medical and 
developmental literature. Furthermore, the literature that deals with 
listening to children usually focuses on able-bodied children, or on 
children who are over seven years old. This thesis also aims to
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unravel how professionals interpret children’s communication 
competencies and how these interpretation procedures may be 
sociologically -  and in practice - problematic.
2) Are there any risks or costs? There were no direct obvious mental, 
physical or emotional hazards to the children involved. I observed 
the assessments from behind a one way screen so that there was no 
physical or other contact with the children. I had more opportunity to 
interact with children in the ‘Children’s Centre’ , although always 
under the supeivision o f the qualified staff - 1 was mainly a marginal 
observer, with certain adult responsibilities, for example, to try to 
prevent children from having accidents. At the time, it appeared that 
this role suited best for me and the children, since I did not have a 
professional background in care work.
3) The protection of privacy and confidentiality were sought for, 
first, by using pseudonyms for all names and locations involved in 
the research, and by referring to these so that they cannot be 
identified or individualised. The fieldnotes will be kept in a secure 
locked filing cabinet for five years after the last publication has been 
released on them. The videotapes were given to the ‘Children’s 
Centre’ after the data analysis was finalised. Documentation o f 
clinical assessments or case histories was not included in the 
research.
In both settings, parents and practitioners were given an opportunity 
to opt into or out o f research, particularly the video recordings and 
assessments. In order to observe assessments, parental and 
practitioners’ consent was sought -  the purpose and implications o f 
the research was explained to them. There was no pressure on any o f 
the participants: the privacy o f the children and their families, as 
well as o f practitioners, was respected at all times. The children in
the ‘Children’s Centre’ , in particular, were said to be used to having 
adults observe them. Finally, my police records and employment 
history with children were checked before the fieldwork started.
4) There were no particular selection criteria for the research subjects; 
for example, the representativeness o f the findings was not central to 
this research. The only ‘ factor’ that the two settings shared, in terms 
o f my research question, was that ‘communication difficulty’ was a 
concern in them both.
5) The funding for the research came from the ESRC, Finnish 
Government and a registered voluntary organisation, which did not 
have any commercial interest in the research.
6) Research review: The research was under continuous supervision 
by academic and professional supervisors. Interim reports for the 
supervisors and the staff members were provided in the course o f the 
research.
7) Information for participants: When parents and practitioners 
received information leaflets about the research, I did my best to 
ensure that this information was understood. The contact details o f 
the researcher and the supervisors were provided in case there were 
any questions or complaints.
8) Consent: Because the children concerned were very young, written 
or spoken consent or assent was not asked from them directly. 
However, the parents were given a full explanation as to what was 
involved. This took into account that some o f the parents were not 
necessarily literate. It was made clear that participation or non­
participation did not affect the services the child received, or the 
decisions that were made by the professionals about the abilities o f
the children. Furthermore, parents were assured that they could 
withdraw their child from the research at anytime during or after 
observation. The practitioners were asked to give group based 
consent. I did my best to explain that I was not evaluating their work, 
or talking about them as ‘ individuals’ in my data in a manner that 
would allow them to be identified. They were also given an 
opportunity to dissent.
9) Dissemination: Different kind o f reports will be extracted from the 
thesis for different audiences: journal articles will include theoretical 
and methodological considerations. Reports for the staff in both 
settings have involved examples o f the data, and left any 
recommendations or decisions for the staff members to make.
10) Impact on children: The hoped-for benefit o f this research to 
(disabled) children is a heightened awareness o f ambiguities in 
human communication within child welfare practice. It has been 
acknowledged that any benefits may not be immediate, but may 
instead contribute to practice on a long term basis.
The above points outline the practical steps that I have taken in order to pursue 
ethically sound research. However, certain events prior to and during the fieldwork 
led me to consider whether there is more to research ethics than is stated in the 
guidelines. One o f my ethical concerns revolved around the epistemology o f 
observation and the different ways o f ‘ seeing’ between disciplines (see also Chapter 
11).
6.4.2 Ethics o f observation in clinical settings
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the meeting with MREC was an eye opening experience 
o f the power o f Medicine as a discipline. No obvious attempts were made to 
understand the point o f view o f a qualitative researcher: instead, a great deal o f 
attention was drawn to the protection o f the practitioners in the setting. I believe that
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since my approach to children was ‘non-interventionist’ and therefore perceived as a 
low risk one, I did not have great difficulties in getting my application accepted in the 
end. On the other hand, i f  anyone believes that my research is not just ‘harmless’ but 
also ‘useless’ for practical purposes, as the MREC members suggested, it is necessary 
to further discuss the ethics o f my theoretical and methodological choices.
The Committee expressed concerns about my research methods, being in doubt about 
their validity and use value, thereby mocking the integrity o f sociological knowledge 
as well as my ‘ inability’ to nail down some ‘hard facts’ . I agree with some o f their 
concerns: it can sometimes be very unethical to do research that will not benefit the 
research subjects’ lives, particularly in the case o f disabled children, who are not 
perceived as a powerful group in society.
The health specialists also expressed concerns about my ability to ‘observe’ , in 
particular, asking: “What do you see that we don’t?” On several occasions, I 
attempted to explain this to the staff members, especially within the ‘Team Service’ . I 
often felt that this was a matter o f me being accused o f not being able to ‘translate’ 
the sociological jargon to everyday language. The implication was that 
‘communication difficulties’ between different disciplines that seemed to constitute a 
barrier to the study o f the children’ s communication, were perceived as my personal 
problem: I was supposed to be able to effortlessly oscillate/mediate between the two 
worlds. However, there was more to the stoiy: I eventually realised that the 
epistemological clash between medicine and sociology had to do with the philosophy 
o f observation. I will come back to this idea in Chapter 11.
Hence I will ask: what exactly does social constructionism challenge in the ‘clinical’ 
and/or the ‘ scientific’ work? Epistemologically, the practitioners’ interpretive 
practices (Holstein & Gubrium, 1998) in both settings relied on what was empirically 
taken to be objective, observable, essential and real. In medicine and developmental 
psychology, it appears that a ‘communication difficulty’ is taken to be a quantifiable, 
measurable and pathological phenomenon. At the same time, I stress, again, that I 
have wanted to explore the social aspects o f clinical work (Smith, 2002). I have never 
claimed that I would particularly search for some factual ‘ errors’ in the ways in which 
the health specialists view children: instead I would point out the discursive,
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interactional, context-bound elements o f clinical work, which is done by human 
beings in social situations. I believe that my sociological ‘ gaze’ can do that and 
therefore I regard my sociological observations as ethical. At the same time, I have 
. recognised the ambiguities o f translating the gaze into an academic text: I will now 
look at the ethical dimensions o f  this translation process.
6.4.3 Reflexivity and ethical dimensions o f representation
In Chapter 5 I talked about the ambiguities in ethnographic writing in terms o f its 
process-like and textual nature, and how it thus undermines ‘ scientific’ notions o f 
descriptions being factual. In this section I return to speaking positions, drawing on 
my personal experience as an ‘ evolving’ speaker, who talks on behalf o f other people. 
I intend not only to reflect upon my research experience, but also try to understand 
what reflexivity means and how it can be put to ethical use.
‘Reflexivity’ in terms o f research methods and ethics refers to the relationship 
between the knower and the known: hierarchies, ‘ good’ and ‘bad’ research, and the 
normatively constituted speaking positions (Adkins, 2002). For Coffey (2002), 
ethnographic writing has a biographical dimension in that ethnographers are 
concerned with observing, reconstructing and writing the lives and experiences o f the 
Others. This has also been highlighted in Disability Studies, where the able-bodied 
researcher’ s right and authority for doing research on behalf o f disabled people has 
been strongly challenged (Barnes & Mercer, 1997).
In my two research settings, the health specialists were undoubtedly regarded as the 
‘knowers’ . I was, at least in the beginning, positioned as a ‘non-knower’ : a student, a 
non-practitioner, and an able-bodied person. I had no problem with that, however. I 
did not enter the field to ‘colonise’ the actors; I had, myself, accepted that I had to 
learn in order to ‘know’ ; but, being a sociology student, my learning outcomes would 
be different from those I would have reached, for instance, in a medical school.
Reflexivity in my research also has to do with the realism/anti-realism dichotomy. By 
this I refer to the dilemma o f using realist methods and then giving reflexive accounts 
o f the data (Coffey, 2002). This is because, although this research uses ‘ social
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constructionism’ for the analysis o f the Other, my initial observations were based on 
‘realist’ principles. Eventually, I had to make it clear to myself and others that I could 
not contradict myself like this, i.e. regard certain things (such as communicating about 
child abuse) as ‘real’ and others as constructed (such as ‘Childhood’ and ‘Disability’).
My solution to this dilemma drew on Smith (2002): what the actors in the setting 
treated as ‘real’ was the object o f my study and my knowledge claims o f their realities 
would be presented as constructions, which can be read in differing ways by different 
audiences. Indeed, after a long period o f confusion and agonising about how to go 
about this research, I have understood that I am experiencing what Denzin calls the 
‘messy moment’ in ethnographic writing: the texts consist o f a "cacophony o f voices 
speaking with various agendas” (Coffey, 2002, pp.314-316). This has been a 
liberating realisation for me. I can now reassure myself that ‘polyvocality’ -  which I 
think my research attempts to incorporate - does not necessarily mean simply the 
same as being ‘ immoral’ or ‘unethical’ . Yet I am not expecting that other people, who 
have been involved in this research, ought to experience this moment in the same 
way.
For Skeggs (2002), ‘telling has always been moral’ . I agree that even though I 
delegate some interpretive power to the reader, I do have to take the chief 
responsibility for the content o f this thesis and for its potential implications for 
practice. The next section continues from this, suggesting that ‘telling’ is not only 
moral but also political.
6.5 Questions of morality and politics
In this section I intend to recap on what I have argued so far in this chapter. I will 
emphasise not only the complex and contested definitions o f what is ethical, but also 
how moral choices have been, and are, linked to the politics o f research. I am talking 
about knowledge claims and their significance to the researcher and the researched, as 
well as for academic debates within and between disciplines.
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6.5.1 The moral character o f medical and sociological knowledge accumulation
In recent years, the relationship between real life moral decision making and the 
forms, styles and content o f reasoning used in bioethics have been the subject o f 
academic debates. In some accounts, moral theorists and, in particular, bioethicists 
have presented the view that their theories o f moral reasoning provide a more rational 
and ordered account o f the moral theorising we all do on a daily basis. In contrast, the 
critics o f mainstream bioethics, particularly from the social sciences, argue that the 
forms, styles and language o f bioethics bear little relationship to the ways in which 
ordinary people describe and explain their moral problems (Braunack-Mayer, 2001).
Braunack-Mayer argues that, in bioethics, ethical dilemmas are defined narrowly, as 
situations in which, on moral grounds, persons ought both to do and not to do 
something. Such a definition implies that issues o f conflict and choice are central to 
moral dilemmas. Furthermore, most bioethics texts suggest that moral dilemmas or 
ethical problems invariably involve conflict, choosing between equally desirable or 
undesirable alternatives, or balancing options. For instance, obtaining a signed 
consent form may be imperative to scientists, while other ethical considerations in the 
research subjects’ lives may remain unnoticed.
This thesis is a continuation o f a long string o f academic texts across disciplines that 
seek to question some legitimate aspects o f scientific (here 
medical/clinical/specialist/therapeutic) knowledge. My intellectual problem is that, in 
recent years, sociologists have been increasingly sensitive to their own knowledge 
production. For example, Seidman has argued:
“ D isciplinary insularity seems less detrimental to the natural sciences but, it
promotes intellectual obscurity and sterility in soc io logy”  (Seidman, 1992, p.47).
It has been recognised that sociologists who specialise in theory acquire sufficient 
fluency in its language and discursive strategies to be able to theorize in a way that 
confers credibility, social status and material reward. As a result, few people except 
theorists read sociological theory texts (ibid).
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In the same manner as natural scientists, many sociological theorists have believed 
that science is an epistemologically privileged type o f knowledge. The ethical 
problem here is, again, that when rooted in the positivist world view, explanations o f 
. social life are considered incompatible with the representations offered by the 
participants themselves. In terms o f research problems, style, and content, research 
production presumes greater mastery and clearer illumination than the non-experts 
who are the targeted beneficiaries (Christians, 2000).
Protecting and promoting individual autonomy may have been the philosophical 
rationale for value neutrality since its origins in the Enlightenment writings. However, 
the incoherence in that view o f social science is now transparent. By limiting the 
active involvement o f rational beings or judging their self-understanding to be false, 
empiricist models contradict the ideal o f rational beings that ‘choose between 
competing conceptions o f the ‘good’ and make choices ‘deserving o f respect’ . The 
verification standards o f this instrumentalist system “take a w a y  w h a t n eu tra lity  a im s  
to  p ro te c t:  a  com m u n ity  o f  f r e e  a n d  eq u a l ra tio n a l be in g s le g is la tin g  th e ir  ow n  
p r in c ip le s  o f  c o n d u c t” (p. 149). This, I think, is a particularly obvious dilemma in 
research on disabled children.
I agree with MacIntyre (1982, p. 178) in that the social sciences are quintessentially 
moral sciences: “ The o n ly  qu estio n  is: w h ich  m o ra lity  is  i t  to  b e ? ” The concept o f 
social benefit is, in the context o f our particular intellectual and political culture, 
essentially debatable and contestable. Moreover, often a multiplicity o f individual 
rational decisions may produce a process, which is itself not susceptible to rationality 
as a whole; someone might always be wronged in some way. Nevertheless, being 
‘wronged’ is not necessarily the same as being ‘harmed’ .
6.5.2 Politics o f ethical choices
With regard to the previous section, the basic ethical problem here is based on the 
notion o f ‘pluralist’ society (Bames, 1979). In this view, social enquiry may be seen 
as a process o f interaction and negotiation between the social researcher, sponsor, 
gatekeepers and citizens. The wider community is involved in the process in several 
ways in that social research depends on the acceptance o f a plurality o f interests and
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views within the community. For Barnes, each o f the parties to the process o f enquiry 
has its own interests and values, its own expectations or lack o f them, about what may 
or should emerge from the enquiry, and its own ideas about what is morally right or 
wrong in making enquiries into social phenomena.
I want this thesis to be not just fundamentally guided by but also reflexive about 
moral values and choices. I agree with Bulmer (2002) in that being ethical limits the 
choices we can make in the pursuit o f truth:
“ Ethics say that while truth is good, respect for human dignity is better, even if, in 
the extreme case, the respect for human dignity leaves one ignorant o f  human 
nature”  (Bulmer, 2002, p.45).
I do not think the pursuit o f knowledge is necessarily the same as ‘the truth’ . 
Nonetheless, from a human rights perspective, I should not ruthlessly pursue anything 
at the expense o f other people. Indeed, a political problem arises where I suspect that 
other people might harm them: i f  I do not take action, I then might, indirectly, let 
exploitation happen. Therefore, studying disabled children’s lives in the contemporaiy 
world is inevitably political.
It can be argued, though, that care has to be taken to distinguish rhetoric from 
practice. For Roberts (2000), listening to children is not necessarily ‘ good’ but may 
be, in fact, intrusive and the cause o f further distress: more listening may not 
inevitably mean more hearing. In other words, researchers should think about when 
and how to conduct research with children so that it is as ethical as they claim it to be:
“ It is clear that listening to children, hearing children and acting on what children say 
are three very different activities, although they are frequently elided as i f  they are 
not”  (Roberts, 2000, p.238).
As already described in Chapter 2, the message within children’ s rights discourse is 
that children should be listened to by adults who make decisions concerning their 
lives -  this involves research on/with children. Yet, I repeat: What are children’s 
‘voices’ and how should we listen to them (Davis, 1998)? Now that I have experience 
o f the day-to-day lives o f young (disabled children), I find the rhetoric o f ‘ listening to
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and hearing children’ rather problematic. This claim will be elaborated in Chapters 9 
and 10, where I w ill present my data analysis from the ‘Children’s Centre’ .
6.6 Conclusion
The typical concerns in social research ethics debates revolve around informed 
consent and the short- and long-term implications o f one’s research for all parties 
involved. Recently also the nature o f the researcher-researched relationship has been 
under increasing scrutiny. In this chapter I have identified further concerns: 
epistemological considerations in observational qualitative research, the ethics o f the 
researcher’ s reflexivity, and the notion o f morality as a discourse. I have only briefly 
sketched some issues around these areas, appreciating that each o f them deserves a lot 
more in-depth treatment: I have merely intended to point out the importance o f these 
debates to this thesis. I now want to conclude with some defences that I have come up 
with in the face o f the primary audiences o f this research.
In terms o f research ethics, my definition o f ‘reality’ is based on Smith’ s (2002) 
suggestion: what is real to the subjects is what matters. My access to the realities o f 
(disabled) children has been limited in both settings. What I know about it has been, 
for the most part, mediated by adults; children’ s participation has not been 
fundamental to this research. However, that mediated knowledge has been sufficient 
enough to convince me that the purpose o f this research -  to develop new 
understandings o f (disabled) children’ s communication issues -  is ethically sound.
Before I entered the two settings, I was prepared to encountering questions about my 
research to some extent. I was also aware o f the complexity o f the sociological jargon. 
For that reason, I tried not to overwhelm people with too much theoiy -  in the 
beginning, the staff members actually expressed that they preferred that. Nevertheless, 
at that point I was increasingly being accused o f not clarifying enough o f what my 
research was ‘really’ about. I had to explain ‘ social constructionism’ over and over 
again without being understood. I took the blame: perhaps I did not find the right 
words to express it to non-soeiologists. I argue that this was clearly a case o f a no-win 
situation. The researcher cannot create rapport, empathy and trust alone: it is a matter
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o f a two way, reciprocal relationship. Perhaps the ‘ empathy’ model better suits 
settings where the researcher is clearly more powerful than the actors in the field.
In both settings, I did not feel that I was unduly invading anyone’s privacy since I was 
not individualising the subjects. For example, I use pseudonyms for the children; the 
staff members are called ‘workers’ or ‘practitioners’ . For me, they were actors who 
were playing their parts in a ‘ social drama’ (Turner, 1974), or members o f a group 
concerting activities in an institutionalised context (Smith, 2002). I did, o f course, 
perceive all the concerned parties as individuals and respected them as such; yet my 
sociological analysis is not about them as medical ‘cases’ .
My approach turned out to be vague and strange to many health specialists, whose 
own research practices stem from ‘positivism’ and bioethics11. This can be seen as a 
situation where people are not harmed but where they may feel wronged. My defence 
here is that, as a student and without any professional background in medical settings, 
I was not able to foresee this conflict or to prepare for dealing with it.
Bearing in mind the power o f MRECs, I stress that the central issue in any risk/benefit 
equation such as this is: who is to draw up the balance sheet and determine whether 
particular methods are justified or not? Whose causes and ethics are the right ones in 
social research (Bulmer, 2002)? Resulting from this question, I have decided that this 
research will incorporate ‘multiple voices’ rather than insist on reaching a one­
dimensional conclusion (Gergen & Gergen, 2000).
My experience o f doing this research suggests that moral encounters are not about 
following rules but matters o f contextual decision making. In this view, morality is 
not voluntary and it comes prior to any calculating action, purposefulness, reciprocity 
or contractuality. Morality is not an optional responsibility: it is both external and 
internal to the agent. I agree with Morrow & Richards (1996), who suggest that 
ethical choices should ultimately depend on the researcher and be therefore context 
specific and situational; at the same time, openness about these choices is a necessity.
11 See British Psychological Association (B P A ): ‘Appendix B: Ethical Principles for Conducting 
Research with Human Participants (British Psychological Society)’ in Robson (1993).
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PART 3: FINDINGS
Part III presents the data analysis and findings of the two research settings. 
Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the ‘Team Service’, and Chapters 9 and 10 on the 
‘Children’s Centre’. The two settings are addressed separately for the sake of 
clarity, although - analytically and thematically -  both draw on a particular kind 
of clinical/therapeutic genre. The data extracts are intended to serve an 
illustrative purpose; they offer snapshots of social interaction under 
investigation, where communication played a central role. The presentation of 
the data takes into account the research subjects’ right to confidentiality and 
anonymity: hence pseudonyms are used throughout the analysis.
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Chapter 7.
IDENTIFYING ‘COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES’: THE ‘TEAM  
SERVICE’ AND SPECIALIST TRANSLATION PRACTICES
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I described the statutoiy process o f professional intervention that 
children go through, when there are concerns about ‘communication difficulties’ 
and/or other needs. In this chapter, I analyse data from an early stage o f that process, 
where children’ s needs were being assessed by a multidisciplinary team. Along the 
lines o f the argument that I started to develop in Chapter 3, the analysis intends to 
illustrate sociologically problematic elements in understanding and dealing with 
children’s communication and ‘communication difficulties’ . The analysis takes up a 
social constructionist perspective, as discussed in Chapter 5.
The ethnographic focus o f my analysis is on child assessment as an interactional 
‘event’ . Indeed I conceptualise the child assessment event as context-bound, framed 
by implicit and explicit norms and rules for good practice. It is a situation where 
descriptions o f the child’s past, present and potential future become crystallised, 
modified and articulated in a legitimised, specialist genre. This chapter talks about the 
techniques o f ‘knowing’ and turning this knowledge into strategies o f  further action.
The findings suggest that techniques o f  ‘knowing’ within the ‘Team Service’ 
produced a particular reading -  a decision about or a diagnosis o f the child’ s difficulty 
- through a clinically trained gaze (McHoul & Grace, 1993). Sociologically, I intend 
to destabilise the assumption that a translation between the child’s interactions with 
others and descriptions o f his/her communication skills is straightforward. By this I 
mean that within what appeared, on the surface, systematic within the context o f 
clinical work, one could also perceive fluidity and situatedness o f interaction, talk, 
and interpretive practices around them. In this process, aspects o f the child were 
overtly, actively and selectively translated from on-going action into verbal 
statements according to clinical relevances and for institutional purposes.
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My analysis, thus, is supported by the idea that clinical work consists o f certain 
reading and writing practices. By the term ‘reading’ I denote both the activity o f 
reading texts, as well as, metaphorically, the observational ‘gaze’ and interpretative 
work. Reading also means the act o f meaning making: what is first seen and then 
verbalised into interpretive statements. ‘Writing’ is the process o f inscription: turning 
spoken words into ‘hard copies’ that represent reality (Potter, 1996).
The main argument in this chapter is that the assessment work treated communication 
as a skill that can be accurately ‘measured’ according to developmental milestones, 
‘Communication difficulty’ was perceived as a deviation from the norm and 
pathology as against, as Goffman (1967) might put it, a situational impropriety. The 
‘ scientific’ presumably systematic, standardised, generalisable means o f establishing a 
‘ communication difficulty’ were supplemented by moral-pragmatic ends, and vice 
versa. By this I mean that the ‘Team Service’ working patterns assumed that 
observational data and standardised tests, combined with specialist knowledge, were 
sufficient for ‘knowing’ and decision making.
I will now illustrate the findings with some data extracts. Section 7.1.1 provides a 
broad overview how the Team set the scene for the assessment o f each child. Here 
‘ selectivity’ becomes a dominant theme. Following on from this, section 7.2 turns to 
‘ communication difficulty’ as an object o f rational, ‘ expert’ action, which I describe 
as ‘scientific’ . In section 7.2.1, this is illustrated by one particular case, who I shall 
call ’ Sam’ for the purposes o f this text. I have chosen this case to represent a typical 
assessment o f ‘ communication difficulties’ , which have been recognised as hard to 
diagnose.
In section 7.3 I question the assumption that ‘ scientific’ (clinical/therapeutic) work is 
systematic, standardised or generalisable. M y data extracts will explain why this is a 
central finding in my observations. Indeed my analysis conceptualises the 
practitioners’ act o f ‘ reading’ as a particular mode o f interpretation, which is 
inherently a social activity.
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7 .1 .1  A n  a s s e s s m e n t d a y  a t  a  g la n c e
Typically, the ‘Team Service’ went through several assessments a week and they 
were organised in the following manner. Once a week an assessment day started with 
a ‘planning meeting’ , where a Team member (who had observed the child in another 
setting, such as the home, school or nursery), introduced the case to the Team. The 
Team members often called this stage ‘ setting the scene’ . In planning meetings, the 
Team would usually plan the assessment procedures for one or more children, who 
were to be assessed either on that day or in that week.
When there was a child who had already been to one assessment and was now visiting 
for the second time, the Team would also hold a ‘preliminary meeting’ , where they 
would recap the results o f the first visit. These meetings were shorter than planning 
meetings and would normally take place right before the second assessment session. 
Once the scene had been set, the Team members who were directly involved in the 
day’s assessment stayed in the setting. They took turns to introduce themselves to the 
parents, assessing the child and observing the child from behind a one way screen in 
the observation room. The assessments varied according to what the child’ s assumed 
problems were, based on what was known from the referral, previous records and 
home or school visits by Team members. Frequently, in my observations, 
‘ communication difficulty’ was the main reason for referral.
A ll Team members would make comments about the child’ s communication and 
speech during and after the observation, but the actual tests to establish the ‘degree’ o f 
‘communication difficulty’ were carried out by speech and language therapists. The 
test materials typically involved ‘age-appropriate’ toys and pictures: according to the 
practitioners, the younger and/or presumably more ‘ disabled’ the child, the more 
‘play-like’ , or simplified the tests. School children were typically assessed with 
language based tests, including, for example, word recognition and sentence 
completion. The assessments were usually one-to-one. Sometimes, however, another 
Team member or a parent would either observe nearby in the same room or take part 
( ‘help out’) in the test. Most parents also spent some time in the observation room 
while the child was being assessed.
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Once the practitioners had finished their expertise-specific tests, they would talk about 
them with the parents and then begin writing up their results and accounts. After all 
the assessments and medical examinations had been completed, the practitioners then 
gathered together in the large assessment room for a feedback session. At this point, 
the parents and the child would have gone home or been taken to a ‘ family room’ or 
outside for a walk. The end o f the child’s first visit, the ‘ feedback session’ was more 
‘ informal’ than the ‘ final meeting’ at the end o f the second visit, where the Team 
would often (but not always) generate a diagnosis. Frequently, one or two visitors 
would attend the final meeting, where decisions about further actions were made and 
reports were written down.
7.1.2 Notes on the extracts
The methods and ethics chapters discussed how the data extracts in this thesis are my 
‘accounts’ o f what happened in the field. I have also explained how I used this notion 
as a methodological tool as I was taking fieldnotes. This choice was based on my pilot 
observations and findings, which indicated that the Team work, for the most part, 
culminated in verbal statements about children’s needs. Therefore I treated 
professional statements as ‘ accounts’ , and the processes o f reading and writing as 
constituting account making.
Since the talk in the setting was not tape recorded, a detailed word-by-word analysis 
is not possible. However, I do not regard this as strictly necessary since the extracts 
are meant to paint a broader picture, where individual sentences may be detailed in 
terms o f their significance to the whole interactional situation. It may also be worth 
mentioning that I did not have access to all possible accounts in the setting, because 
sometimes practitioners’ ‘ gatherings’ were held in a small office, where there was no 
room (physically and metaphorically) for me.
For confidentiality reasons and practical purposes, in the data extracts, all the 
practitioners are referred to as ‘P ’ or ‘ she’ ; the children are given pseudonyms and 
referred to as ‘he’ . Section 7.2 details the progress o f the ‘communication difficulty 
case’ called ‘ Sam’ : the others examples are a selection o f different instances. 
Furthermore, some details, such as the child’ s accurate age or family relations or
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exact diagnostic signs have been altered to protect confidentiality and maintain 
anonymity.
Speech and language therapists, whose role was very important in the assessment o f 
the child’ s communication skills, are occasionally referred to as ‘ SLT’ -  one may bear 
in mind that there were several speech and language therapists in the Team. Teachers, 
health visitors, students, outside social workers or nurses (other than the core Team 
members) are referred to as ‘visitors’ . Where there is a conversation between two or 
more Team members, they are numbered PI, P2 and so on in their speaking order.
7.2 ‘Communication difficulty’ as an object of ‘scientific’ action
As a whole, my data analysis describes situations in (disabled) children’s lives in 
expert encounters, where ‘communication/difficulty’ (possibly among other suspected 
needs) was an explicit object o f concern and/or action’ . In this section, the focus is on 
the ‘ scientific’ character o f that action.
I argue that the ‘Team Service’ work strongly drew on certain empiricist
epistemologies with the emphasis on standardised and systematic fact finding 
procedures. When put into practice, these epistemologies produced a particular 
reading o f a child through pre-selection o f a clinical problem (communication
difficulty), its translation from something fluid to something solid by means o f
observation and tests, and its joint inscription in the form o f a case report. 
Standardised and systematic work involved the use o f clinical criteria, protocols and 
test materials, all o f which allowed for a verbally or numerically quantifiable output.
I will now map out the typical features o f an assessment day from
planning/preliminary meetings to observations o f assessments to concluding/final 
meetings. This is to illustrate the explicit logic o f the Team’s construction work and 
emphasise its process-like nature: how the definitions o f ‘communication difficulties’ 
arose and transformed within a specified time span.
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7 .2 .1  ‘ S e t t in g  th e  s c e n e ’
At the point o f introducing the child in the preliminary meeting, a ‘ slice’ o f the child’ s 
characteristics was given to the Team. Previous records were outlined in terms of 
what was relevant for the problem at hand. This meant that, although the protocols 
recommended looking at the child’ s needs as a whole, the problems defined by the 
referral tended to be the core concerns. ‘Communication difficulty’ featured 
frequently in these concerns.
The existing records and their reading during the preliminary meeting linked the 
child’s past to the present and formed a baseline for the assessment; in other words, 
they ‘set the scene’ . They affected the initial decisions that the practitioners had to 
make: what tests to carry out and how, or what diagnostic signs or needs to look for. 
Thus, prior to the assessments, various selective and descriptive processes had been 
gone through. The ‘reliability’ o f existing records appeared to vary depending on who 
had offered them and when. This was evident when the Team members, for example, 
were cautious about the comments that had been made by absent Team members, 
parents and so on.
I will now describe a preliminary meeting, where the Team talked about ‘ Sam’ , who 
was visiting the setting for the second time. This is a typical example o f a 
‘communication difficulty’ case, where features o f the so-called autistic spectrum 
were a concern.
Sam is referred because, apparently, he has social communication and interaction 
problems. A  practitioner (P ) presents the background: H e ’s got English speaking 
(non-British) parents; his speech is good  and polite, even though ‘ there was a slight 
stutter on a particular day’ ; he can speak a lot, ‘ almost like verbal diarrhoea’ . The P 
sees the mother as protective. One P says that there were no signs o f  that last week 
(this is the fam ily ’ s second visit) apart from  the fact that there is a ‘ shoes o f f  rule at 
home. Apparently the mother suspects Asperger’ s syndrome.
Another P is looking for medical records and is amazed because there are a lot o f  
them. One P has a sample o f  his drawings. Reports are being circulated and 
comments made. She refers to the previous week and mentions ‘ repetitive p lay ’ ; Sam
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had asked her name which she thought o f  as being unusual; he had needed a lot o f  
refocusing; he had asked a lot o f  W h y questions; he had wanted to show his 
achievements to his parents. I asked later on what the problem with ‘ repetitive p lay ’ 
is, and she said that it has implications for other areas o f  life  in that the child does not 
want to extend his knowledge.
On the basis o f  the fam ily ’ s first visit, the Ps thought that Sam was rushing to do 
things -  ‘ he had no concept o f  doing things s low ly ’ . A  P  was wondering whether 
there were problems with his balance: apparently the mother had tried to make him 
s low  down. H e had not crawled a lot as a baby -  he had started walking on tiptoes.
P I :  ‘Autistic type behaviour?’ P 2 :’ I saw him flapping hands once’ . P3: ‘ I  wouldn ’t 
make decisions on that basis’ .
The ‘background’ to Sam’s current referral difficulty was presented in a form o f a 
spoken ‘ one person narrative’ that was supplemented with ‘ relevant’ written 
documents. The speaker had observed and interacted with the child at home and paid 
selective attention to the clinically relevant points in the child’s behaviour, family and 
the home. Descriptions o f the child’s ‘problem’ were made with caution, such as that 
‘ there was a stutter on a particular day’ . The description involved the speaker’s 
personal slant, such as that the child’ s speech was ‘almost like verbal diarrhoea’ . I 
interpreted that the statement - ‘ there’s a ‘ shoes o f f  rule at home’ - referred to the 
comment about the mother being (over) protective. In addition, the mother’s opinions 
o f the child’ s ‘problem’ were stated.
The verbal accounts in planning and preliminary meetings were typically informal 
‘ feelings’ rather than formal, conclusive statements, as the conversations between the 
three practitioners indicate. Criterion related descriptive words were used, such as 
‘repetitive play’ , ‘hand flapping’ or ‘walking on tiptoes’ : the practitioners were 
looking for symptoms o f Asperger’ s Syndrome-type behaviour (see Figure 4 in 
Chapter 2, p. 29).
7.2.2 Translating procedures
Once the scene had been set, the practitioners would begin observation and tests to 
either prove or disprove the referral concerns and the outcomes o f
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planning/preliminary meetings. The assessment sessions followed a routine pattern: 
they always started with an adult facilitated play session, during which the child was 
expected to settle in the large assessment room. Meanwhile, the practitioners, who 
were observing in the observation room, made comments about the child.
Translating the ongoing elements o f the child’ s communicative skills into a coherent 
narrative, which was expected o f each practitioner in the end o f the assessment, 
necessitated structure: the tests meant that the every child had to do certain tasks in a 
required manner under adult instruction. The parents sometimes expressed that they 
did not always ‘ see the point’ o f the tests and consequently the practitioners had to 
explain what they were trying to do.
In the large assessment room, a P makes a point (to the parents) that her tests are 
‘ standardised’ ; she keeps mentioning that word. Sam is still in the large assessment 
room, asking: ‘ W here is ‘M ary ’ ? ’ Another P  is having a chat with the father in the 
assessment room. Father: ‘ I  don’ t know what you are looking for with these 
assessments; I  think he’ s very  c lever’ . The P explains something genera! about 
doing standardised skills assessments tests. I can sense the father’ s concern.
N o w  there are three Ps in the large assessment room. One o f  them tries to get the 
child to a smaller room  to be tested. Sam: ‘ H ave you got toys next door? ’ P then 
confuses him by saying that later on he wants him to do a different test for her in 
the big room. For a little while he does not seem to know where to go, but then 
fo llow s another P to the small room.
Both o f  the parents are in the observation room, clearly conscious o f  my presence 
as well. They  keep making comments to me about how they think Sam is doing; I 
try to on ly nod rather than speak. The mother says that she thinks Sam is really 
bright. Then Sam does not fo llow  the instructions in the test and the parents think 
that it is funny but the P seems to take it really seriously. For example, Sam was 
told to put one brick at the time into a box but he grabbed five  at the same time.
W h ile one P is doing an assessment with Sam, another explains to parents that 
since the tests are standardised, the Ps cannot, for example, ask the same question 
twice. I asked about this later and they agreed that the Ps expectations vary 
depending on activity setting. They  also said that over time the P: s would see the 
child ’ s capacities better -  on e-o ff assessments tend to be too short.
W hen P  writes results in her notepad, Sam asks: ‘ W h y did you do that?’ P : ’ I ’ m 
writing down how clever you are’ . Sam looks at the mirror, sometimes smiles at it.
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He pulls a card o f f  the P ’ s hands: ‘ Excuse me, it’ s my turn now ’ . H e does not want 
to do the test: ‘ I  don’t want to write onto paper’ . H e is asking peop le ’ s names and 
the names o f  colours, but the P does not answer -  she carries on with the test.
Both practitioners emphasised the standardised nature o f their tests as a positive and 
necessary thing. However, the parents and I made various interpretations o f the 
situation. The parents kept saying that in their opinion Sam was a bright boy who just 
was not following the adults’ instructions. Later on I asked the practitioners about 
how they knew when to standardise and when to adapt to a .unique situation. I asked 
the same question many times o f different practitioners, and they tended to resort to 
their expert knowledge and the ‘eye’ that they had from work experience with ‘this 
kind o f children’ . For example, in the case o f Sam, standardisation meant that only the 
adults asked questions and children’ s questions were not necessarily answered.
7.2.3 Constructing readings
The reading o f the child’ s skills was framed by pre-established scales for a ‘normal 
range’ o f communicative abilities. During the tests, the practitioners who sat in the 
observation room would make comments about their readings o f the child. Towards 
the end o f the assessment day, they would write down their individual reports either in 
the observation room or in the office. This is what I call ‘ translating descriptions o f 
the child’ s assumed skills into clinical genre’ .
By the final meeting, the reading and writing procedures had started to merge in the 
form o f each practitioner’ s reports. The next step was to make individual accounts 
public and turn several reports into one: the final report.
One o f  the Ps starts, again mentioning the word ‘ obsession’ . She outlines the 
‘ developmental milestones’ (apparently they are vague in the case o f  Sam). The 
fam ily ’ s medical and educational history as w ell as some recent major changes in 
their lives are described. Their accommodation is described.
One P  says: ‘H e sometimes plays with the same toy for 4 weeks’ . Earlier in the 
observation room, the mother said that Sam did this once. The P  points out that he 
‘ looks normal’ , but his muscle tones are low , although: ‘ I ’ ll leave that to the expert 
to say’ . Another P thinks his speech is programmed rather than intuitive.
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P I says that his communication is within ‘normal limits’ , even though’ he’ s got a 
habit o f  asking questions’ , and that he also ‘has a bit odd intonation’ (P2  adds:
‘ robotic )’ and poor eye contact. P3: ’H e  looked at me w e ll ’ . They were trying to fit 
him in the autistic spectrum but he did not meet the criteria. A lso  his politeness 
was seen as a problem because it was too ‘ learned’ .
One P says: ‘ H e  was unable to cope with the instructions’ . Another P asserts that 
she had never seen anyone swapping hands like Sam whilst drawing. The Ps seem 
to be very  precise -  one o f  them says that his ability in one o f  the tasks was at the 
level o f  a 3year 7 month old. She says: ‘There was some rigid ity in his 
perform ance’ . P I :  ‘ Obsession?’ P2: ‘N o , rigid ity ’ .
One P suggests that some o f  Sam ’s skills are 12 months behind. It is mentioned 
that Sam was surprisingly interested in a m edical bag (unlike many other children) 
and focused on it a lot. P I : ’ Obsession?’ P2: ‘ I wouldn’ t call it obsession but rather 
inquisitiveness’ .
This section reveals how one practitioner may offer the notion o f ‘ obsession’ while 
the others systematically refute it with alternative words, such as ‘ inquisitive’ or 
‘rigidity’ . Indeed the final meeting was for a great part concerned with finding 
appropriate descriptive words to write down in the report, negotiating or even arguing 
about them. The arguments were not always verbal: sometimes merely glances (that I 
interpreted as meaningful to the participants) were exchanged. Most negotiation 
concerned whether the child was ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ o f a particular criterion: the 
‘normal’ limits were not necessarily clear cut in those accounts. The differences in the 
child’ s behaviour between the first and the second visit were noted.
The Team members called the child’s speech ‘programmed’ , ‘ learned’ or ‘robotic’ . In 
addition, one P mentioned that he had ‘ strange intonation’ : none o f the Team 
members, however, mentioned that his parents had non-British accents. She thought 
his eye contact was poor, whereas another P defended that it was not too bad. It was 
also pointed out that he had ‘a habit o f asking questions’ : this seemed to be part o f the 
‘problem’ that ‘he was unable to cope with instructions’ .
The child’ s level o f development was expressed in numbers: three years and seven 
months. This was based on the information gathered from standardised tests, which 
involved ticking boxes on score sheets and a more elaborate verbal account from the
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therapist in question. Different issues about the child, such as the ability to 
communicate, or levels o f muscle tones, were compared to ‘normal’ scores.
The practitioners paid attention to anomalies in Sam’s behaviour. However, in this 
case it appeared to me that, as they were giving second hand accounts from the 
parents, they usually reduced those accounts into fewer words. It was also typical to 
mention whether the parents were educated, in good health and had a ‘normal’ home.
7.3 Oscillating between rigid and fluid readings of the child
The previous section has given a taste o f how the assessments typically unfolded. I 
will now turn to analysing ‘ interpretive practices’ in more depth. In this section I 
define ‘ communication’ as a contextual activity that entails processes o f meaning 
making. By using the notion o f ‘ context’ I denote a juxtaposition o f two entities: first, 
a focal event; and second, a field o f action within which that event is embedded 
(Goodwin & Duranti, 1992). ‘Context’ , such as the clinical setting being researched, 
is seen as being shaped by the specific activities being performed at that moment. It is 
also the physical environment, and shaped by social dimensions and historical 
processes. Moreover, actors in the setting are seen as being situated in multiple 
contexts, some o f which are more stable and others more dynamic and constantly 
changing (ibid). I propose that various readings o f each child were possible, 
depending on the context, although a limited number o f those versions became 
authorised. The authorisation process was not straightforward, which I now intend to 
illustrate.
7.3.1 The tree o f language: sturdy oak or weeping willow?
When the children had speech but were referred for communication difficulties, the 
assessment always involved speech and language tests. I have earlier talked about the 
‘tree o f language’ (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2, p. 18; Law et al, 2000) and the 
compartmentalisation o f different elements o f language and speech into ‘branches’ . 
Law et al stress that the ‘organic tree analogy’ serves to illustrate the active rather 
than static nature o f communication (p. 8). Metaphorically, I suggest that Law’s 
model o f  communication could be described as a ‘weeping w illow ’ that is blown
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about by the wind12. Yet, within the ‘Team Service’ setting, I suggest, the normative, 
written down version o f communication appeared to be something quite solid, like a 
‘ sturdy oak’ .
The next extract describes a preliminary meeting, where language difficulties were the 
major reason for referral. The child had already been assessed once by another team: I 
was not told why a reassessment by the ‘Team Service’ was needed.
This is seem ingly a communication difficu lty case. The child ’ s medical history 
problems are outlined by two Ps who read out another team’ s earlier reports:
‘ They did not understand what he was talking about’ , he has minor language 
difficulties but more with the ‘ use o f  language’ .
A  visitor starts her description next: she tells what ‘T on y ’ likes to do in his peer 
group: he may sometimes spend time on his own ‘watching the world go b y ’ but 
‘does get upset i f  someone is hit’ . She says that he makes up stories and is very 
easily distracted. She also gives an example o f  him getting very upset i f  there is a 
break in a routine. Furthermore: ‘H e generally comes across as a bit clumsy’ . She 
has not mentioned any obvious problems, but one P  mentions that he has got some 
‘ phonetic’ problems. Furthermore, he cannot apparently construct proper written 
stories and ‘when he starts saying something, he has to finish it’ .
One P points out that the mother had said that ‘ a lump is missing from  his brain’ , 
meaning that he apparently cannot make connections. She had seen him privately 
and said that his eye contact had been b rie f but ‘ I was not even looking at his social 
communication’ . Therefore another P w ill do a school visit.
It was mentioned that the previous team had not understood ‘what he was talking 
about’ . Some other autism related features were noted, such as clumsiness, routines 
and slightly unusual behaviour with peers and adults. One practitioner, who had seen 
the child privately, mentioned that while she was busy looking at other, expertise- 
specific features about Tony, she had not been able to observe his communication 
skills. Social communication with peers was treated as something that could be 
observed at school and this task was delegated to a relevant specialist, who would do 
a single visit.
12 Although the ‘ tree o f  communication’ in Figure 2 looks more like a sturdy oak than a weeping 
w illow , I  suggest that L a w ’ s m odel could be better illustrated by the latter example.
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The rigidity -  ‘ sturdy oak’ like character - o f inscribed versions o f the child’ s 
communication difficulties became particularly apparent in final reports, where the 
extent o f the ‘problems’ was measured. The quantification process, which was central 
to report writing, would make the child’s skills comparable across time and space, in 
terms o f the child’s development, and what was regarded as ‘normal’ .
P I  describes ‘ Harry’ s ’ communication difficu lty as ‘ m ild ’ or ‘moderate’ -  ‘He 
uses more com plex language than what he understands’ . P2 now  wants to 
conclude that he has a g lobal developmental delay, but P I  challenges her in this: 
she wouldn’ t use the word ‘ g lobal’ but rather conclude that ‘ Harry’ has got 
d ifficulties in some areas. P I  comes up with descriptive words, such as 
‘ discrepancy’ , ‘ inconsistencies’ or ‘disorder’ . P2: ‘ Can you quantify that?’ She 
says that she needs to com e up with something that w ill help the school, which 
referred Harry to the Team . P I  says that ‘ g lobal delay’ has a slant that she can’t 
agree with. P3 suggests ‘ dyspraxia’ and some other Ps laugh at this. How ever, it 
seems that P2 is happy with that.
In terms o f  social communication, one P thinks that Harry ’ s eye contact was 
prolonged and inappropriate: ‘H e couldn’t just casually look at something’ ; ‘ he 
said ‘hello ’ to me in an overfriendly manner, even though we have never met 
b efo re ’ . She also says that his vocal tone and loudness were socially inappropriate.
The Ps calculate his ‘ developmental age ’ (4 .9 ) and agree with the label: ‘universal 
delay ’ .
There was a lot o f discussion and negotiation about what exact words should be 
written in the final report. However, as P2 put it: it was important to come up with a 
clear and pragmatic result that would help the school, which referred the child to the 
Team, in other words, a label. I perceived that the ambiguities in decision making 
were not apparent in the final reports, which reduced the practitioners’ accoimts to 
fewer words. The child’ s social communication skills were measured by both words 
(such as ‘prolonged’ eye contact, ‘overfriendly’ manner or ‘universal’ delay) and by 
numbers. The child’ s ‘ developmental age’ , as against biological age, was a sum total 
o f each practitioner’ s calculations.
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7.3.2 Meaning making activities: alternative readings
‘Team Service’ work involved objects, such as toys, texts or pictures, the use o f 
which had specific meanings and purposes for the practitioners. M y analysis suggests 
that these test ‘ tools’ were structured and that they constituted particular kinds o f 
frames for interaction. The logic o f testing overlooked the complexities and 
ambiguities o f meaning making where the child was not merely a passive object o f 
testing, but an active agent. These points are illustrated in the following two extracts, 
which describe speech and language assessments.
The S L T  starts her tests and the mother, P  and I in the observation room. ‘C olin ’ 
seems to be doing outstandingly well, repeating sentences such as ‘ the computers 
and printers were donated by school governors’ . H e also asks a couple o f  times 
what the sentences mean (either as a whole or individual words), e.g. ‘ W h y  did 
they donate them?’ Colin  also notes things that are not part o f  the test, such as a 
note on the wall saying ‘Please close the w indow ’ . H e asks the S L T  why it needs 
to be closed and she does answer his question, not ignoring it or rushing back to 
the test.
Colin  really loves the ‘ absurdity pictures’ (he was shown some picture cards where 
there was ‘ something w rong ’ );  fo r example: ‘ The bird is flying upside down!! H e 
laughs. The umbrella picture is a bit more puzzling -  he goes: ‘ W ait a minute, the 
rain should be everywhere’ (not just underneath the umbrella). H e  adds: ‘ But could 
the rain not be behind the umbrella?’
S L T  wants him to list some food  items, and she starts: ‘ P izza, app le ...’ . ‘N o , you 
are spoiling it’ , shouts Colin. Listing jobs  (occupations) seems to require more 
probing. H e starts listing domestic chores, such as washing up, cooking. About 
more public jobs, S L T  says: ‘ I f  you are ill...the correct answer would have been 
‘ ...you  go to see a doctor’ . Colin  had said: ‘Y ou  go to hospital’ . The mother makes 
a different interpretation o f  the situation.
Another practitioner in the observation room explained to Colin’ s mother and me that 
Colin was doing cognitively better than most children in the test. He understood the 
instructions and the purpose o f the tests, but we noticed that he would go ‘beyond’ 
them as well: for example, instead o f just repeating sentences, he would inquire about 
their semantic content, or ask why the window needed to be closed.
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Once Colin had to start ‘explaining’ the contents of pictures, several interpretations 
emerged. For the speech therapist, there was a narrow range of correct meanings of 
each picture; for example, the rain was ‘underneath’ the umbrella, not ‘behind’. In 
. addition, Colin’s ideas of ‘occupations’ involved domestic tasks rather than paid work 
outside the home. The mother then pointed out to m e  that various interpretations 
could be mad e  of the same situation: for example, whe n  Colin would ‘go to hospital’ 
instead of ‘a doctor’.
A s  the above extract and the next indicate, children m a y  interpret the practitioners’ 
questions in various, imaginative and sometimes surprising ways. The next extract 
describes a speech and language test, which assessed ‘Daniel’s’ verbal 
comprehension:
The S L T  starts a sentence completion test. P: ‘ W hat is a dress?’ ‘Dan iel’ : ‘ Skirt 
and a t-shirt’ . SLT : ‘ What is a bed?’ D : ‘ It is for sleeping with a p illow ’ . SLT :
‘ W hat do you need to do when you cross the road?’ D : ‘ Stop, look and listen’ . The 
S L T  probes to get a desired answer, by repeating the question i f  Daniel says 
something else. SLT : ‘ It was a love ly  day ’ ...D : ‘And then a ginormous sunflower 
cam e’ (excited ly). SLT : ‘ What is a hat?’ D : ‘ A  hat...is a sort o f  planet shape’ , 
doing a rim with his hands above his head. Ps in the observation room comment 
that he is probably thinking o f  Saturn. S LT : ‘ The bird flies, the fish ... ’ D : ‘Does 
not f ly ’ . A fter  that question he seems to g ive  up or gets fed up and replies: ‘ I don’ t 
know ’ .
The S L T  seems to be rushing, looking at the clock and m oving forward fast. She 
then asks Daniel to explain pictures on cards -  he does not recognise all o f  them 
and the S L T  shows the same cards a few  times. Daniel starts imitating her: ‘W e ’ ll 
go back to that one’ . The S L T  carries on: ‘H ow  are a man and a dog d ifferent? ’ D:
‘ Because human and a pet are the right answers’ .
The practitioner’s task was to sort out the ‘correct’ answers from incorrect ones, based 
on her interpretation of whether the child had comprehended the question. 
Interestingly, this time the practitioner was allowed to ask the same question more 
than once; on some other occasions, the requirement for standardisation had prevented 
this.
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Thus, meaning making was a complex activity, both verbally and non-verbally. 
Sometimes the practitioners expressed their awareness of this to me, as in the 
following extract.
‘ Jeremy’ is spotting 'mistakes' in P ’ s pictures -  he laughs when a person in the 
picture puts food in the washing machine and not in the oven. Meanwhile, another 
P  in the observation room  talks about his enunciation, which seems to be the 
problem, not comprehension (he starts words with the letter D ). This P  is 
convinced that the Ps are 'tuned in to understand' what the child says (when I was 
wondering whether the parents would understand him). Still they all keep saying, 
every once in a while, that they don't understand a word that Jeremy is saying 
during the test. One P  says that when she did a test, she just nodded to pretend that 
she was fo llow ing  him.
It seemed obvious that Jeremy did not have any problems with understanding the 
intended jokes in the pictures. However, I was having trouble with understanding his 
speech and expressed this. I then asked whether anyone else in the observation room 
could m a k e  any sense of it. Whereas one practitioner said that as experts they are 
‘tuned in’ to understand the child, another said that she pretended to understand in 
order to carry on with the assessment.
I stress that, in the assessments, interpreting children’s meanings was always locally 
contextual, on the ‘here-and-now’ level. Sometimes it was also the wider 
contemporary context -  in this case, television news at the time -  that gave the 
practitioners clues for interpretation.
(Shortly after September 11th)  ‘K ev in ’ seems to focus a lot more now on building 
blocks than during his first visit. H e is building a tower and playing with a fireman:
‘H e ’ s gonna get k illed ’ , K ev in  says to a P. The Ps in the observation room  say:
‘That’ s a sign o f  the times, isn’ t it? ’ H e plays with the blocks -  w e can see an 
aeroplane hitting the tower.
In m y  observations, visitors and parents would frequently interpret the children’s 
behaviour and meanings in different ways. Sometimes these alternative readings 
contradicted the versions that were either written d o w n  in earlier reports or what the 
practitioners were stating at the time of assessment:
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‘ O liver ’ does not have speech: he makes a distressed noise, when, for example, he 
can't reach a toy that he wants. The visitor, who had spent a lot o f  time with O liver 
before, points out that he is not actually 'clingy to mum' even though this was 
stated in the previous assessment report by another team. Earlier in the observation 
room she had said to me that she thinks the situation matters to the w ay in which 
children behave.
The visitor asks exactly how standardised the tests are -  one P says that sometimes 
they use the test forms just as a guideline. Another P suspects that the child has 
some autistic features, such as hand flapping. H e seems to m ove slowly. How ever, 
some games help him interact more than others -  such as bubbles. H e says 
something like 'yeah'. The visitor says that O liver ’ s hand flapping meant 'go'.
W h e n  an opportunity arose in the observation room, the visitor and I talked about the 
child. She k n e w  the child and the family and did not agree with the previous 
assessment report that had, for example, described the child as being ‘clingy to m u m ’. 
For this reason, she was also suspicious of the Team: would they come up with the 
same or a different label and how? She kept asking the practitioners about their 
methods and reasons for doing assessments in certain ways. She also m ad e  her o w n  
interpretations: for example, for her, the child’s hand flapping meant ‘go’ whereas it 
was a possibly autistic feature for the practitioners.
It appeared that competing interpretations emerged and practitioners used 
explanations -  sometimes persuasion -  to authorise the clinical readings. Usually, 
w he n  the parents asked about the ‘validity’ of the assessments, the practitioners 
justified their work by its standardised nature. This time, however, the practitioner 
mentioned that she sometimes had to use the tests just as a guideline, based on her 
personal judgment that the child was not up to the test.
7.3.3 The practitioner knows better
Although information about the child, such as referral forms or previous case reports, 
formed a baseline for the assessment, the practitioners retained their authority to judge 
whether the referral concerns were worth taking into consideration.
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‘M ark ’ is playing in the large assessment room. I can see that he is a young child.
One P asks the parents about what he likes to watch on T V . The mother then goes 
and takes part in the play as well. H e seems to be too young to speak but he 
‘ communicates’ non-verbally, e.g. ‘ slurp’ ( ‘ drinking tea’ ), or ‘ b leep ’ ( ‘ p icking up 
the phone’ ). They g ive  him Teletubbies. Meanwhile, one P  in the observation room 
says: ‘The mother thinks he’ s autistic’ . I ask a P  about the referral and she reads 
out the text in it; he had been referred by a health visitor. Apparently he has poor 
eye contact. P: ‘ The mother has been concerned for a while but that does not mean 
there’ s anything wrong -  he’ s just 2 ’ .
It appeared that both the mother and a health visitor had concerns, and that the mother 
suspected autism. According to the referral form, this assumption was based on the 
observation at h o m e  that ‘M a r k ’s’ eye contact was poor. W h e n  I enquired about this 
in the observation room, the practitioner explained that since the child was very 
young, an assessment and expert opinion was needed.
The following extract indicates h o w  T e a m  m e m be r s ’ also trusted in each others’ 
expertise, as well as various interpretations of the child’s comprehension. This extract 
is also an example of an assessment where the practitioners attempted to establish 
whether a ‘communication (language) difficulty’ was a cause or an effect of some 
other ‘condition’.
P wants ‘ Paul’ to find ‘ cheese’ and he picks ‘ keys’ -  the cheese was not an obvious 
one though, said the Ps in the observation room, because it was Edam-style. The 
father in the assessment room says that Paul did not know it because he ‘ does not 
have dairy’ .
N ow , all o f  a sudden, Paul displays very  aggressive behaviour (because he did not 
recognise the cheese?). H e w ill not sit on his chair, but sits on the table even 
though one P tells him not to. They  now try to get him outside. I  cannot see him 
but I  hear Paul screaming ‘ idiot, id iot’ , kicking and struggling. It is such mayhem: 
he throws things on the floor and people run after him. H e says ‘boring’ when they 
try to get him back to the small assessment room.
One P asked about how  he had behaved before she came into the observation 
room. I said that he had been ok, but she did not really listen to me. A s  soon as 
another P. came in, she asked her instead. The Ps mention a ‘ short fuse’ and that the 
child w ill become a dangerous adult i f  he keeps behaving this way. One P thinks 
he is testing boundaries. They  suggest doing some chromosomal tests to see 
whether he has too much testosterone.
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After the tantrum, addressing ‘bad behaviour’ became a primary target of 
intervention. This had been on the agenda anyway since the referral. Nevertheless, it 
appeared that although the practitioners asked questions of the parents and me, they 
did not really listen to what w e  said. Both medical and social explanations of the 
child’s behaviour emerged, and the practitioners then negotiated between these 
various possibilities. There were no reflections on the effect of the context, however, 
on the child: the child’s problem was perceived as ‘innate’.
7.4 Conclusion
In the ‘T e a m  Service’ practice, ‘communication’ had a particular, object-like 
meaning. Like other needs, it was referred to and treated as something that could be 
quantified and measured using scales. ‘Normal’ communication was defined using 
developmental parameters, which sometimes involved the use of tests and sometimes 
not. ‘Communication difficulty’, on the other hand, was perceived as a deviation from 
a norm. It was treated primarily as a cognitive, psychological or physical pathology 
that could be identified by clinically trained experts. The experts used specific tools -  
observation and tests -  to explain aspects of reality. Various structures, protocols and 
background material were incorporated in the activity of generating a ‘scientific’ 
reading of the child.
The ‘T e a m  Service’ practice aimed at generating a diagnosis of the child’s 
‘communication difficulty’, and/or decisions about the child’s needs. This typically 
involved a great deal of negotiating and selecting the most accurate descriptions of the 
child, particularly in the process of writing d o w n  the final report. In the case of 
disputes about the various interpretations that would arise during the assessments, the 
practitioners retained their authority over lay perspectives. T o  put it in sociological 
words: decisions were connected to action via texts such as case reports, which were 
an outcome of social construction work, including ‘setting the scene’, ‘translation’ 
and ‘inscription’ procedures.
The child, his/her communication and possible ‘communication difficulty’ were 
objects of structured adult instruction, interpretation and action. In this respect, I 
argue, the assessment setting was a different context from the child’s other everyday
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experiences. For example, there were specific ‘time-slots’ to allow different kinds of 
communication to emerge. During the tests, the child was expected to demonstrate 
that he could follow the rules of the game. The assessments typically involved 
continuous testing, so there was not m u c h  time left for more spontaneous interaction. 
At the same time, the ‘settling in’ session at the beginning of each assessment day was 
the only time w h e n  the child was ‘allowed’ to do his/her o w n  thing; in fact, was 
expected to do so. During the tests, in contrast, the child was not supposed to ‘explore 
the nursery’ but focus on the task at hand. Typically, the children did not separate 
time and tasks in this kind of clear cut manner.
Indeed the ambiguity of meaning making appeared to be a frequent feature of 
assessments. Standardised tests - such as tests that measured verbal comprehension - 
had a limited range of ‘correct’ answers (Gardner, 1998). In this respect, a reading of 
the child’s performance was d o w n  to the practitioner’s situational judgment. This was 
questioned m a n y  times by parents and visitors, w h o  observed the assessments from 
behind the one w a y  screen.
This chapter has concentrated on the practical accomplishment of constructing a 
diagnosis/decision of a child’s ‘communication difficulty’. It has detailed ‘science in 
action’ (Woolgar, 1988); h o w  guidelines for good practice and expert knowledge 
were put in practice within a specified time span in a particular context. I have 
attempted to paint a picture of ‘what was going on’ in the day-to-day, localised 
practice of the ‘T e a m  Service’. In the next chapter, I will continue with analysing 
what I call the ‘socialness’ of clinical interaction. I will take on a broad discursive 
perspective to what I perceived as ‘sociocultural’ within the clinical/therapeutic 
practice.
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Chapter 8.
THE ‘TEAM SERVICE’ AND ‘COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTY’ AS A 
SOCIOCULTURAL PHENOMENON
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I described h o w  the child’s communication skills were treated 
as something that could be systematically observed and measured by ‘scientific’ 
means. M y  focus was primarily on the epistemology of clinical process of 
identification: in other words, the ‘gaze’. I argued that the epistemology of clinical 
work was often justified by the assumptions that it used standardised tools and 
techniques. I then started to develop an argument that the ‘scientific’ in the clinical 
work was typically ‘messy’ (Gilbert &  Mulkay, 1984) rather than straightforward. I 
propose that this messiness of clinical work revealed something about the h u m a n  face 
of expert work, in that it was through and through social.
W ha t  I label as the ‘social’ components of the ‘clinical’ challenge a conventional 
view of clinical/therapeutic work being based on unbiased knowledge of ‘hard facts’ 
in the natural world. A s  Woolgar (1988) has suggested, scientific activity is indeed 
social in three main senses:
1) social rather than individual in that it involves teamwork, networks, 
culture, and so forth
2) all scientific actions are imbued with pre-selection of certain 
problems
3) scientists direct their activities at other social beings.
I will n o w  turn to this ‘socialness’ aspect of T e a m  work and the assumed ontology of 
‘communication difficulty’. I will explore h o w  certain value based features of 
‘normal/good communication’ were defined by the T e a m  members. M y  focus here is 
centred on some normative statements that would occasionally emerge in the midst of 
meetings and informal conversations in the observation room. These statements were
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not necessarily agreed upon, and they could be called ‘hints’ rather than explicit 
arguments.
Nevertheless, I stress that child assessment practice routinely involved statements of 
someone’s personal preferences or stereotypical thinking in terms of gender, or the 
children’s and their families’ social class and ethnicity. This is important in terms of 
what happened to the child after the assessment; in essence, what was being done with 
the statements - whether they were treated as factual or not.
8.2 Making sociocultural distinctions
The extracts in this section are examples of ‘communication difficulty’ cases. At the 
same time, I intend to address aspects of conceptualising ‘normality’ in a broader 
perspective than simply communication, involving further issues that were held to be 
as significant to the child’s overall needs and development. I will first use the 
distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ in child development as an analytical tool, 
in terms of h o w  the T e a m  members distinguished between these two causes for the 
child’s perceived problems. Second, I give some examples of h o w  the child’s family 
was sometimes positioned along the nature/nurture spectrum in terms of ‘good 
communication’ and ‘communication difficulties’.
8.2.1 ‘Nature and/or nurture’: looking for causes
Decision making in the assessments typically involved identification of the ‘problem’ 
in its current state as well as causal explanations for it. These would often entail 
factors other than only references to physical or cognitive impairment.
One P says that ‘N ick ’ is capable o f  ‘ situational understanding’ and ‘ echoing’ , and 
using jargon instead o f  spontaneous language. Social interaction happened 
‘ sometimes’ . Another P says that he has expressive hands. It is suggested that A D D  
(attention deficiency disorder) m ight be the condition behind all his difficulties. One 
P seems to be unsure: ‘ I t ’ s hard to say whether it is A D D  or an inability to do 
things’ . The Ps mention the problem  o f  ‘ self-directness’ . The Ps agree that N ick ’ s 
biscuit eating looked funny and one P adds: ‘ They might be the sort o f  fam ily who 
don’t eat at a normal table’ .
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The conversation in the extract revolved around specifying what particular 
communication skills the child had or did not have, including non-verbal behaviour. It 
might be noted that the practitioners did not do a standard speech and language 
assessment with this child, because they believed that he was not up to it, 
developmentally or otherwise. For instance, they mentioned the word ‘self- 
directness’: the child would do his o w n  thing rather than follow adult instruction.
The practices of detecting anomalies in the child’s general behaviour included 
observing the w a y  he was eating the biscuit. O ne  practitioner connected this to the 
child’s h o m e  environment: ‘They might be the sort of family w h o  don’t eat at a 
normal table’. Here I perceived not just a social class based preference but also a 
somewhat fluid m o v e  ‘from nature to nurture’.
A  similar situation took place with another ‘communication difficulty’ referral, 
‘Philip’, although, this time there were no perceived problems with ‘nurture’:
One P had done a home visit and she said that everything there seemed to be ‘ very 
nice’ (the equipment, toys, furniture, parental care; the mother was ‘ gentle and 
calm ’ ). She said that the children interacted w e ll with her; she had played peek-a-boo 
with them. She had talked about ‘ Ph ilip ’ with the mother, i.e. what words he says and 
what noises he makes, such as animal noises.
The Ps say that he is too young to be assessed with standardised methods: 
‘Everybody w ill just have to put it together’ . This was ‘ because o f  his personality’ , 
not just about his age. P I  asks: ‘ Is he fis ty13? P2: ‘ I was looking for all the usual 
m arkers...’ . P I  also asks: ’ So his speech is ok then?’ P2: ‘H e ’ s very  shy’ .
The T e a m  agreed that Philip was too young for standardised tests, but that they had to 
achieve some kind of decision about the nature of his difficulty. At this point, the 
problems in his communication were connected to his behaviour -  being ‘shy’ -  
rather than to any specific disability.
13 In the above situation, I understood the word ‘ fisty ’ as referring to a child who tends to close his 
hands tightly and may be aggressive. I interpreted this meaning from  the speaker’ s illustrative hand 
movements.
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Sometimes ‘nature’ was explicitly intertwined with ‘nurture’. The next extract 
describes an occasion where a practitioner was questioning the mother in the 
observation room, while the child was being tested in the small assessment room. 
There was another practitioner present as well and w e  had been told that this child 
was a potential Asperger’s case.
One P  starts chatting with the mother (the father is outside). The mother says he gets 
stressed with other children in school: the teachers say that he has behavioural 
problems and is not conforming. The P also asks whether there is anything ‘A n d y ’ is 
good  at. The mother mentions, for example, technical things such as switches with 
which his play can be quite repetitive. P: ‘ Is this an obsession’ ? The mother does not 
think so.
The mother then says: ‘ I  have to confirm  with the father, his perspective is d ifferent’ .
The mother is in tears. The P says: ‘ I  think you have done a marvellous jo b  (as a 
parent). Mothers always tend to think they have done something wrong. That’ s why 
I ’m asking you, I do not think men see these things as easily as mothers. M en are the 
weaker sex. This is the way they cope ’ . Another P in the observation room  says 
nothing.
It seemed that the parents did not agree with each other about the ‘problem’ and the 
practitioner attempted to console the distressed mother by referring to the mother’s 
alleged ability to perceive ‘these things’ better than the father. I saw a gender 
stereotype in use on this particular occasion. Later on the practitioner, w h o  heard the 
above conversation between the mother and another practitioner, approached m e  in 
private:
I had a long chat with a P  in the observation room -  it was almost as i f  she was dying 
to get certain issues o f f  her chest. Her point was that the Team  members do not 
always vo ice  their opinion even though they disagree with some o f  the others. She 
mentioned the fo llow ing  issues: ‘w ell known’ hierarchies among occupational 
statuses and among professions, sweeping statements/generalisations, for example, 
about the fam ilies ’ social statuses, dated opinions o f  motherhood. I  sensed that this P 
did not agree with another one in the observation room who was making stereotyped 
comments to the mother about parenting [as described in the previous extract].
This P said that she sometimes felt that some Team  members do not necessarily 
recognise that teamwork should be equal and everyone is an expert in their field.
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Sometimes, in her opinion, differences in attitudes could stem from generational 
issues as well. Another P  came to the room and the conversation ceased.
This was the first time for m e  in this setting that I realised the importance of 
hierarchies in the setting. It was not something that would have been openly discussed 
in m y  presence. Nevertheless, some underlying discrepancies within the T e a m  work 
were momentarily unveiled.
I regard the occupational hierarchies and the incorporation of stereotypes into 
assessments as a particularly social element of professional practice: people in groups 
m a y  approach the same goals in different ways, and this m a y  stem from their 
personalities, as well as from their social-structural position in their institutions and 
society. However -  as the practitioner stressed -  sometimes, within teamwork14 
situations, it is difficult to voice one’s opinion, for one reason or another.
Thus, teamwork is m u c h  more complicated than simply putting different areas of 
expertise together into a coherent whole. It involves h u m a n  interaction, which is 
contextual, and depends on w h o  is present and what the object of action is. In this 
sense, for example, the causes for and interventions into any particular 
‘communication difficulty’ are socially defined as well. The next section follows on 
from this finding.
8.2.2 ‘Communication difficulties’ between adults
The children w h o  were referred for the T e a m  were assessed in the context of their 
family background. In this section, I intend to illustrate situations where the parents 
were seen as lacking communication skills, with some implications for the 
understandings of the children. The following extracts show, however, that somewhat 
casual remarks about the parents were not necessarily agreed upon. In m y  
observations, these statements were typically related to the client’s social status.
One P thinks that this w eek ’ s session with ‘ James’ was a lot better than last w eek ’ s 
one, and that she also fe lt m ore relaxed this time with him. One P mentions that
14 M y  use o f  the word ‘ team work’ refers to work performed by a team in general, whereas ‘Team  
w ork ’ refers to the clinical/therapeutic work particular to this research and the ‘ Team  Serv ice ’ setting.
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James had ‘ verbally abused’ his parents during the last visit: ‘whether you can call it 
that from  a 5-year-old’ . Another P  mentions that he says ‘ sorry’ but he does not 
really mean it; they suspect that he has emotional problems but not Asperger’ s.
A  visitor says: ‘ H e ’ s not trying to communicate meanings to you ’ . She also thinks 
that it is d ifficu lt to communicate with the parents -  ‘ the father talks too much’ . One 
P mentions that he may not have anyone else to talk to about this matter. The visitor 
thinks that the parents may be ‘ thick, lacking comprehension’ . They conclude that the 
child has ‘ situational behaviour problems’ .
This occasion was the family’s second visit to the T e a m  Service’. The visitors started 
to interpret James’ meanings: at this point, differences between the visitors’ and the 
T e a m  m e m be r s ’ opinions started to show quite clearly. For example, ‘talking too 
m u c h ’ is one of the features of Asperger’s Syndrome (see Figure 4 in Chapter 2, p. 
29). It appeared that one of the visitors attempted to link the father’s talk with the 
syndrome. However, the T e a m  members interpreted the situation in a different way. 
O n  this occasion, the visitor located the problem with the speaker, whereas a T e a m  
m e m b e r  hinted that the problem could in fact have been with the listener.
The next extract illustrates a situation where the parents, again, are seen as having 
special communication problems. However, during the meeting, the T e a m  members 
themselves appeared to have difficulties in ‘sending messages across’.
P I  outlines some points about the child ’ s past -  it is noted that both parents are 
illiterate. The parents’ occupations and residence are mentioned, as w ell as the 
fam ily ’ s medical history. Then P2 starts to talk about changes in the assessment 
meetings to P I ,  so that after the fam ily ’ s first visit there is just discussion rather than 
‘writing dow n ’ . This is because sometimes ideas are not clear after the first visit.
P I  says that she had been thinking o f  an underlying syndrome, but did not find 
symptoms for it. P I  and P3 speak louder and louder over each other but not clearly 
arguing. Then they think that it may be the child ’ s impulsive nature rather than his 
ability to do things, which is the problem. P I  repeats that the mother had previously 
said: “ I  did go to school but did not learn anything” .
This time a slight conflict arose mostly between one practitioner and the rest of the 
Team, which mainly revolved around h o w  to go about the meeting and ‘writing 
d o w n ’. It seemed that PI was eager to com e  up with a diagnosis, including the
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parents’ illiteracy and educational attainment ‘problems’, whereas the others wanted 
to leave the decision making until later.
The dynamics of the T e a m  work is one example of the ‘socialness’ of action in a 
clinical/therapeutic setting. I will n o w  turn to another persistent feature of the 
assessments: h o w  the sociocultural nature of T e a m  work particularly manifested itself 
in definitions o f ‘good’ and/or ‘normal’ speech.
8.3 Definitions of appropriate communication
Although non-verbal communication, especially eye contact, was taken into account 
in the assessments, speech and language were at the heart of the assessment of 
communication needs. This section illustrates h o w  understandings of ‘good 
communication’ were culturally embedded in the ‘T e a m  Service’ practice.
8.3.1 ‘Locally appropriate’ communication
T e a m  work as sociocultural practice involved understandings of ‘good 
communication’ as something locally appropriate. W h a t  I m e a n  by ‘local’ is not 
referring to the actual field location as such, but more generally to a certain regional 
accent or manner of speech that was implicitly or explicitly preferred in the setting. 
These preferences would frequently surface in the T e a m  m e m b e r s ’ accounts, 
sometimes in clinical, sometimes more in lay terms. Hence, the clinical notion of 
‘social communication’, I argue, is a social construction of what is deemed locally 
appropriate. Within assessments, it included judgments of what was perceived as 
‘good manners’, as in the following extract.
The Ps discuss ‘ Charlie’ s ’ play. P I  wants to quantify his developmental age, and P2 
replies that it is ‘ nowhere near 3 ’ , which is his b io logical age. P I  points out that 
some o f  his social communication was nice, such as saying ‘please’ . P2 thought that 
this was unusual in her job . P3 adds that Charlie had been telling her about how he 
hurt his head, even though she did not understand him until the mother translated 
this.
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Frequently in m y  observations, the children were praised for using polite phrases, 
such as ‘please’ and ‘thank you’ in social interaction. In terms of what one of the 
practitioners said -  that this was unusual in her job -  I interpreted that most children 
were not perceived as polite in that way. In Charlie’s case, it seemed that there was a 
speech problem rather than a developmental disorder. It appeared that the mother 
understood the child whereas the T e a m  members did not. For this reason, calculating 
his developmental age was difficult: Charlie was seen to have ‘mixed skills’.
A  similar situation emerged in the case of ‘William’:
It appears that the child is not a native English speaker. I asked to look at the referral 
that said: speech concerns. A  ‘ visitor’ says that ‘W illiam ’ is so sociable and wants to 
communicate with the world, whereas in the referral it says that he has no meaningful 
interaction with the world. She had taken part in writing up the referral.
Then W illiam  plays a kitchen game with one P. The Ps in the observation room 
notice that he is talking to a doll, looking at it in the eye, and interacting w ith it. One 
P says that he is very  self-directed and hard to engage. The visitor and one P discuss 
W illiam ’ s eye contact. V isitor: ‘ Is he engaging or just ‘ staring towards you? ’
Here I sensed a few contrasting interpretations of whether the child’s communication 
was ‘appropriate’ or not. The visitor herself seemed to be oscillating between whether 
the child was ‘sociable’ or did not have normal interactive skills. The practitioners 
then pointed out that William interacted ‘normally’ with a doll. Nevertheless, since 
the child did not have m u c h  speech, this was a problem on the basis of the 
developmental tests for 2-year-olds.
The visitor did not consider h o w  the fact that the child was not a monolingual English 
speaker and possibly learning two or more languages simultaneously m a y  have 
affected his spoken English, or h o w  his cultural background m a y  have shaped his 
non-verbal interaction with adults. I observed situations similar to this whenever there 
were other than monolingual -English children in the setting. The next subsection 
continues with the assessments with one or more languages, where English was not 
the child’s mother tongue.
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8 .3 .2  T h e  c h i ld  ‘ g a b b le s  in  a n  u n u s u a l la n g u a g e ’
As  indicated in Figure 8 (p. 77), children w h o  were referred for the T e a m  came from 
various backgrounds. W h e n  ‘communication difficulty’ was a referral problem, the 
T e a m  members would mention whether, for example, the parents had non-English 
(e.g. ‘French’) or regional accents (e.g. ‘South London’)15 or whether another 
language was spoken at home. I was told that sometimes a professional interpreter 
was needed for assessment; however, this did not happen during m y  observations.
The following extract describes an instance where the child’s family spoke several 
languages and this was seen as a problem, because, according to English based 
developmental tests for 2-year-olds, the child was delayed.
A  ‘ visitor’ comes in and talks about her home visit where ‘ Robert’ had ‘ gabbled in an 
unusual language’ so she had referred him to the Team. She says: ‘ I  could see there 
was a problem ’ and she bases her judgment on developmental tests for 2-year-olds.
‘ Having said that’ she continued that ‘ he had a good  eye contact’ . In her opinion, 
multilingualism was a problem, as w ell as the parents’ cultural isolation.
She had encouraged the parents to speak on ly one language at home. She said that 
Robert did not look at books ‘ in a meaningful w ay ’ . The visitor had done one home 
visit. P I  then talks about what he can and cannot do for his age, such as that ‘ he 
deconstructs rather than constructs’ ; ‘ his action is purposeless’ . She concludes that 
she cannot actually put a developmental ‘ age’ on him, jok ing: ‘ H e ’ s still doing peek- 
a-boo ’ .
P2 describes Robert as: ‘ impulsive’ , ‘ self-directed’ , and ‘ single-channelled’ . The 
others do not necessarily agree with her. For example, she says that she did not see 
sym bolic play or pretending, whereas two other Ps saw him playing phone 
conversation. She also did not see him saying ‘ brick ’ -  P3 said that Robert said 
‘ brick ’ . But P2 thought he did not copy properly. The Ps say that he is 
developm entally delayed, not ‘ disordered’ , negotiating this nuance. The delay was 
estimated to be about 6-10 months. The S L T  says at that stage they cannot yet 
quantify receptive/expressive language.
This is a typical example of h o w  monolingualism was regarded as the norm to which 
children were compared. The visitor m ad e  comments on the meaningfulness of the
15 These are pseudonyms.
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child’s non-verbal communication based on one h o m e  visit. It appeared that the child 
was not ‘up to’ quantification, so any particular ‘disorder’ could not be established: 
the negotiation revolved around whether this was a matter of ‘disorder’ or ‘delay’.
Nonetheless, cultural differences were typically discussed at T e a m  meetings, 
whenever a non-British child was to be assessed. A  lot of the time, assessments were 
concerned about whether the child was ready for school, or whether the child needed 
a special needs school instead of mainstream school. This proved problematic with 
non-British families w h o  were used to a different kind of education system, for 
instance, where children started school at a later age than British children.
In the next extract, which refers to this kind of situation, I have, for confidentiality 
reasons, replaced the actual languages in question with ‘French’ and ‘G e r m a n ’.
Visitor 1 sets the scene. Apparently the father denies that there is anything wrong 
with his son. They  then check what ‘ surveillance checks’ had been done in his past.
V is itor 2 describes his eye contact: ‘H e looks through/past you ’ . N o w  there is some 
disagreement whether he speaks ‘French’ or ‘ German’ : one P says French and the 
others say German. Apparently he also has some English words.
P talks about a lot o f  things, mentioning, for example, that in ‘France’ children don’t 
have to go to school until they are 6 or 7 and that the mother prefers that. P says that 
the mother claims that she is the only one who rea lly  understands ‘ G eorge ’ and she 
doesn’t want any interpreter in the assessment. The Ps suggest strategies for getting 
her to change her mind; one o f  them says that an interpreter is needed so that they 
can assess how  intelligible he is to people other than parents.
In one P ’ s opinion, the mother’ s parenting style is ‘ rude’ : she would say ‘ build, 
build ’ to the child, rather than gently ask him to build with legos. Apparently the 
mother has accepted the speech delay problem but is still reluctant to get him 
assessed. V isitor 2 was surprised, because the mother is a ‘ powerful woman with a 
deep vo ice ’ so it was odd that she did not demand that he be assessed.
One P is concerned about the non-existing quantification o f  the child ’ s difficulties:
‘ W e  need to have a baseline’ . She had met the child once but ‘ it was too short a 
period o f  tim e’ .
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Frequently, w h e n  the parents did not accept the referral, the practitioners would talk 
about ‘parental denial’. In the above extract, the denial was partly explained by the 
father’s outright disbelief, partly by the family’s different cultural experiences. 
Nonetheless, the main reason for the assessment was to see whether the child could 
communicate with people other than the mother, particularly at school. The mother, 
however, did not think that an interpreter would help, or that her child needed to go to 
school at such an early age. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that the legal 
duties for early intervention do not necessarily exist in other countries in the same 
w a y  as in the U K  today. This could be one of the reasons w h y  there were not always 
previous medical records about the child by the time they came to be assessed by the 
Team.
8.4 Conclusion
I argue that the notion of ‘good communication’ in the T e a m  practice -  as distinct 
from the clinical/developmental notion of ‘normal’ communication -  was in part a 
matter of sociocultural preferences. F r o m  what I gathered from the practitioners’ 
accounts, ‘good communication’ seemed to be regarded as something quite self 
evident. It involved norms for h o w  families ought to organise their h o m e  life, a 
preference for monolingualism (English language in England) and for certain accents, 
and certain general rules for face-to-face conduct. However, some practitioners and 
visitors emphasised this side of communication more than some others: I can only talk 
about those assessments that I witnessed. Moreover, not all the comments that I have 
illustrated in the extracts came to be written d o w n  in the final reports.
In addition to the previous chapter, this chapter has illustrated h o w  clinical work 
fundamentally entailed ‘socialness’. The sociocultural elements of practice were 
something that would surface only sometimes, although in a consistent manner. 
Communication as a skill was n o w  a matter of something more than the child’s innate 
abilities: it was a reflection of an approved ‘nurturing’ environment as well.
At the same time, in terms of ‘sending messages across’, I sometimes perceived 
‘communication difficulties’ occurring between adults as well as between adults and 
children. Thus it becomes clearer that communication and understanding are not
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straightforward phenomena. People do not always agree on things, or share the same 
cultural constructions of ideas, objects or actions. In the T e a m  Service setting, I got 
the impression that the T e a m  members would modify their ‘verbal output’ to suit the 
requirements of the assessment situation, instead of always ‘reveal’ all of their 
thoughts. This surfaced on the occasion, w h e n  one of the practitioners told m e  about 
the hierarchical dynamics of the T e a m  work. She approached m e  in private since this 
would have been a difficult topic to bring out in front of other members of the Team.
M y  analysis of the ‘socialness’ of ‘communication/difficulties’ continues in the next 
two Chapters, where I will talk about the ‘Children’s Centre’. M y  analysis in both 
settings questions achieving understanding as a basic feature of ‘good 
communication’. I argue that, more so than in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting, this was 
salient in the everyday practice of the nursery.
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Chapter 9.
THE AMBIGUITY OF RATIONAL ACTION: OBSERVING EFFORTS TO 
‘BRIDGE THE COMMUNICATION GAP’ IN THE ‘CHILDREN’S CENTRE’
9.1 Introduction
This chapter talks about the ‘Children’s Centre’. Thematically, (interactions in the 
nursery represented a point in the interventionist process where children had already 
been diagnosed and were receiving additional support and therapy.
There were differences between the two settings in terms of the children’s perceived 
needs and disabilities. In the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting there were children with a variety 
of ‘needs’. In the ‘Children’s Centre’, on the other hand, all the children had been 
diagnosed with a particular type of disability, the clinical definition of which involved 
a range of cognitive and physical impairments. A m o n g  other things, these 
impairments were seen to create barriers to the child’s communication and efforts 
were m a d e  on a continuous basis to alleviate or eliminate those barriers.
Wha t  the two settings shared was the concern for ‘communication difficulties’, which 
were understood to be impairment based and therefore perceived as requiring 
specialist intervention. The T e a m ’s role was to ‘identify’ and m a k e  decisions about 
‘communication difficulties’, and in the nursery these decisions (although not literally 
the same ones16) became implemented. Both settings explicitly drew on the same 
legislation, rules for professional conduct and recommendations for good practice.
As with the ‘T e a m  Service’, in the ‘Children’s Centre’ m y  sociological gaze focused 
on h o w  various understandings of ‘good communication’ and ‘communication 
difficulties’ arose from practice. First, I argue that, in the nursery, verbal (unmediated) 
communication involved ambiguities: having ‘words’ did not guarantee a direct link 
between the adults’ and the child’s ‘minds’.
16 Here I am referring to the intervention process that children may go  through (see Figure 3, p. 23).
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However, since m a n y  of the children in the nursery had little or no speech, 
observations of entirely non-verbal communication made up a great deal of m y  
fieldnotes. After some time spent in the field, I started to observe the use of picture 
communication symbols in detail, since they featured in daily practice more 
frequently than, for example, the use of sign language. The use of communication aids 
was part of what I call ‘communication as a m e d i u m ’. They were material objects that 
were intended to replace words or enable the child to express a need or choice, and 
thereby establish shared understandings between the carer and the child.
Second, I argue that the use of visual aids fundamentally involved ambiguous 
processes of meaning making: the hoped-for ‘shared understandings’ between 
children and adults in the setting had an accomplished and situational character. This 
meaning making was based on a certain logic: it imputed rationality to both adults and 
children. M y  analysis questions the feasibility of such logic, first and foremost 
because it was meant to serve moral-pragmatic purposes. Third, I observed some 
ambiguities in h o w  routine practice in the nursery constituted the child as an agent. I 
argue that, for example, choice making situations assumed rational thought and action 
on the part of the child, whereas on some other occasions it was commonplace to treat 
the child as an ‘irrational’ being.
This chapter concentrates on the ‘rationality’ of communication in the nursery; the 
‘socialness’ of it will be the topic of Chapter 10. The previous chapters have 
described h o w  the focus of m y  observations developed during the beginning of the 
fieldwork period in the nursery. In a similar w a y  to Chapter 7, section 9.1.1 describes 
a typical day in the field. This ‘first encounter’ is intended to provide an overview of 
what was going on in general. It creates a categorical baseline for m y  further analysis 
of the data in this chapter and the next. The rest of the chapter develops the above 
arguments.
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9.1.1 A  ‘thick description’ of a typical afternoon in the nursery
The following lengthy extract is meant to set the scene, in the same w a y  as in Chapter 
7. A s  with all the extracts in this thesis, the children are given pseudonyms and some 
details have been altered for confidentiality reasons. The nursery staff are either 
generically referred to as ‘workers’, regardless of their occupational status; or given 
pseudonyms.
W e are in the middle o f  a Teletubbies watching session -  there are 6 children, 5 
workers, the lunchtime is just over. I am introduced to the sta ff on duty that day and 
told what I am not allowed to do (e.g. lifting up a child, walking, or carrying them); 
and what I can do (e.g. talking, playing and asking all the time). The children say 
hello to me. They seem to be in a good mood, there is no crying. The child ( ‘M artin ’ ) 
who cried all the time last time is on the floor again, I get eye contact with him. In 
the timetable, this is called 'floor activity'.
‘ What's going on (in  the v id eo )? ’ A  worker is trying to interpret what ‘ Jemma’ s’ 
noise means: ‘ Is that what you are trying to say?’ The children are all glued to the 
T V  screen. The worker calls Jemma a ‘noisy g ir l’ ? Meanwhile, ‘ S teve’ has been 
carried in. Another worker is talking about Steve to ‘ Anna’ , who is watching 
carefully: ‘ L e t me take his jum per off, it's really hot’ . Another worker says ‘ good 
boy ’ to Steve. H e w iggles on a mat. Then Anna is taken to the corner separately, 
where they play with kitchen toys. Another girl is strapped in a special chair and she 
has fallen asleep. Steve sneezes, and the worker says: ‘B less you son’ . I t ’ s very 
quiet and peaceful in the nursery.
I focus on Jemma now. She has made noise for a while and every time someone says 
‘ W h y  are you making noise?’ T w o  people are talking to her about Teletubbies: ‘ Is it 
funny, Jemma?’ She can turn her head towards movements or sounds, and makes 
noise, frowns or smiles when people talk to her. ‘ That's ‘ Sim on’ next to you. D o you 
like this bit? Y o u  like the rabbits, don’t you? The same worker keeps talking. She is 
left alone for a while, and then she starts making even more noise. The workers 
react: ‘ What would you like? Have you had enough o f  Teletubbies?’ A  worker says 
about Jemma: ‘ I  love that grin ’ , and a minute later: ‘Don't g ive  me that sad face ’ . I 
think Jemma understands the worker -  at least there is clear eye contact. She is the 
noisiest one. For example, ‘ John’ repeats the same hand movements over and over, 
claps his hands. Steve does not 'say' anything. There is only one child who speaks.
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Circle time is about to begin and they start walking the children to chairs. The 
nursery is all o f  a sudden quite noisy with singing, talking and noise making. Some 
children are resisting this but Jemma smiles on the floor.
The talking child ( ‘M ik e ’ )  still wants to watch Teletubbies: no singing, 'no cars', but 
John is clapping already. T h ey  look at M artin ’ s eye movements about what song he 
wants to choose. M ike keeps blow ing raspberries rather than singing. H e is told o f f  
and then he chooses a song and talks (after the worker says she wants to hear him 
talk). I  am sure Steve can recognise this song as w e ll -  it looks as i f  he is enjoying it.
The workers talk to him as i f  'he' was ringing the bell, even though it was the 
workers. W h y are they doing this? One worker has to hold Martin's head upright all 
the time. A  worker asks John to choose a song. H e holds on to a page in the 
songbook but the book is then taken away. H e starts crying.
Some children fo llo w  the song and play i f  they can actually touch nose, head etc., 
many cannot. Then they start listening to a story (one protest here...by M ike). W hen 
one worker has to leave the room, another says: ‘ I ’ ll keep them occupied. Change the 
story’ . She almost read the same story again, making comments like: ‘ Jack thinks it's 
a M um m y mouse’ . There is signing go ing on at the same time as puppets com e out 
-  the workers are making up a story themselves, improvising. But when they read 
aloud, it is a particular way o f  reading to children.
They  are now asking everyone, in turn: ‘ W hat did you do this weekend?’ Steve is 
pointing out pictures for ‘M um ’ , ‘ Granny’ and so on in his picture book. ‘Y e s ’ and 
‘no ’ answers are possible in this activity.
M a n y  of the children in the nursery were verbal, although they might have been 
diagnosed with speech delays of various degrees. A s  the extract illustrates, they were 
actively encouraged to talk: for example, Mike often tended to, say, burst into tears or 
make ‘meaningless’ noise (blow raspberries), even though he was capable of uttering 
some intelligible words and signing. In the extract, he was encouraged to choose a 
song (which he did reluctantly) and say his choice out loud.
In the extract, the workers asked the children: “W h a t  did you do at the weekend?” 
One of the explicit educational elements in circle time was to practice social and 
disciplined behaviour, such as turn taking. T w o  observations can be m ade here: 
firstly, there was a ‘question-answer’ model built into circle time, and this facilitated, 
according to the staff, practising of communication via picture communication
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symbols, testing the child’s m e m o r y  or teaching them to follow adult instruction, and 
so forth. Secondly, circle time was an opportunity for all the children in the nursery, 
verbal or non-verbal, to do joint activities, which was believed to be as beneficial for 
child development as, say, individually tailored therapy programmes.
There was, of course, opportunistic and spontaneous talk between adults and children 
as well. This casual talk could be about anything: joking, helping out, chatting, 
playing, having fun, and so forth: sometimes structured and more casual elements of 
talk merged together. The interactions between adults and children followed the 
pattern displayed between J e m m a  and the worker in the extract, apart from the fact 
that children would occasionally talk back or initiate conversations.
The extract illustrates a situation where a worker was ‘conversing’ with Jemma. 
Whenever J e m m a  made noise or rolled her eyes, the worker would com me n t  on it, or 
ask her a question, such as: “W h a t  are you trying to say?” She was interpreting 
J e m m a ’s noise making during a situation, which was referred to as ‘chatting’, and 
thereby engaging her in the social situation in the floor comer. I later learned from 
another worker that this kind of ‘engagement’ was one of the routine aims in the 
nursery, particularly in more structured activities, such as circle time.
The extract also suggests that not everyone was a ‘noisy girl’ like Jemma: interpreting 
non-verbal behaviour included interpreting hand or eye movements as well. S om e  
non-verbal children, w h o  had more control over their movements, would, for 
example, sign w h e n  the workers prompted them. They would m a k e  other gestures as 
well, some of which were interpreted as meaningful, such as waving ‘bye bye’. O n  
the other hand, some gestures, such as John’s repetitive clapping, m a y  have been seen 
as symptoms of certain types of disabilities.
The use of visual communication aids, such as picture communication symbols, was 
typically related to the act of ‘choice making’ with non-verbal children. For example, 
in the extract, Martin was asked to choose a song, and expected to indicate his choice 
by eye movements and John was expected to do the same by hand movements. Apart 
from this occasion, in m y  observations, picture communication symbols were 
frequently used during meal times (see Appendix 3).
1 5 8
There were practical reasons for the choice of communication aids that were 
available: for example, I was told that head pointers were not used in this nursery, 
because they can cause physical strain to the children. Picture cards were convenient 
to use: they would often be arranged in books to suit each child’s projected needs, and 
it was possible to take the books home. With therapeutic assistance, some children 
were also practising the use of computers for their communication, as well as for 
other special needs. The communication aids that were available were adapted to the 
children’s ‘developmental age’. Changes in these arrangements happened if the staff 
members were convinced that the child was ready to use more complex material.
Communication aids were one means for attempts to establish a ‘meeting of minds’ in 
the nursery. The next section will address the ambiguities that were involved in daily 
practice, where ‘bridging the communication gap’, either verbal or non-verbal, was, 
directly or indirectly, the object of action.
9.2 Communication as a ‘medium’ between minds
This section looks at communication as ‘m e d i u m ’: h o w  it was perceived as a tool for 
transmitting messages and enabling-the meeting of the child’s needs. For the sake of 
clarity, I will talk about verbal and non-verbal communication separately.
Adult-child communication in the nursery fundamentally entailed adult interpretations 
of the children’s meanings. The workers expected the children to learn certain ‘fixed’ 
meanings that they had applied to words, signs or pictures. I argue that this assumed 
face-to-face communication to be something rather linear and straightforward. M y  
observations suggest that this view was consistently applied to nursery practice with 
both verbal and non-verbal children.
M y  data extracts have a specific focus on acts of choice making, which was part of 
the ‘good practice’ ethos in the setting. This is because situations where children were 
encouraged and expected to m ak e  choices crystallised certain understandings of 
communication and of the child in the research data. Both verbal and non-verbal 
interaction in choice making situations drew on the idea that children are not only 
entitled to choices but also willing to m a k e  them.
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The possibility of ambiguities in verbal choice making suggests that there were 
ambiguities in non-verbal choice making as well. The ambiguities did not, however, 
necessarily stem merely from the child’s lack of cognitive abilities, or that the child 
. had not learnt the meanings of, for instance, picture cards. Instead, the ambiguities 
would arise from situational and contextual interaction, where unpredictable turns of 
events and behaviour were commonplace. This observation challenges some taken- 
for-granted preferences for ‘rational action’ and ‘intentionality’ that a great deal of 
specialist work in the nursery was based on.
I also suggest that children were typically encouraged to m ak e  choices w h e n  it was 
appropriate in terms of adult frameworks, such as daily timetables. M y  data illustrates 
h o w  meal times m a y  have been one of the few opportunities for the children to initiate 
their preferences. In this respect, ‘communication’ in the nursery was tied to adult 
judgments of what was the primary task at hand, as well as, for instance, to the 
management of a number of children at the same time.
9.2.1 Verbal communication in the nursery: ‘transmitting messages’
The following extracts describe verbal choice making during meal times, where 
children were served a ‘three course’ meal, and before each round they were given 
options to choose from, such as apple juice or orange juice, or different kinds of 
pudding.
Eating goes on as usual. A t  first, ‘ Sarah’ is the on ly adult who keeps talking to the 
children, e.g. ' I f  you don't eat it you w ill always be as tall as that'. Then two other 
workers jo in  in -  especially ‘ T racey (lou d ly ) and newcomer (quietly): ‘ W ould you 
like some more? G ood boy ’ . T w o  workers talk about ‘ M artin ’ -  they think that he 
might have chickenpox. Robert is crying -  Tracey: 'Enough noise now  -  you are 
going to have pudding'. T racey seems to be in charge o f  the situation that way.
‘ Brian’ says: ‘ I would like some custard’ . Sarah: ‘ W e ll you are a llowed to change 
your m ind’ ( I  did not see whether he wanted something else earlier).
Verbal children would sometimes initiate choice making, like Brian w h o  wanted 
‘some custard’. However, verbal choice making was sometimes quite ambiguous too.
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A  worker says to ‘ M ik e ’ : 'Y ou  are looking at this one and pointing at other one 
M ike. W hich one do you want?' M ike says: 'Something', and the worker smiles at 
me. Tracey did a very  quick round with the food  items; still, quite a lot o f  
speculation is involved in the choice making. Children are given ‘ something’ , 
anyhow. Martin still cries quite desperately. A  worker asks M ike  whether he wants 
to have apple ju ice; H e replies: 'N o  no no no - y es !’ and the workers laugh at this.
Then M ike says something but no one hears it. Eventually the worker brings out the 
actual food  items and he points approximately at the apple juice.
Although the children m a y  have understood the intended meanings of the cards and 
the purpose of using them, they were not necessarily bothered about making choices. 
Yet they were typically quickly given ‘something’ anyway unless they expressed a 
very clear ‘n o ’. In this extract, the worker first tried to get Mike to point at picture 
cards of orange or apple juice: w h e n  this method did not work in the way she 
intended, she brought in the actual cartons, and Mike then rather casually pointed at 
one of them. In m y  interpretation, the worker assumed that Mike did not comprehend 
the link between the picture cards and the food items.
In contrast to the previous examples, I will next describe a situation where the child 
actively ‘sent a message’ -  several times - and faced some mixed responses to it:
This appears to be an educational session. The children are sitting at a table and a 
worker is teaching them numbers through play. ‘ Jonathan’ is complaining about 
stomach ache. W ork erl: ‘ I t ’ s nearly lunchtime, you must be hungry’ . ‘ Jerry’ knows 
what to do next. The children are banging the table with sticks really loudly. ‘ Paula’ 
is not with this at all. She keeps banging the table. She repeats ‘ tick tock ’ . Jonathan:
“ I need to w ee” . W orkerl says no because he has just been to the toilet. Worker2 
then enters the room, hears this and asks Worker3 to take him to the toilet.
The children sing a pat-a-cake song w ith playdoh. The worker explains to me how 
the children anticipate the events, because they remember them from  the previous 
session. Paula is falling asleep. The others are clapping and messing around -  they 
seem to have fun. Some o f  them shout rather than sing. Jonathan protests: “ I ’ m 
tired” .
This is an example of a situation where different interpretations of the child’s verbal 
intentions emerged. Workerl interpreted that Jonathan was complaining because he 
was hungry, but since lunchtime was approaching it was not a problem for the worker.
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Workerl also dismissed his request to go to the toilet, whereas the other two workers 
took notice of this. It was typical of the nursery practice that situational judgments of 
the child’s intentions and needs were m ad e  like this.
9.2.2 Non-verbal communication and meaning making
I have suggested that verbal communication in the nursery involved ambiguities, but 
also that non-verbal communication was often even more obscure. This, I stress again, 
is not simply a matter of a lack of speech on the part of the child. Instead, the 
ambiguities arose where non-verbal communication -  or attempts to establish such -  
was treated according to ‘ideal’ models for verbal communication (see Chapter 3).
In the next description, non-verbal children, w h o  sat in their wheelchairs, were 
arranged in a circle so that they could face each other.
The children are g iven toys while they are also taken to the toilets one by one. I  can 
see that ‘A lan ’ does not like the doll he is given. ‘ S teve’ is trying hard - 1 think he's 
quite patient. The toy falls on the floor every once in a while - does he want it to 
drop? H e takes breaks and starts again. A lan notices that Steve's toy keeps dropping - 
smiles when I go 'oops'. A lan  is now a very  sm iley boy - makes noise (almost shouts) 
but ‘ Jemma’ goes quiet again. Then she makes noise and her toy falls down.
O n  occasions like this I certainly became aware of m y  o w n  lack of understanding the 
children’s worlds. I was looking for some signs of interaction between the children, 
but did not see it, at least in any conventional sense. O n  the other hand, the children 
m a y  have been perfectly aware of what was going on -  for example, Alan seemed to 
be amused by the fact that Steve’s toy kept falling on the floor. This time it was 
impossible for m e  to tell w h y  the children m ade noise; whether it was social and 
meaningful or not. It seemed that I would have needed to spend a lot more time (than 
a three-year long C A S E  studentship, for example, allows for) with these children to 
better understand what they were like as individuals.
Aware of m y  o w n  shortcomings in the attempt to ‘bridge the communication gap’ I 
felt that non-verbal communication in the nursery was a challenge to all participants 
in the setting. It seemed obvious that verbal expressions m ad e  the daily tasks easier,
162
and therefore children were encouraged to use either straightforward words or 
expressions that resembled words. The function of picture communication symbols 
was to replace speech.
With non-verbal children, the same model of communication was used as with verbal 
children. A n  adult asked what a child wanted, and the child’s answer was ‘retrieved’ 
from eye or hand movements, which were interpreted as pointing at one or the other 
card with oppositional meanings.
A  worker is using 'yes' and 'no' cards with ‘ Sim on’ - a more experienced worker 
tells the newcomer what hand movement means 'yes' -  it is not quite obvious to me.
H e actually refuses the food by not swallow ing it even though his hand m ovement is 
interpreted as having meant 'yes'. The newcomer tells this to the older one. The 
workers then take turns in using the cards and offering the food. He refuses again 
and the meal is taken away. The newcomer is still practising with yes/no cards.
W h a t  Simon wanted was never clear to either of the workers, but the more senior 
worker encouraged the newcomer to offer food items to him. There seemed to be a 
power play -  or an educational situation - between two workers of different statuses. 
The senior worker did not allow the newcomer to ‘give up’ too easily, in other words, 
to immediately interpret that the child said ‘no’.
The use of picture cards involved a question-answer model that did not allow children 
to ask questions or to dismiss the question. They only provided dichotomies, such as 
‘yes’ or ‘n o ’, rather than, for example, ‘I don’t k n o w ’. Obviously, there were practical 
reasons for the simplicity of the cards. O n  the other hand, the cards, for this particular 
reason, only facilitated adult-led ‘conversation’. They also expected the child to be in 
the m o o d  for, and capable of, making rational choices.
At its extreme, it appeared that choice making had become an end in itself so that the 
adults insisted the child give an answer. I frequently observed the workers making 
decisions on behalf of the child w h e n  an ambiguous situation arose:
It seems to take quite a long time to feed ‘Jemma’ (o r  to teach her to eat by herself) -  
others have gone through their pudding already. N o w  she is shown both food items
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(and a picture card to make the connection). The worker seems to be fed up because 
Jemma did not look at the 'no' picture card but refused a banana. Another worker 
says ' I think Jemma likes custard so let's have that'.
The problem is in that one could never be sure exactly what the children wanted until 
they either swallowed the food or not; by then, they might have just changed their 
minds anyway. A s  such, there were no exact means to measure whether the task of 
giving children a choice was successful on each occasion.
Sometimes it seemed that the child really did not want to m ak e  choices or choose 
anything that the adults suggested; yet the adults had their objectives to deal with the 
child’s ‘needs’. The next extract is a detailed (video-recorded) example of such a 
situation. This lengthy illustration shows in detail what meal times typically looked 
like to me; here the focus is on one child, ‘Adrian’. The worker’s talk is in bold.
Adrian eats and the worker sits beside him, holding a picture book on her lap. She 
wants him to sit on a box. The picture book is not much in use. The worker corrects 
his sitting, w ipes his hands. She does not talk much. A l l  the children are eating; it is 
quite quiet in the nurseiy. Adrian makes noise, pointing at two other boys with a 
spoon. N o w  the worker helps him to finish the plate. The phone rings, Adrian stands 
up.
Worker: ‘Adrian, sit down on your box because this is lunchtime. Good boy.’
Adrian keeps m oving and the worker correcting. Worker repeats: ‘It's lunchtime; 
you have to sit on your box. Good boy’.
She asks Adrian to put the plate on the table. Worker: ‘Do you want some more?’
(at the table, no communication aids were used). Adrian makes no noise, sits down 
on the floor. H e stands up again; she holds his hand, pointing at food.
'Show me if you want some more' -  the worker decides to put some pie on his 
plate, while he is walking around the table
Worker: Sit down. H e sits down and starts eating again. The worker signs: ‘Do 
you want some more? Are you finished?’
Adrian stands up, makes noise and looks distressed. They  go together to take the 
plate away. Another worker signs at him too behind the table and points at his box.
Worker: ‘Stay there, stay there’. She repeats this many times. She has to 
continuously struggle to keep him on the box. Adrian is restless.
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N o w  a picture book is taken out. Worker: ‘Adrian, do you want some pudding?’
Adrian walks away. H e falls on the floo r again and the worker goes to lift him up.
Adrian goes to sit down. Worker: ‘That's it; you are going to the chair now’. She
takes his chair and makes it ready.
She brings the pudding and orders him to sit down on the box. Adrian looks at the 
two options; real food items are shown to him. H e nearly catches the banana, which 
is taken away. The worker puts the custard away and comes back with the banana 
and peels it: ‘1,2, 3 -here’s a banana’.
The worker takes the picture book again (she had said earlier that today they would 
practice with it). Adrian falls o f f  the box, still eating the banana. Worker: ‘Do you 
want a drink?’ Adrian points at the table. The worker takes his hand and shows a 
picture card (it was upside down). She interprets yes.
The worker has enough o f  messing and secures him in the chair17. Adrian goes:
‘N o o o ! ’
H e pretends to drink from  the mug. Then real ju ice  cartons are shown to him:
‘Which one?’
H e points at the orange. Worker: ‘Orange? O K ’.
The worker is glancing at the picture book pages. She shows him the ’m ore1 card:
‘Adrian do you want some more?’ She puts her finger on the picture. Adrian puts 
his finger on the picture as w e li and she goes to get some more. Worker: ‘Good 
boy’.
H e is g iven a mug but it is taken away.
The worker is trying to find 'pudding' in the picture book. Adrian is looking the other 
way. The pudding bow l is brought for him to see, he points at it but then turns his 
head away. Worker: ‘Do you want some of this? I heard you make some noise’.
Adrian looks tired [or fu ll]. Worker: ‘I don't know what you are pointing at’.
Worker: ‘Are you finished? Wipe your hands’. Adrian does what she says.
The use of picture cards entailed an insistence that a child m ak e  choices. However, it 
seemed that the child did not share this objective with the worker. The only time it 
appeared very clearly that Adrian m a d e  a choice was w h e n  he resisted being secured 
into his chair. At the same time, he m a y  have m ad e  some other more subtle choices, 
such as wanting to hold the banana or the mug, which were taken away from h i m 18.
17 Children like Adrian had their own, specially designed chairs, which sometimes had straps on them 
to prevent them from  falling.
18 These suggestions were later discussed with the nursery workers, when w e watched the videotape 
together.
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Outside meal times, the above example is very typical of what was going on in the 
nursery with non-verbal children. It describes h o w  a model of a straightforward 
exchange of messages via communication aids is unthinkable in an everyday 
childcare context. I argue that interaction and communication in the nursery were 
inherently ‘messy’. The objectives of adults and of children (whatever they m a y  have 
been) did not inevitably coincide despite the workers’ efforts to follow the 
recommendations for good practice.
9.2.3 The ‘irrational’ child
So far I have talked about h o w  the nursery staff typically interpreted what the children 
meant. I have suggested that in choice making situations the child was expected to be 
‘rational’, that is to say, clearly indicate a choice between two or more options. In this 
section I describe h o w  the staff, at the same time, treated the child as an ‘irrational’ 
being. This, I argue, further illustrates the complexities that are involved in face-to- 
face communication between adults and children, as in the next caption.
‘ Joshua’ has tried to peel a toy banana -  a worker explains and signs to him that it is 
‘ m ake-believe’ one: ‘Y o u  cannot peel it but you can ‘ cook ’ it’ [in the toy  oven ].
Joshua is going back and forth between the floor corner, where all the others are 
sitting, and the kitchen corner. H e is carrying items o f  food  and a huge teddy around, 
demanding that others ‘ cuddle it ’ . I interpret that ‘M ik e ’ is crying ‘ attention-cry’ -  
he stops and smiles when one o f  the workers says: ‘Excuse m e’ . ‘ John’ is making 
repetitive sounds.
It appeared to m e  and to the worker that Joshua had tried to peel a toy banana and the 
staff m e m b e r  m ad e  sure that Joshua understood what he could do with the toy. 
Neither M i k e ’s nor John’s noises were interpreted as ‘appropriate’ social 
communication by the workers or me: the former was treated as attention seeking and 
the latter, as the workers had previously explained to me, a feature of John’s 
disability.
While in the previous extract the worker tried to lead the child away from play 
towards ‘reality’ (so that he would not eat the toy banana), in the next the opposite
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took place. This is an example of a free play session, where ‘Harry’ m a d e  a lot of 
noise and the worker tried to keep him quiet.
Harry was scared o f  the ‘ dinosaur’ -  a worker tricked him to be quiet so that the 
dinosaur does not wake up... Harry was funny - he walked on tiptoes, trying to be 
quiet. I  thought he was easily led into this fantasy world. Harry said to me: ‘ B ye  bye,
I want to get m y car’ . Soon he came back and parked his car near the kitchen corner.
I  asked whether there was ‘ petrol’ in the tank. H e said: ‘Bedroom ?’ And he went to 
sleep on the kitchen corner floor because he was 'tired' and he decided that this was 
his bedroom.
In m y  observations in the nursery, adults routinely ‘managed’ the children by mixing 
reality and play, or simply had a laugh with the children this way. A s  it appeared to 
me, sometimes this was acceptable but sometimes not. This depended on the 
judgment of the adult involved. M y  impression here was that Harry was easily led 
into believing that there was a ‘real’ dinosaur, because he was quieter after the worker 
tricked him. It seemed that the distinction between play and reality became blurred to 
him, and it appeared that he did not see the adult agenda. W h e n  I took part in play 
with Hany, I accepted that he did not necessarily understand the word ‘petrol’, and 
that he easily m o v e d  from one ‘scene’ to another: from the car to the ‘bedroom’.
M y  point is that during free play sessions a different kind of child was constituted 
than on more structured occasions: in the former case, it was accepted that children 
were ‘irrational’, in the latter they were expected to be more ‘rational’. Nevertheless, I 
argue that whatever the situation, what was deemed to be ‘rational’ or not was judged 
by the adults and based on interpretations. This applied to children’s communication 
in different ways, for instance, in terms of whether their talk ‘m a d e  sense’ to adults:
A  hand-puppet teddy (the user can m ove its mouth) is now used by ‘T racey ’ (kisses 
and cuddies). ‘ M ik e ’ likes it. Another worker comes in, and he says as a first thing:
“ I don’ t need m y dummy” . This refers to the situation before, when a worker asked 
whether he has a dummy at home. M ike still keeps repeating that he does not need 
his dummy. Then he says: ‘ Com e back here’ and a worker asks ‘ W hom  are you 
talking to? ’ H e starts repeating ‘This w ay ’ , looking at ‘ S teve ’ who is w igg lin g  on the 
mat. M ike calls the teddy Fred -  he wants to cuddle Fred, dragging it towards 
himself.
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Since I had been observing the situation for a while, I k n e w  that a worker and the 
parents had wanted to wean Mike off the d u m my .  W h e n  another worker came in, she 
did not k n o w  w h y  Mike was talking about the d u m m y  and asked: ‘W h o m  are you 
talking to?’ It appeared that Mike was a bit distressed about the d u m m y  episode -  I 
was only able to interpret this from the context -  but the workers did not appear to 
realise this, and ignored his talk. In short, what could have been logical for the child 
in any particular situation did not necessarily appear as such to the workers, if they 
did not k n o w  what had previously happened to the child. Hence the constructions of 
the child as either ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ were contextual.
9.3. Conclusion
In this chapter I have described communication in the ‘Children’s Centre’ in terms of 
‘rational action’. I have referred to situations where communication was perceived as 
something relatively straightforward, cognitive and preferably symbolic. In the 
nursery, it was treated as transferring messages between actors via words or symbols 
in particular situations, where it was appropriate. Choice making during meal times 
was an example of such situations.
M y  main argument here is that what was regarded as ‘rational action’ on the part of 
the child, particularly in the context of using visual communication aids, appeared 
rather ambiguous and context-bound to me. However, this was not due to the child’s 
impairment alone but to the multiplicity of meanings that were possible during 
interactions. Different meanings could be attached to what children ‘said’, verbally or 
via picture cards. Thus I challenge the desire that an unproblematic, direct connection 
could be established between the child’s intentions (or a lack of them) and the adults’ 
minds with the aid of A A C .
I argue that the use of picture communication symbols, in particular, constituted the 
child as a rational actor, requiring them to want and need. Nursery practice 
fundamentally involved preferences for not only rational action but also for rational 
thought. In contrast, during free play sessions, for instance, children’s ‘irrationality’ 
was openly addressed and often used as a means of managing them in a group.
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Another dimension of ‘rational action’ in m y  findings involves the adult frameworks 
for w h e n  to communicate one’s intentions. I observed that meal times were 
constructed as opportunities for the child to express his/her wishes and needs, whereas 
at other times this was not apparent. Sometimes, for example, during circle times, 
children could choose a song, and so forth. O n  occasions like this, choice making was 
on the adult-led therapeutic and educational agenda.
This chapter has looked at h o w  ‘communication’ was understood in the ‘Children’s 
Centre’ and h o w  this manifested itself in the daily practice. I have explained that this 
had to do with assumptions of what children were like, what they ought to do, and 
what was good for them. The next chapter will m o v e  to a more specific concern - 
‘communication difficulties’ -  and analyse h o w  children were objects of specialist 
intervention. Again, the key underlying theme in Chapter 10 is the notion of 
‘socialness’.
Chapter 10.
‘COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES’ AND CORRECTIVE PRACTICES IN
THE ‘CHILDREN’S CENTRE’ 
10.1 Introduction
This chapter continues with the ‘Children’s Centre’. M y  data analysis features routine 
events and activities where notions of ‘good’ and ‘normal’ communication played a 
central role. I will describe h o w  hegemonic discourses manifested themselves in the 
daily practice, and construed children as objects/receivers of care, education and 
‘correction’.
The findings suggest that in the ‘Children’s Centre’, ‘good’ and ‘normal’ 
communication was a central institutional objective: daily activities involved the 
conceptualisation and treatment of communication as a particular ‘skill’. In section
10.2 I will look at some ways in which specialist knowledges and practices framed the 
nursery day, and h o w  conventionalised forms of communication appeared to be a 
taken-for-granted element of interaction. Section 10.2.1 describes h o w  children’s 
communication was sometimes compartmentalised in different branches, in a ‘sturdy 
oak’ fashion (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2, p. 18). S o m e  elements of everyday versus 
specialist norms for ‘social communication’ skills will be described in section 10.2.2.
Educational and therapeutic activities in the nursery -  with both verbal and non-verbal 
children -  involved targeting literacy and oral skills. Symbolic understanding and 
clear speech were at the heart of these activities. In section 10.2.3,1 will illustrate h o w  
the nursery work involved an explicit preference for abstractions and words as ideals 
for ‘good’ and ‘normal’ communication. At the end of the chapter, I will summarise 
all the findings from the two settings.
10.2 Communication as an educational and therapeutic objective
In the same w a y  as in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting, the routine patterns of nursery work 
involved rules for h o w  to communicate. I have previously mentioned h o w  children in
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the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting were expected to behave in a certain w a y  at ‘appropriate’ 
times -  this section takes up this notion again. M y  analysis explores the various 
‘corrective practices’ in the nursery, which aimed at making children’s 
communication as ‘normal’ as possible.
10.2.1 The ‘sturdy oak’ revisited
The first data extract describes ‘Joshua’ and ‘T o m ’ receiving speech and language 
therapy. This is an example of a situation where developing ‘as-close-to-normal-as- 
possible’ speech was the purpose of interaction and h o w  children’s speech was 
routinely compartmentalised into separate skills, where they m a y  have had a variety 
of ‘deficiencies’ see (Figure 2 in Chapter 2, p. 18). O n  occasions like this, I argue, I 
observed the developmental ‘science’ of therapy merging with the ‘socialness’ of 
real-time interaction.
Joshua and T o m  had been diagnosed with different kinds of communication 
difficulties, one having to do with phonology, and the other with comprehension. 
F ro m  the therapist’s point of view, both of these difficulties affected the children’s 
verbal and literary performance. During the therapy session, the speech and language 
therapist (SLT) emphasised those aspects of the game that were the most appropriate 
for each child. For example, the S L T  asked T o m  to repeat certain letters over and over 
again, or to sign, whereas Joshua practiced with connecting words with symbols on 
the screen.
The extract is a transcription of a typical speech and language therapy session19, 
where the boys were looking at a computer screen. The S L T  had chosen a few 
interactive games that would suit both children. In the games, the computer voice 
asked a question about a word or sound, and the child was supposed to repeat it, as 
well as match words and sounds with correct symbols on the screen. It appeared that 
the boys had played these games before. The S L T ’s questions are in bold.
19 This was a video-recorded session. I had obtained permission for doing it from both the S L T  and the 
parents o f  the children.
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The boys are sitting at the computer next to each other. The S L T  starts the 
programme.
SLT: “I want us to play 'I spy with my little eye* - who wants to go first?”
Tom : (raising hand) ” M e !! ”
SLT: ”Off you go. ”
Tom  clicks the button.
Tom : ” It's not com in g ...”
SLT: ’’Joshua, are you watching? ”
Joshua turns to him and nods.
Then the S L T  repeats the computer’ s question:
SLT: ”1 spy with my little eye something that begins with 'd' - what was that 
noise? ”
Joshua is still distracted by me. Tom  takes hands o f f  the mouse and points at the 
screen when the S L T  asks what there is.
Tom : “ Th ere !!”
SLT: ’’What is it? Do you know? ”
Tom :”  d ...”
Joshua is smiling. H e knows how to say dinosaur, smiles at me. The computer 
rewards: ‘A l l  right’ , when the correct button pressed. Tom  pushes the mouse to 
Joshua saying nothing.
SLT: ’’Tell him that it is his turn. ”
Joshua takes the mouse and plays with it. H e does not appear to find the required 
symbol.
SLT: ’’Not there. ”
Joshua: “ W h y?”
SLT: ’’You have to put it there. ”
Joshua: “ W h y?”
SLT: ’’Because it turns the page! ”
The g ame was about articulating sounds -  in this case ‘d\ It displayed things starting 
with ‘d ’, such as ‘dinosaur’, on the screen. The boys were expected to recognise the 
‘thing’ on the screen, enounce the sound correctly and take turns in doing this. In 
other words, they needed to understand the rules of the game.
Tom : “ N ext p age...”
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T om  repeats the new sounds after the computer wh ile looking at the S L T  - 1 think he 
is defin itely listening, Joshua says nothing.
SLT:”Don't play with the roller ball. It's your turn. Have a look at what you 
want. ”
Joshua picks T  instead o f  'N'.
SLT: Tiii-nsect. ”
Joshua still keeps pointing at it.
SLT: ’’Does that begin with 'N'? ”
Joshua: “ O K .”
SLT: ”OK, if you think so. ”
There are just 3 symbols on the screen. Joshua got it right eventually.
SLT: ”Nnnn-ails. ”
Joshua repeats: “ Nnnn-ails” , looking bored.
SLT: ’’Can you do it Tom?”
Tom : “ N nnn ...”
SLT: ’’Well done, that's very nice talking Tom. ”
Tom : “ M y  turn.”
SLT: “Tom can you just try that sound for me - nnnn?”
Tom : “ nea...”
Joshua pushes the roller ball back to Tom .
SLT: ’’Well done Joshua, thank you.”
The computer says to Tom : “ W e ll done, you are doing really w ell.”
3 new symbols appear on the screen, including the letter Z.
SLT: ’’Difficult sound, isn't it? ”
Joshua knows 'Zip' as well. The S L T  asks him to show where he's got a zip  and he 
shows his jumper. Joshua is not talking but smiles when asked whether he's got a zip 
as w ell in his clothes.
SLT: ’’Not today.”
Joshua goes excitedly 'ooh' when Z  comes up on the screen.
SLT: ’’Can you say ZZZZ Tom? ”
Tom : “ I don't know.”
Tom  pushes the roller ball to Joshua, trying to say ‘Z ’ as he does so.
SLT: ’’Nice try”.
%As I interpreted it, T o m  was eager to follow the instructions and repeat the sounds: he 
demonstrated that he understood what he was supposed to do. Because T o m  was seen 
as having difficulties in uttering certain sounds, the S L T  tended to specifically ask 
him to repeat the sounds. Joshua did not appear to connect the words with the correct 
items on the screen, and the S L T  had to prompt him until he got it right.
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Tom : “ N ex t p age ...”
K  comes up.
Joshua: “ ICa!”
H e repeats it correctly and stands up. Tom  says ‘ Kangaroo’ almost right.
SLT: ’’Very good Tom. Now your turn Joshua. ”
Joshua is looking the other way, he does not say ‘Kangaroo’ .
Tom  takes the roller ball: “ M y  turn.”
N o w  Joshua looks really bored, leaning his head in his hands.
'IT  comes up. The S L T  suggests making sentences with 'House'.
Tom : “ I live in ... ’ ’ [The S L T  had said earlier that he tries to teach Tom  to make more 
than one-word sentences], Joshua is looking at me now.
The S L T  is signing 'mummy' and 'daddy' with Tom , who is repeating and signing as 
well.
The whole exercise is based on repetition.
The S L T  asks his own questions now.
SLT: “What about your house Joshua? Who lives there at the moment?”
Joshua: “ David  and M om m y.”
H e doesn't sign, even though the S L T  signs to him.
Tom : “ Daddy has gone to work, Daddy has gone to work.”
M eanwhile Tom  steals the roller ball.
SLT: “Tom are you talcing Joshua's turn?”
‘Haha’ , T om  smiles as w ell, m ischievously.
'I' comes up.
SLT: “Would you like me to help with it?”
Joshua: “ N O !”
N o w  Joshua has got ' I' right and says ‘ Insect’ . But he refuses to say it again after 
Tom  has tried to say it several times. Joshua hides his face in his hands.
SLT: “Just say no if you don't want to say it.”
Joshua nods, he's had enough o f  this game. The programme ends.
At this point I realised that Joshua was probably bored with the game, but also 
distracted by m y  presence. While T o m  was trying hard to get things right, including 
signing back to the SLT, Joshua was looking the other w a y  and fidgeting in his chair. 
T o m  kept taking the roller ball; as it appeared to me, the boys did not really want to 
take turns.
SLT: “Do you know what 'quit' means?”
The boys nod.
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Joshua is happy when the rocket game starts: ‘Yeah, I like it’ , he smiles.
But Tom  chooses the balloon game instead and stops the rocket game.
The computer says: ‘ Let's play the balloon game. Look  at the pictures in the 
balloons’ .
The symbols are ‘ thumb’ , ‘ thimble’ , ‘ ob long ’ , ‘ thermometer’ and ‘ sheep’ . The 
sounds are supposed to be connected to the right pictures, and the ones that start with 
the same sound should be selected. Then a letter representing the sound comes up.
The S L T  explains the game, repeats all the words and points at them. The S L T  thinks 
it's a d ifficu lt game, because it deals with ‘T H ’ and ‘ SH ’ sounds.
It seemed that Joshua would have preferred the rocket game; however, T o m  managed 
to choose the balloon game first. It was another one that emphasised enunciation.
SLT: “Do you know what you are trying to do?”
Both boys seem to be really concentrating. T om  tries hard now  that he's got the roller 
ball. Joshua looks totally lost, smiles at the S L T  when he says:’ T H , T H . ’
Joshua refuses to say thimble, says thumb when the S L T  asks: ‘ W hat is that?’ The
S L T  asks him to stick his tongue out like Tom  when he says T H , but he refuses to do
it. The kids look at each other every once in a while. Joshua is leaning on the table - 
he has been more restless than Tom  so far, but Tom  also is getting tired now.
N ew  pictures come along. Joshua can play this game really w ell -  he got them right 
instantly! Joshua laughs at the S L T ’s 'egg-degg' jok e  [egg  does not begin with d ... ] - 
it sounds funny. N o w  Tom  looks bored and tired.
The SLT asks which one starts with D.
Joshua points at the symbol in the corner o f  the screen that turns the page.
SLT: “No, that's the chap who helps us with the programme”.
N o w  Joshua starts getting things wrong and Tom  says the right answer. The S L T  
helps Joshua to point at the right symbol.
The boys seemed to get tired or bored at different times. This either affected, or was 
affected by, their performance.
SLT: “Would you like to play the rocket game now?”
Joshua nods:’ mmmmL 
Tom : “ I want a rocket game” .
Computer: “ Let's play the rocket game. C lick  on the letter that makes the beginning 
sound o f'y a k '” .
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Letters are written on rockets, and the rocket launches when the correct letter is 
chosen.
The computer says: “ This letter makes the sound...”
N o w  Tom  yawns. The rocket is launched.
Joshua: “ W here did it go?”
Joshua takes Tom  by the hand when T om  tries to m ove the roller ball. N o w  Joshua 
is, reluctantly, holding his hand over the roller ball and whispering 'stupid'. The 
children smile at the rockets. Joshua waits the S L T ’ s permission to take his turn 
again.
Joshua keeps playing with a wrong letter (o  instead o f  y; yoghurt). H e clicks on the 
wrong one many times and the computer repeats what he did wrong: ‘This letter 
makes the sound...o eve iy  time. H e smiles at this repetition.
SLT: “I think we had better stop now.”
Joshua: “ A re  we going to turn it o f f  now?”
SLT: “No, we are going to take one quick turn each.”
The boys look at each other. Joshua asks Tom : ‘W hat? ’
SLT: “I think he is waiting for you to do it.”
The goals of the games in the extract were clear: they all addressed a particular ‘skill’, 
whether it was phonetic, or having to do with symbolic understanding. The training in 
these skills is geared towards the development of the child’s oral output and literacy. 
Having two children in the session at the same time also created an opportunity to 
practice social skills, such as turn taking.
The two boys were regarded as having different kinds o f ‘communication difficulties’, 
and therefore being in need of different types of exercises. However, I perceived that 
there were also other situational differences that affected their performances. These 
would include what they were interested in, whether they were tired, what was 
amusing to them, w h o  were present and so forth. It appeared that ‘success’ in the 
games was contextual and depended on whether the adult and the children shared the 
same understandings of the situation.
10.2.2 ‘Social communication’ skills
‘Social communication’ skills were an explicit objective of action in the nursery. 
Attempts were being m ad e  to encourage child-child commimication and co-operation.
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So far I have mentioned, for example, turn taking. Social communication would also 
include everyday polite behaviour, such as simply saying ‘thank you’.
There are now lots o f  children in the nursery, but not that many workers. ‘L es lie ’ and 
‘M ik e ’ are crying. ‘ John’ makes noise. ‘ Joshua’ is playing with toy cars on his own.
The workers take children to the toilets one at the time. There is a lot o f  noise in the 
room. Then the workers start planning the next group activity. ‘ T racey ’ says to 
Joshua: “ Thanks for tidying up (toy  cars)” . M ike says about Joshua, who is sitting in 
a car: "He's in the car". The workers repeat and grammatically correct what he says.
They are continuously asking questions, such as: "W here are you going?"
Then M ike goes to sit in the car. H e starts to cry all o f  a sudden. D id  ‘Adrian ’ do 
something to him? I did not see. Tracey: “ Stop crying. D o you want to get out?"
Other children watch him crying. Tracey: "M ike, that's enough, hush". Adrian brings 
in an apron for ‘ S teve’ . A  worker says ‘ thank you ’ on his behalf (S teve does not have 
speech).
The workers typically rewarded children for having ‘good’ manners and ‘helping 
out’; this was mostly quite spontaneous. The children were particularly praised when 
they were polite towards each other, such as w h e n  Adrian, of his o w n  accord, helped 
Steven, w h o  was in a wheelchair.
However, it often seemed that child-child communication in the nursery was not 
obvious. The verbal children would very rarely talk to each other without adult 
encouragement. M a n y  children preferred playing on their own, or together if there 
was an adult co-ordinating the play; often there was one adult per child present, which 
allowed for one-to-one contact between the two. This was particularly apparent when 
the adults attempted to engage the whole group in a joint activity.
‘ Gareth’ and ‘ Jenny’ are fighting -  they slap each other and squeeze arms. The 
workers notice this immediately: ‘ Stop. Y ou  have to say sorry’ . The children start 
looking the other way. ‘L es lie ’ is looking at (not speaking) the children and adults 
beside him. The nativity play starts -  ‘T racey ’ explains how it works. Some children 
are crawling on the floor. Each child has a different role in the play - Leslie 
remembers other children’ s roles but not his own.
The workers sign the story and g ive  hats and other accessories to children. They  are 
singing ‘ little donkey’ when ‘Jemma’ (the donkey) is pushed forward. A lso  ‘ M ary ’
( ‘ Jenny’ ) comes forward. The workers do not appear to remember the words but are
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planning how to do it. They  explain to the children what is going on, trying to get 
them to learn the lines. The children are so funny, w e just laugh. They  bounce 
around and do the opposite to what they are told. ‘ Denise’ knows it's time to ring her 
bell. (Jingle bells). Some children are more engaged in this than some others.
Even though the rehearsal focused on verbal communication and signing, there was 
non-verbal communication going on between the children. The latter was not 
necessarily perceived as social though: for instance, the workers had to intervene in 
Gareth’s and Jenny’s fight and remind the children that ‘they had to say sorry’.
It was difficult to get the children together for the rehearsal: the children had to be 
actively engaged, particularly the ones w h o  were physically mobile. The situation was 
rather chaotic, and this seemed to amuse the staff. Leslie, however, appeared to be 
interested in the rehearsal and showed that he had listened to other children’s lines the 
last time. S o m e  other children were enjoying their roles as well, and did what they 
were told.
At the time of the observation, in m y  eyes, the active engagement of m a n y  reluctant 
children in the play looked like an attempt to simulate ‘normality’, that is to say, 
trying to m a k e  the rehearsal a ‘normal’ social situation. I had observed the same 
‘simulacra’ during other circle times where children were seated in a circle, facing 
each other, but where the adults did all the talking. I could not help regarding most 
children in the nursery as passive recipients of instruction, w h o  were not interested in 
communicating with other children. However, this assumption was challenged 
sometimes.
Lunchtime is starting and the children are prepared for it. The children are now  'told' 
what to do such as 'sit up'. A  worker comes in and starts helping a trainee. The room 
is all o f  a sudden really noisy when all the kids are brought in.
Some children are sitting around the table - the others, who are in wheelchairs, are 
quietly watching. W hat does a worker at the table say to a boy? 'Eat properly ’ ;
‘ L eave it on your own plate i f  you don't like it’ ; ‘Denise, what are you doing? ’ ;
‘Don't bang your plate’ . ‘M artin ’ is being fed  and given medication -  the worker puts 
his hand in the potato mash. The worker is telling him what the food is like. I asked 
why and she replies: ‘Because he has missed the messing with food that normal 
children d o ’ .
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Other children have already finished. I think there is quite a lot interaction between 
children at the table. They  are looking at each other; smiling, laughing when other 
kids are told off. The children are expected to sit down until everyone has finished 
eating. They cannot wait though. A l l  the children are being talked to individually by 
the workers.
W h a t  the extract suggests is that children would interact with each other w h e n  the 
adults did not necessarily expect them to, or w h e n  they treated it as ‘noise’. I observed 
a lot of non-verbal behaviour going on, some of which indicated to m e  that the 
children were engaged in the situation, even though they did not talk to each other.
At the same time, I noticed that there was a practical division between verbal and non­
verbal children. The former sat at their o w n  table, whereas the latter were seated in 
their wheelchairs behind the verbal ones in a semi-circle. It was typical to divide 
children into different groups depending on their self-help skills, also at other than 
mealtimes. There were plenty of practical and understandable practical reasons for 
this: yet the constant presence of adults, particularly on a one-to-one basis, seemed to 
impose limitations on the child’s hoped-for attainment of social skills with other 
children.
Verbal exchanges between children and adults were m u c h  more c o m m o n  than those 
between children. For example, sometimes children would initiate play:
‘ Harry ’ took the initiative from  the start. I went to sit at a table and he guided the 
game: “ W ould you like a cup o f  tea? W ould you like some more?”  H e kept putting 
things on plates in front o f  me, answering m y questions such as: “ D o you like 
oranges? What's that?”  (e.g. spaghetti). I  didn't correct him when he called toy 
spaghetti a 'plate'. ‘Anna’ tried to com e to the kitchen corner too but he did not let 
her. ‘Don't com e here’ he said and shouted to the other workers: “ W e  are playing” .
Anna looked at us and I said to Harry: “ M aybe she's hungry” . He asked “ W h y?”  as i f  
he wanted to 'own' me, and Anna went away. Harry asked: “ W h y is she taking the 
fruit?”
Our verbal exchange on this occasion followed the culture-specific conventions that I 
had seen adults teaching to children before in the ‘kitchen corner’: Harry would aski 
polite questions and offer m e  a cup of tea. W e  seemed to naturally slip into a 
‘question-answer’ model, although unlike what the staff members would have done, I 
did not ‘correct’ Harry’s item labelling. I also felt that both Harry and A n n a  preferred
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playing with an adult to playing with other children. I draw this conclusion from the 
fact that Harry chased A n n a  away and asked me, instead of her, w h y  she took the 
fruit.
10.2.3 The primacy of speech and symbolic understanding
Labelling items was a typical feature of adult talk to children, during ‘free play’ or 
more structured educational or therapeutic sessions. With verbal children the adults 
labelled items with words.
Three children and W orkerl are playing in the kitchen corner. ‘D iana’ says hello to 
Worlcer2 -  ‘Robert’ cuts toast. The worker looks at me: "Safe cutting...". She talks 
all the time naming the items and actions: marmalade, peanut butter, plates; i.e. to 
have a meal and what the items are like. W orkerl tells Robert to pick up a ja r  that he 
had thrown on the floor - he starts sidling in that direction but sits up on a chair 
instead. Then he goes to sit in a car. W orker2 comes in with a keyboard and the 
children are now  interested in that and leave the kitchen corner.
With non-verbal children the same idea was used, although words were replaced with 
signing or picture communication symbols. The following extract is an assemblage20 
of data gained from some informal interviews with staff members over the course of 
the observations, w h e n  I opportunistically asked about their views on picture books 
and their use; m y  questions are in bold. It offers a rationale for the ways in which the 
picture books were employed in the nursery.
Why do you use picture books in the nursery?
Picture books are simple to start with: at first there are on ly 2 symbols per page. The 
books have 2 uses: to tell the child what is happening so that they can start to learn 
meanings. The w ay in which the book is organised facilitates choices that they can 
start to make. The books used w ill change as the children grow  older: they w ill be 
more categorised, including e.g. mealtimes, places...subject categories; they w ill 
facilitate using a w ider system o f  vocabulary once the child is ready to use it; they 
w ill have 4 colour coded pictures per page -  colours also represent meanings (see 
Appendix 3).
20 This assemblage is a reconstruction o f  m y data (rather than ‘ raw data’ )  for two reasons: 1) to bring 
together fragmented pieces o f  information that were gathered over a period o f  time, and 2 ) to protect 
the identities o f  the sta ff members.
1 8 0
Do the parents use the books at home?
Some parents like this idea but most o f  them would prefer their children to speak - 
sometimes parents are either lazy or don't believe that picture books help.
Where do these symbols come from?
There are various symbol systems -  sta ff members have to choose suitable ones and 
sometimes create new ones or borrow from  other systems. Signing should be just 
one system (there is still diversity - similar to languages in general). N o t  all parents 
want/like to sign and workers do not always either - like the children themselves, 
they prefer speech. D ifferent systems work differently depending on the child (e.g. 
whether to trust hand or eye movements). One should know the child to make it 
easier to understand symbol usage; sta ff members may know the child better than the 
parents.
Who decides what symbols to put in these books or to use? Experts and parents 
combine their ideas about the child's needs; the child ’ s needs com e from  the 
everyday life  societal pool of knowledge.
What are the written words for in the picture books? For adults and some 
children who learn to read (IQ  is mentioned); this is purely a developmental v iew  
based approach. H ow ever, children are not always interested in learning the 
sym bolic meanings - they may not be mature in that w ay or maybe simply 
disinterested, but one has to probe though.
The symbols in the books were categorised logically (see Appendix 3):' in the simplest 
books these could be categories such as mealtimes (‘yes’ or ‘n o ’, food items, and so 
on) or places (home, nursery, playground), as mentioned in the extract. In the more 
complex books, they could also be categorised by colour, for example: green 
representing ‘health care’, blue representing ‘hobbies’, brown representing ‘family 
mem be r s ’ and so forth.
The books were creatively designed by the nursery staff, w h o  had consulted the 
parents, and the changes in the books took place w h e n  they felt that the child was 
ready to learn more symbols. It was noted that it helped w h e n  the adults k n e w  the 
child well. Including symbols for body parts in the books was, to an extent, a sensitive 
issue, because of the various connotations they m a y  entail; however, this was not a 
routine concern in the nursery.
In the nursery practice, it was stressed that children had to be taught symbolic 
meanings, in the form of abstractions. In the extract, it is acknowledged that the
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teaching and learning processes were tedious, not just for the child but also for the 
parents and workers, w h o  sometimes just stopped trying altogether. For example, the 
child might be frustrated if the earliest picture book is too simple to express those 
ideas he/she wishes to communicate; on the other hand, a n e w  book with a more 
complex structure m a y  also be frustrating to teach and learn for different reasons.
Even though staff members explicitly stated that the rationale for using picture books 
was based on the somewhat ‘scientifically proven’ developmental view of children’s 
symbolic understanding, the actual construction of the books drew on a general 
‘societal pool of knowledge’. This is an example of h o w  expert knowledges merged 
into more everyday knowledges.
In the ‘Children’s Centre’ picture books were mostly used to replace ‘missing’ 
speech. They were socially constructed ‘texts’ that were meant to establish links 
between reality, the child’s mind and the adult’s mind; the success rate in this was 
judged in terms of the child’s overall development. Since the children were very 
young, it was obvious that other people constructed the books for them. The extract 
indicates that this construction process was seen as being easier for people w h o  k ne w 
the child -  his/her needs’ - best. A s  I interpret this comment, ‘knowing’ the child was, 
thus, a joint project, where specialist input alone did not suffice.
10.3 Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that communication was an important institutional 
objective in the ‘Children’s Centre’. Children’s communication was first and foremost 
treated as a skill. If children were perceived as lacking certain skills -  phonetic, 
vocabulary, understanding and so on -  the staff had duties to work on the impairment. 
Sometimes the ‘corrective practices’ were quite structured, such as in speech and 
language therapy; at other times they would be incorporated into free play and other 
everyday activities.
Children in the setting were expected to speak, or communicate via A A C ,  in a certain 
way. B y  this I m e a n  that culture-specific social conventions for ‘good’ 
communication were a routine element of education and therapy: it was the staff
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m embers’ duty to pass the ‘societal pool of knowledge’ on to children. Moreover, a 
particular view of social communication was a salient element of nursery objectives: 
joint activities, interaction between children and talk/signing whenever possible were 
encouraged.
In the nursery, targeting communication was a central part of all activities. Speech 
and literacy skills were emphasised in education and therapy: children were 
straightforwardly taught words, or symbols to replace words. The importance of 
certain words over other possibilities was visibly manifested, especially in the 
individual picture books. In these books, which I understood as socially constructed 
‘texts’, preferences for abstractions and understandings of what each individual child 
was like were brought together.
♦
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PART 4: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In Part IV, I will discuss the findings, and draw the thesis to its conclusion. 
Chapter II  reviews the findings in the light of the sociological theories that were 
outlined in Parts I and II. Following my own advice on ‘doing’ reflexive 
research, Chapter 12 continues the discussion that started in Part II. Chapter 13 
concludes the thesis, with some ideas for future research on 
‘ communication/difficulties ’.
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Chapter 11.
DISCUSSION: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF YOUNG (DISABLED) 
CHILDREN’S ‘COMMUNICATION/DIFFICULTIES’
11.1 Introduction
I will n o w  discuss the findings in light of sociological theory. The title of this Chapter 
is meant to stand for what m y  discussion aims to bring together under the term ‘social 
construction’. First, I regard ‘good communication’ and ‘communication difficulties’ 
as social constructions. Second, I connect these constructions to the discursive 
features of ‘Childhood’ and ‘Disability’, bearing in mind that the children in m y  study 
were young, but not necessarily ‘disabled’; nevertheless they were all participants in 
clinical/therapeutic encounters.
In section 11.1.1 I will summarise m y  findings from the two settings. This Chapter 
then talks about social construction of ‘communication/difficulties’ on both discursive 
and everyday interaction levels. Section 11.2 relocates m y  data on young children’s 
‘communication/difficulties’ in the context of current moral-pragmatic discourses in 
the U K  (England). I argue that certain dominant discourses, w h e n  translated into 
social interaction in the two settings, drew on notions of ‘good communication’ as a 
skill, right and need and ‘communication difficulty’ as an object of specialist action.
In section 11.3, I intend to deconstruct the above notion of ‘good communication’ 
with regards to m y  data. I will discuss h o w  understanding and treating ‘good 
communication’ as a m e d i u m  and objective in the two settings was connected to 
rationalist assumptions about the h u m a n  mind. Yet communication - in other words, 
meaning making - between adults and children (and between children) was 
contextual. This finding challenges the primacy of verbalism and abstractions within 
hegemonic ‘adult’ models for communication.
The knowledge/power of the expert in this research manifested itself in the social 
construction of ‘Childhood’, ‘Disability’ and ‘communication/difficulties’. Section
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11.4 considers this in terms of ‘techniques for knowing’. With reference to specialist 
‘reading’ and ‘writing’ processes, I will discuss the significance of decision making 
being in the hands of the clinical/therapeutic expert. The juxtaposition of the 
‘scientific’ with the ‘socialness’ of h u m a n  interaction aims to deconstruct specialist 
epistemoiogies, in terms of h o w  they operated in the ‘T e a m  Service’ practice in 
particular.
In section 11.5, I will return to powerful societal discourses on the necessity of 
communication for a ‘good’ life. I argue that the pathologisation of ‘communication 
difficulty’ m a y  contribute to disablement of young children in that it normalises and 
gives priority to some skills over others. M y  findings have indicated that, typically, 
discourses for good practice involve preferences for ‘rationality’, which permeated 
relationships between experts (subjects) and children (objects). I suggest that m y  
findings in the two research settings, can, in this respect, be generalised to other 
arenas o f ‘child centred’ action in western societies.
Sections 11.6 and 11.7 follow on from this, by addressing the practical difficulties that 
the ideal of ‘meeting children’s needs’ poses to health professionals. This is to 
acknowledge that changes in child law and other societal discourses do not easily 
translate to practice. However, it would be too short-sighted to simply blame the 
professionals. Instead, I suggest that the notions of children as ‘agentic beings’ are 
beset with ambiguities, which childhood sociology has not yet resolved (Lee, 1999). 
This, in m y  view, has profound implications for child protection work, as well as 
everyday ‘child centred’ practice.
11.1.1 S u m m a r y  of findings
The ‘T e a m  Service’
In the ‘T e a m  Service’ practice, communication was perceived as a measurable skill. 
‘N or ma l ’ communication was defined using developmental parameters, where 
language played a key role. ‘Communication difficulty’ was treated primarily as a 
mental and/or physical pathology that could be identified by clinically trained experts.
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The ‘T e a m  Service’ practice was decision orientated. Decision making typically 
involved negotiation and selective descriptions of the child. The practitioners retained 
their authority over lay perspectives. Their expertise involved the use of specific tools 
to explain aspects of reality and to generate a ‘scientifically proven’ reading of the 
child. Decisions were connected to action via texts such as case reports, which were 
an outcome of social construction work.
The assessment setting was a different context from the child’s other everyday 
experiences. It was structured by adult-led activities, and the child was expected to 
follow the adult logic. The assessments typically involved so-called standardised 
tests; yet the child’s performance was subject to situational adult interpretation. They 
frequently featured individual T e a m  m e m be r s ’ sociocultural preferences for ‘good 
communication’ and ‘normality’.
The ‘Children’s Centre’
In the ‘Children’s Centre’, communication was perceived as the process of 
transferring messages between actors via words or symbols in particular situations, 
where it was appropriate. Communication was seen as vital to, for example, choice 
making, and as a choice maker, the child was expected to be a rational actor. Yet the 
choice making situations revealed the ambiguous character of meaning making via 
abstractions. Furthermore, at other times, it was ‘all right’ for the child to be 
‘irrational’. A s  a communication event, choice making was on the adult-led 
therapeutic and educational agenda.
Children’s communication was treated as a ‘skill’ that could be improved. A n y  
‘difficulties’ in communication skills were addressed with various ‘corrective 
practices’. Children were actively encouraged to speak and develop literacy skills 
whenever possible. Furthermore, children in the nursery were expected to speak, or 
communicate via A A C  in a certain way. Culture-specific social conventions for ‘good 
communication’ were a routine element of daily practice.
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11.2 The place of children’s ‘communication/difficulties’ in the landscape of 
moral-pragmatic discourses
In view of the practice literature that I reviewed in Chapter 2, work with children in 
the two research settings followed contemporary recommendations for good practice. 
The explicit understandings of children’s ‘communication/difficulties’ drew on moral- 
pragmatic discourses, the purpose of which was to identify and meet children’s 
perceived needs. In both settings, communication was treated as a skill, which some 
children lacked to some extent because of developmental or other ‘difficulties’. Thus 
these children were in need of professional intervention, in the form of assessment, 
therapy and/or education.
11.2.1 The ontology of ‘good communication’ as a skill, right and need
Chapter 2 described h o w  dominant practice discourses on communication presented it 
as the essence of h u m a n  life (Glennen, 1997; Phillips, 1998). These discourses 
suggested that, legally and ethically, a professional’s duty is to enhance the child’s 
communication skills and promote a positive self-image as an effective 
communicator. This was seen as beneficial for the individual - in both the short and 
long term - in terms of what society can offer to them.
B y  and large, these discourses draw on developmental psychology, within which I 
distinguish two different ways of understanding ‘good communication’. First, there is 
a hegemonic discourse, which positions language as playing a central role in child 
development. Figure 1 (in Chapter 2, p. 18) illustrated Cooper’s (1978) model of 
children’s language development, which conceptualises language as a vehicle for 
thought. Models like this construe the ‘normal development’ of the child’s 
communicative skills evolving from pre-language and situational understanding to 
symbolic understanding. The Piagetian theory of child development has been 
influential in this respect with its emphasis on developmental stages that children go 
through (Jenlcs, 1996).
Second, there is a more recent, although, as it appears, less influential trend within 
developmental psychology, which understands children’s communication as a
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multiplex phenomenon (Bishop &  Leonard, 2000). This view stresses that vocabulary 
and speech is often overemphasised as a measure of communication skill: language is 
seen as only one part of the overall picture of child development, and that recent 
research shows considerable variation within the ‘normal’ range (Law, 2000). This 
poses a challenge to, for example, C h o m s k y ’s grammar-based theory of children’s 
language development.
I argue that in the two research settings, ‘good communication’ was fundamentally 
treated as a cognition-based skill along the lines of the above hegemonic discourse. In 
the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting, children’s speech was explicitly compared to 
developmental standards. The practitioners would c ome up with a numerical score for 
the child’s developmental age, of which speech and language were regarded as a 
central part. W h e n  the child was perceived as being ‘up to’ a standardised test, his/her 
skills were tested on the basis of measures of ideal-typical average ability at a certain 
age. Children at pre-language stage were often assessed with less verbal tests than 
‘more cognitively able’ children, w h o  would, for instance, complete sentences, or 
repeat complex sentences. Sometimes standardised tests were not used at all, if the 
child was seen as being either too young or too ‘disabled’.
In the ‘Children’s Centre’, teaching communication skills to children was an explicit 
objective. Speech, signing and the use of picture communication symbols were the 
dominant forms of communication that were practiced with children both within 
everyday social interaction and therapeutic intervention. Since literacy training ( AA C)  
was central to the work of the nursery, I argue that in terms of ‘good communication’, 
there was a preference for symbolic exchange.
In terms of children’s perceived rights, the notion of ‘good communication’ also 
features within the discourse of consultation. This discourse promotes personal choice 
and control, the child’s right to information and to freedom of expression, and, whe n  
appropriate, having his/her wishes and feelings listened to (Morris, 1999). In a similar 
vein, in both settings, communication skills were understood as a need. In the 
‘Children’s Centre’, signing and the use of picture communication symbols were 
examples of efforts to ‘bridge the communication gap’ between adults and children
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with little or no speech. Enabling children to m ake choices was an important objective 
in the nursery in this respect.
11.2.2 ‘Communication difficulty’ as an object of action
Practice literature has suggested that developmental discourses constitute 
‘communication difficulties’ both as societal and personal problems, and well- 
delivered early intervention is seen to have long-term positive influences on 
children’s lives (Glascoe &  Sturner, 2000). This research has specifically studied 
‘communication difficulty’ related expert intervention in child assessments and 
speech and language therapy. The former focus has explored the identification process 
for ‘communication difficulties’, and the latter has looked at ‘corrective practices’ in 
post-diagnostic intervention.
M y  findings indicated some discursive ambiguities in these practices. I argue that the 
pressure for early intervention and the practical difficulties in diagnosing children 
under three appeared to be a significant contradiction within the ‘T e a m  Service’ 
practice. Frequently, in m y  observations, the child was seen as too young to be 
reliably assessed using formal tests. At the same time, recent literature suggests that 
m a n y  ‘difficulties’ m a y  resolve of their o w n  accord (Dockrell &  Messer, 1999) and 
early intervention, therefore, might not be necessaiy after all. Because of the variation 
involved in clinical criteria for different ‘difficulties’ and the recognition that children 
do not manifest the ‘symptoms’ in a straightforward way, a lot of ‘cases’ constitute a 
grey area for the practitioners.
The main ambiguities in the assessments that I witnessed21 revolved around 
diagnosing complex developmental disorders, distinguishing between different 
‘conditions’ and the feasibility of using standardised screening tests. Several times in 
m y  observations, the referral had suggested Asperger’s Syndrome (or another 
‘disorder’ along the so-called autistic spectrum) as the source of the child’s 
‘difficulty’. This suggestion was sometimes initiated by parents, sometimes other
21 A s  indicated in Figure 8 (p. 77), ‘ communication difficu lties ’ were a frequent reason for referring the 
child to the Team  for assessment. In m y interpretation, the Team  carefully considered all possibilities 
for the child ’ s difficulties: a com plex developmental disorder was one o f  the possibilities.
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agencies, such as primary school teachers or health visitors. In the literature on 
complex developmental disorders it is recognised that they can be notoriously 
difficult to diagnose (Attwood, 1998). I observed that, typically, in the assessments 
the T e a m  members looked for autistic-type symptoms. ‘Communication difficulties’ 
sometimes being part of a syndrome, poor social communication skills were pointed 
out, including, for example, unusual eye contact.
The T e a m ’s role here was to first question the parents about the child’s behaviour at 
h o m e  and then either confirm or reconsider referral concerns. W h e n  the parents or 
other visitors were in doubt about the outcomes of assessments, the practitioners 
emphasised that their tests were standardised and each child would thus receive equal 
treatment. The complexities of actually pinning d o w n  the label or category for the 
child’s difficulties were not openly discussed in the presence of parents or me. For 
example, it was not always certain whether the child had a developmental or language 
disorder, or a combination of both.
Another challenge in assessing the child’s language ‘difficulties’ were bilingual 
and/or multilingual children. Recent practice orientated literature on communication 
difficulties in childhood suggests that bi/multilingualism should not be treated as a 
disadvantage, and that the child’s skills should not be simply compared to 
monolingual norms (Martin, 2000). In the ‘T e a m  Service’ practice, it was 
acknowledged that the T e a m  members could only assess the child’s skills in the 
English language. However, I observed some sociocultural preferences emerging 
from the assessments of these children.
In both settings, the speech and language therapist’s duty was to maximise the child’s 
communication potential. In the assessments, his/her role involved identifying each 
child’s communicative needs, which required further intervention. In the ‘Children’s 
Centre’, this role entailed enhancing children’s speech and literacy skills, as well as 
the use of A A C .  Nonetheless, it appeared that speech and language therapy in both 
settings tended to compartmentalise the child’s skills into different areas, i.e. different 
branches of the tree (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2, p. 18). The whole tree would come into 
the picture in terms of calculating the test scores and comparing these with
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developmental milestones. In speech and language therapy sessions the focus was on 
a particular ‘weakness’, for example, in symbolic understanding or phonology.
M y  data analysis suggests that, in both settings, speech and language therapists 
explicitly drew on medical, developmental and language models (Byers Brown, 
1981). I argue that these models essentially located ‘communication difficulties’ in 
the speaker. Communication was construed as a matter of speech and symbolic 
understanding, which had to be taught to children. ‘Communication difficulty’ was 
perceived as a pathology that prevented the child from functioning ‘normally’ and the 
effects of which could potentially be alleviated by therapeutic corrective practices; i.e. 
the child needed to be corrected.
I will n o w  discuss what, in m y  view, constituted ‘good communication’ in the two 
settings. Drawing on interpretivist, interactionist and integrationist perspectives, I 
suggest that there are various methods of communication, but that only some of these 
forms tend to be preferred over others. This is sociologically problematic, and, 
according to m y  observations in both settings, fundamentally affects adult-child 
interactions in daily practice.
11.3 Communication as a contextual and interpretive accomplishment
This thesis proposes that meanings in h u m a n  communication are ultimately context- 
bound. In the two settings, they arose from situational interaction and interpretations, 
although they were at the same time framed by influential discourses and practices 
that sustained those discourses. This finding not only challenges the ideal of ‘good’ or 
‘normal’ communication in childhood, but the feasibility of this normalising ideal 
anywhere, including various modes of communication.
Bakhtin’s dialogical model of speech communication provides an alternative to the 
hegemonic monological view. It suggests that meanings are a joint product, and 
mutual understanding of them requires a certain reciprocity between actors 
(Graumann, 1995). This rejects certain traditions in the study of semantics, where 
word meanings, for example, are reduced to their dictionary-like form. It also rejects 
an atomistic view of the ‘self as either sender or receiver of messages, and places
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emphasis on the interaction between h u m a n  actors, including the communication 
m e d i u m  (Wadensjo, 1998), which can sometimes be another person, text or a method 
of A A C .
I discuss these ideas, firstly, in section 11.3.1, which turns to the notion of the ‘fallacy 
of verbalism’ and preferences for abstractions in h o w  they emerged from m y  findings. 
Secondly, section 11.3.2 looks at what implications the understanding of 
communication as contextual and rational, and ‘communication difficulties’ as 
socially constructed m a y  have for conceptualising children’s ‘voices’. Finally, in 
section 11.3.3, I question the feasibility of a child wanting to express his/her 
innermost thoughts, wishes and feelings in institutionalised contexts regardless of the 
m e d i u m  of communication.
11.3.1 The fallacy of verbalism and the ambiguity of abstractions
It is probably safe to generalise that talk and literacy, for m a n y  of us, are taken-for- 
granted skills. The two settings were not exceptional in this respect: children were 
actively encouraged to talk and develop literacy skills. For instance, nursery workers 
would label items for children in order to extend vocabulary and teach social 
communication skills through play. In the nursery, signing and other methods of A A C  
were practiced with children w h o  had little or no speech. A n  important purpose of 
teaching children abstract symbols and conventional literacy was to enable them to 
develop context-free modes of communication.
Nevertheless, m y  observations of the two research settings suggest that 
communication in them was thoroughly contextual. This was because the typical daily 
events, although patterned and conventionalised in m a n y  ways, always involved an 
element of unpredictability. Although the staffs roles were to act as ‘puppeteers’, 
children would employ their o w n  perceptions of the situations in their actions, or there 
were other situational factors (such as the parental presence) that ‘interfered’ with 
rationalised plans of action. This was not only the case between children and adults 
but also between adults. Because of the contextuality, I argue, communication in both 
settings was often, if not all the time, ambiguous.
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The basic problem was that, in verbal or non-verbal communication, there was an 
underlying although obvious ideal model for transmitting messages, coupled with the 
expectation that, w h e n  the adults so wished, the child would be a rational, intentional 
being on those occasions. Choice making by using picture cards epitomised the 
idealisation of ‘fixed’ meanings. Symbols were used as a language: they were treated 
as part of a system as words are in sentences. Often, in practice, they also came to be 
used as if they were directly representative of reality (Potter, 1996). I see a connection 
between this finding and H a m s ’ (1996) term, the ‘fallacy of verbalism’, in that non­
verbal signs were treated as words.
In addition, noise making in the nursery was often attended to in this manner, so as to 
include non-verbal children in social situations. For example, the workers would ask: 
" What are you trying to say?” Sometimes they did not pay attention to it, or they 
deliberately treated it as distracting ‘noise’ rather than ‘good communication’. The 
adult responses to children depended on the situation: they were by no means 
consistent. At any rate, I ask: h o w  could they have been? The workers’ situational 
interpretative work was based on h o w  they felt at the time in terms of what they 
‘k n e w ’ about the child.
Thus I argue that meanings, in general, were generated through interactions, which 
were, in turn, subject to interpretation again. This became particularly apparent in the 
use of picture communication symbols, as well as during free play sessions, w hen 
children would initiate and create their o w n  meanings. Typically, children would 
creatively mix and match adult-type conventions (such as polite requests) with their 
o w n  fantasy worlds. Children also expressed their imagination in the ‘T e a m  Service’ 
assessments, for example, w h e n  they interpreted the meanings of pictures in their o w n  
words.
11.3.2 Children’s ‘voices’ and the problem of meaning making 
I agree with L a w  et al (2000), w h o  have stated:
“ [The] organic ‘ tree’ analogy is helpful because it relates the various subcomponents
with another in an active sense. Noth ing about communication is static either in
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terms o f  the interaction between individuals or in terms o f  the developmental 
sequence o f  the individual skills”  (See Figure 2 in Chapter 2, p. 18).
I have previously used the metaphor ‘sturdy oak versus weeping willow’ to describe 
h o w  something fluid becomes abstract and solid by interpretive action. In this respect, 
the notion of ‘the voice of the child’ appears problematic, regardless of whether the 
child has been diagnosed with ‘communication difficulties’. O n  the basis of m y  
findings, I question the construction of children’s ‘voices’ as coherent entities that can 
be systematically and in generalisable ways retrieved either through verbal or non­
verbal interaction. Unlike in developmental and mentalistic approaches, however, I 
a m  not justifying m y  argument by young and/or disabled children’s less developed 
cognitive functioning or lack of experience alone. Instead, I want to steer the attention 
to complexities of adult-child interaction in situations where the child’s ‘voice’ was 
sometimes explicitly on the agenda. I encountered this kind of situations in both 
research settings.
In m y  attempt to theorise children’s ‘voices’ in the two settings, I draw on the 
Bakhtinian point of view, where they are conceptualised as processes rather than 
locations (Foppa, 1995). This perspective suggests that they never exist in social 
isolation: meanings com e  into existence w h e n  two or more ‘voices’ meet. Bakhtin’s 
concept of ‘multivoicedness’ means that ‘voices’ do not simply c om e  from an 
individual’s head but are shaped by others in society. For this reason, interpersonal 
communication is never fail-safe. In this section, I connect m y  version of this view to 
both verbal and non-verbal communication in m y  findings.
I argue that the child’s ‘voice’ in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting was fundamentally 
framed by the fact that the child there was primarily a test subject and in the nursery 
by the fact that the child was a receiver of care, therapy and education. Furthermore, 
in the nursery, efforts were regularly m ad e  to ‘bridge the communication gap’, 
whereas with the ‘T e a m  Service’, listening was not built into the assessments as such. 
In both settings, I argue, the child’s ‘voice’ was attended to if and w hen an 
opportunity arose and w h e n  it was allowed for by the professional adult agenda22.
22 Sometimes this involved child protection concerns; however, for confidentiality reasons, I have not 
detailed these situations in my data.
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Teaching ‘social communication’ skills as an institutional objective in the nursery is 
an example of h o w  children’s ‘voices’ were addressed in daily practice. During circle 
times, children were encouraged to learn skills, such as turn taking and polite 
manners. They were also encouraged to express their opinion, either verbally or via 
picture communication symbols or toys. The staff told m e  that disabled children were 
often passive: active participation in social life had to be taught to them. Here I 
perceived children’s ‘voices’ and communication being understood as social and 
assertiveness skills.
Recommendations for this kind of practice can indeed be found in recent literature 
commenting on the place of communication skills in the current National Curriculum 
in Britain. Circle times, for example, are seen as opportunities for children to ‘talk’ in 
a safe, fun and supportive environment (Phillips, 1998). I observed elements of this 
ethos being applied to both verbal and non-verbal children during circle times. All the 
children were addressed in the same way, to choose a song for example. Picture books 
were sometimes used so that non-verbal children could ‘talk’ about what they did at 
the weekend, for instance. Obviously, the ambiguities that I have already described in 
the use of picture communication symbols were present here as well. Hence I often 
equated ‘stimulation’ with ‘simulation’: non-verbal children were stimulated to 
express their ‘voices’, although the interaction typically simulated talk-like 
conversation. Nevertheless, this practice entailed the philosophy of inclusion, and 
therefore followed recommendations for good practice.
Another typical feature of adult-child interaction in both settings involved what I call 
a question-answer model, where the adult asked the questions and children were 
expected, for instance, to m ak e  a choice or give a correct answer to the test question. 
This practice might at first appear as something perfectly commonplace in that, as I 
think is safe to say, adults typically talk to children like this in everyday life. 
However, I argue particularly that non-verbal children and children in assessments 
had little chance to reverse these roles. For instance, in assessments, children’s 
interpretations and questions about pictures were not obviously taken into account 
(see e.g. Gardner, 1998).
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In the nursery, children’s individual picture books were crafted according to their 
perceived needs. This framed the ways in which they could express themselves, 
provided that they had first learned the meanings of the symbols. Nevertheless I argue 
that because of the ambiguous nature of the use of picture communication symbols, 
they were not necessarily the best m e d i u m  for communicating about abstract and 
sensitive topics such as abuse. A s  Oosterhoom &  Kendrick (2001) have found, there 
can be some completely different subtle ways of finding out about abuse, but this can 
only be realistically possible over a longer period of time.
Even though difficulties in using A A C  have been acknowledged in recent practice 
oriented literature (Millar &  Scott, 2001), some problems still seem to remain 
unresolved. For example, it has been suggested that methods of A A C  m a y  to be 
learned by communicating in meaningful situations. This, in m y  opinion, makes it 
difficult to talk about sensitive topics, things that have happened in the past or things 
that simply are out of context in some way. A s  Scott (2001) has argued, for younger 
children it is sometimes hard to m ake a representational leap between a symbol and 
what it represents in the ‘real’ world. In this literature it is also acknowledged that any 
technology cannot simply replace speech or remove impairment: yet, in m y  
observations, picture communication symbols were used as if they could do just that.
11.3.3 Children’s ‘voices’ and the problem o f ‘subjecthood’
I thus propose that even though the ethical purpose of listening to children was a 
recognised part of the nursery’s work, children’s ‘voices’ and meanings were 
ultimately interpreted by adults. This idea surfaced particularly w h e n  two or more 
adults interpreted the child’s behaviour at the same time and came up with different 
retrievals. In situations like this, notions of communication as a m e d i u m  and an 
objective became blurred. The staff attempted both to give the child choices and teach 
the meanings of picture cards; however, it was not always clear whether the child had 
made a ‘genuine’ choice or learned the ‘fixed’ meaning of the card. It was often hard 
to get the child to focus on choice making -  for one situational reason or another. In 
fact sometimes, during meal times, the workers would bring in the actual food items, 
w he n  picture cards ‘didn’t w ork’. Nonetheless choice making remained ambiguous, 
despite the workers’ patient efforts to listen to the child.
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The same ambiguities prevailed within verbal exchanges between children and adults. 
For example, if a child expressed a ‘need to w e e ’, it was not necessarily taken as a 
credible statement. Indeed it appeared that the workers had to m a k e  situational 
judgments of children’s meanings and needs, based on what they k n e w  about the child 
in terms of past or present experience. They also typically distinguished between what 
they perceived as ‘reality’ and children’s make-believe world, and whether it was 
appropriate to resort to one or the other.
I would like to note that there was often a practical reason for addressing children like 
this, including, for instance, attempts to manage a number of children in a group or 
prevent accidents. After all, it was the adults w h o  had responsibilities over what 
happened in the setting. I stress that I a m  not jumping to the simplistic conclusion that 
choice making by adults was inevitably detrimental to the child. This was clear in 
terms of the child’s daily needs, such as being fed. At any rate, the expectation of the 
child to be an active and purposeful choice maker has implications for perceptions of 
the child as a communicator.
It therefore seems that the notion of the ‘voice’ connotes the idea of clear 
thought/opinion in an individual’s mind that he/she wants to express to others. In a 
similar vein, Lee (2000) has talked about child witnesses in court, who, since the 1991 
Criminal Justice Act, have been provided with the possibility of giving their evidence 
to the court through the m e d i u m  of pre-recorded video-recorded interviews with them. 
For Lee, however, rather than simply turning the child into a ‘speaking subject’ 
(p. 149) like adults, the video m e d i u m  enables children to perform a particular kind of 
‘subjecthood’. This ‘subjecthood’ is equated with the notion of a one-dimensional, 
rational and intentional actor.
Other studies have described the use of A A C ,  with both adults and children, in a 
similar fashion. For Moser &  L a w  (2001) communication aids play a role in what it is 
to be a competent person in contemporary Western societies. Methods of A A C  are 
intended to give disabled people a 'voice' that others can hear and reflect the desires, 
concerns, needs and abilities of each person. Then again, the ways in which they are 
usually designed assume that the user is a m o d e m  rational technologically ‘adapted’ 
subject w h o  is able to distinguish instantaneously between discrete and hierarchical
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options. In addition, the options provided within the capacity of any type of 
communication aid are limited - giving one ‘voice’ takes away another and centres the 
subjectivity on 'preferred' needs. Passivity, for instance, is not an option: one has to be 
an active and competent, decision making, rational subject.
In m y  observations, this kind of ‘subjecthood’ also surfaced in speech and language 
therapy sessions, where the main objective of action was to teach skills: 
communication as a m e d i u m  did not feature there as m u c h  as in other situations. This 
is an example of h o w  the adult framework set the parameters for h o w  the child could 
‘communicate’. The idea was to match the child’s mind to that of the adult, w h o  was 
in charge of the situation. Children were expected to understand and follow the rules 
of the game.
As  literature suggests so far, there are no reliable methods available for exchanging 
messages of this nature with very young children. O n  the other hand, this is not 
necessarily a matter of neglecting the child’s right to express him/herself: it is about a 
practical difficulty of interpretation. I a m  also asking w h o  claims the right to interpret 
the child’s intentions in settings outside the family, such as clinical/therapeutic 
settings, and w h y  parental interpretations of them m a y  be downgraded. At the 
moment, the expertise in this area, particularly in the case of disabled children, lies in 
the hands of the Medical profession. In the next section I will address the 
knowledge/power of the clinical/therapeutic expert and h o w  it operated in the two 
settings.
11.4 The ‘scientific’ and ‘social’ elements in specialist knowledge and practice
The epistemology of medical reasoning is an important topic of investigation, since it 
can have a significant impact on a person’s life -  and, sometimes death. In c o m m o n  
sense thinking, w e  expect health professionals to ‘k n o w ’ and solve practical 
problems. Yet certain theories underlie their knowledge, and theories change over 
time. A  distinction can be drawn between medical scientists w h o  generate knowledge 
and practitioners, w h o  are the consumers of knowledge (Rochel D e  Camargo, 2002).
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This section looks at h o w  knowledge about children’s ‘communication difficulties’ 
was generated and consumed in clinical/therapeutic practice. I have drawn on both 
philosophical/theoretical considerations and empirical studies for this purpose. First, 
certain sociological ‘schools of thought’ —  Foucault, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK), ethnomethodology -  have provided m e  with lenses through which 
I view the problems of knowing about and representing reality. This is because they 
all share an understanding of aspects of ‘reality’ as being socially accomplished, 
represented, (re)constructed and reflected upon in talk and (inter)action.
M y  findings have suggested, as for Holland (2001), that in spite of a tendency for 
social work rhetoric to claim that children are at the centre of their work, the children 
in these assessments in fact tend to be represented as objects rather than as subjects. 
Especially young children’s behaviour is observed and understood through the 
professionals’ knowledge of developmental charts. In other words, children are 
k n o w n  and portrayed through a developmental ‘gaze’ (p. 334). For Walkerdine 
(1993), this calculating and classificatory gaze produces the very object it claims to 
describe.
Holland’s (2001) studies of child protection assessment have indicated that 
developmental charts imply a rational, scientific measurement of behaviour. However, 
m u c h  of the terminology can be seen as value laden and culturally specific, in that 
they delineate what is ‘normal’, ‘appropriate’ or ‘realistic’ behaviour. In sociology, 
this is not new. At the same time, White (1998) has noted that despite the critiques of 
developmentalism in academic literature, there is little evidence of scepticism among 
practitioners about the ‘validity’ and purposes of their practices.
I argue that, particularly in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting, discourses about child-objects 
manifested themselves in ‘case histories’ (Gillman et al, 1997). These ‘texts’ 
consisted of a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements 
and so on that in some w a y  together produce a particular version of events (Smith, 
2002). Indeed:
“ Everything exists in a fu zzy  and fluid state until crystallized in particular texts or
particular interactions”  (Potter, 1996, p. 103).
2 0 0
This refers to the idea that experts’ decisions are not merely simple outcomes of tests 
or observations. O n  a textual level, the notion of ‘social construction’ in this thesis 
emphasises that descriptions are h u m a n  practices, and that they could have been 
otherwise (Potter, 1996). This is an important consideration because, regularly, it is in 
the interest of relatively powerful groups that some discourses and not others receive 
the stamp o f ‘truth’ (Burr, 1995).
In m y  data analysis, I have posed the following questions about clinical/therapeutic 
work: W h a t  is it about expert, scientific knowledge that sets it apart from ‘non- 
scientific’ knowledge? W h a t  does scientific knowledge production consist of? W h o  
are the actors and what competence do they have? H o w  do the actors achieve 
agreement (Callon, 1995)? In this section, I will discuss established 
clinical/therapeutic understandings of what can be k n o w n  about children through 
‘scientific’ methods, and the ‘socialness’ of this practice.
M y  findings have highlighted what m a y  be called the ‘messiness’ of everyday 
scientific work (Gilbert &  Mulkay, 1984), with the conclusion that clinical facts result 
from social construction processes. The ‘science’ of clinical/therapeutic knowledge 
tended to be emphasised, particularly in the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting. Central to the 
assessment practice was the clinical/therapeutic ‘gaze’, which was justified by its 
scientific merits. I m ak e  a connection between this ‘gaze’ and the so-called 
essentialist perspective within science, which assumes that scientific knowledge is 
determined by the physical world, and that aspects of this world can be k no wn  
through obseivation, carried out by actors with appropriate skills (Woolgar, 1988).
The ‘T e a m  Service’ practitioners drew upon empiricist epistemologies, which 
typically involve standardised and systematic fact finding procedures (Potter, 1996). 
Similar findings have emerged from other recent sociological studies on medical 
settings, which have described h o w  scientific epistemology of the physical world has 
been applied to practice. These studies have described medical work in terms of the 
use of clinical criteria, protocols and test materials; all of which allow for verbally or 
numerically quantifiable output (Berg, 1997).
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In this section and the next, I will discuss the process-like character of the T e a m ’s 
construction work, which aims at a diagnosis or a decision within a specified time 
span. I argue that ‘knowing’ the child’s communication skills took place through what 
I call the practices of translation (Berg, 1997), in other words, specialist reading and 
writing practices, where the clinical gaze and verbal accounts (written and spoken) 
turned aspects o f ‘reality’ into manageable objects of action.
11.4.1 Carving out the ‘difficulties’
In the same w a y  as illustrated in Figure 3 (p. 23), the ‘T e a m  Service’ work followed 
certain established procedures for intervention. In Chapter 7 I described the 
assessment process in h o w  it typically unfolded. In the planning and preliminary 
meetings, this process started off with ‘setting the scene’, where the plan of action 
focused on core concerns, such as ‘communication difficulty’.
I have argued that the initial accounts entailed a great deal of selectivity, stemming 
from referrals, and considerations of whether the ‘problem’ was something that 
belonged to the expertise area of the Team. Accounts were also subject to selections 
in terms of w h o  provided them. In general, the T e a m  members trusted in each other’s 
accounts, and if they did not, they would negotiate or argue. A  definite line, however, 
was drawn between those w h o  were experts and those w h o  were not. Observations 
and tests were then employed either to prove or disprove the initial ‘hypotheses’ that 
the T e a m  members constructed during the planning and preliminary meetings.
Holland (2001) has found similar procedures taking place in specifically child 
protection focused assessments. She argues that ‘information’ about the child was 
mediated through the representations provided by the social worker, for instance, in 
the narratives from h o m e  visits. In most of the assessment reports in this study, 
children were in fact minor characters in the narrative, whereas parents were often 
portrayed in a detailed manner. In other words, the social worker selected aspects of 
family life and reassembled them into a bricolage, where children were positioned as 
objects of adult actions.
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In this respect, the phenomenon of ‘summarising’ (Berg, 1997) was central to the 
T e a m  work. With each n e w  child, information from diverse sources was transformed 
into short statements of ‘what is the case’. In the case reports, the information 
gathered from tests, T e a m  m embers’ talks with the parents and previous case records 
was condensed, to create a concise statement of the ‘current problem’ and its relevant 
history. W h e n  the child’s situation was re-evaluated, the entries m a d e  earlier are taken 
as the ‘grounds’ upon which the next evaluation proceeded. These statements were 
stripped of their situational uncertainties and the specific context in which they 
emerged.
In this way, for Berg (1997), decisions about patients are spatially, materially and 
temporally distributed. The temporal distribution of decisions, however, m a y  not 
always be apparent. Yet, within ‘T e a m  Service’ practice, lines could be traced back to 
previous negotiations about the child: ‘feelings’ became conclusions, and previous 
steps were undone, changed, or simply discarded. In other words, an image of orderly 
and systematic work leading to decisions is portrayed by the production of ‘rational’ 
and ‘typical’ narratives. This is where the fluid nature of the ongoing heterogeneous 
medical work disappeared. However, this was necessary for the process of making the 
child’s problem manageable.
Berg (1996) has found Medical Record to be a fundamental constitutive element of 
medical work. H e  has defined it as an artefact, which mediates the social relations in 
specific contexts through practices of reading and writing. Another important 
organising principle in clinical/therapeutic practice is the ‘Protocol’ (Timmermans &  
Berg, 1997). The Protocol, as a link between knowledge and practice, functions as a 
crystallisation instance. Problems m a y  arise w h e n  protocols m ak e  something appear 
universal and standardized, thus steering the attention away from the local and 
situational. Hence, instead of seeing ‘Protocols’ as straightforward guides for action, 
they can be defined as outcomes of negotiations between actors and agencies.
Since all T e a m  members could not always be present in the assessments, or record 
everything that happened in great detail, they often had to rely on each other’s 
accounts, and trust these accounts. For this reason, I argue, texts, such as case reports, 
were of primary importance as mediators between the child and the decision makers
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in the social construction process of ‘communication difficulty’. I agree with Knorr- 
Cetina in that ‘scientific’ procedures were constructive and descriptive, rather than 
simply ‘reporting’ features of the world out there:
T o  the constructivist, in contrast, “ rather than considering scientific products as 
som ehow capturing what is, w e w ill consider them as selectively carved out, 
transformed and constructed from  whatever is. And rather than examine the external 
relations between science and the ‘ nature’ w e are told it describes, we w ill look at 
those internal affairs o f  scientific enterprise which w e take to be constructive”  
(Knorr-Cetina, 1981, p.3).
I define clinical/therapeutic epistemology and practice as a matter of ‘literacy’ instead 
of ‘knowledge’ since the latter implies some kind of privileged access to reality. B y  
the former term I m e a n  that T e a m  work consisted of reading and writing practices: the 
act of ‘reading’ included both the literal activity of reading ‘texts’ (Smith, 2002), as 
well as observational gaze and the interpretations of the child. In another sense of the 
word, ‘reading’ also meant the act of meaning making through observation.
The process of report writing in assessments started from initial jotted notes and 
gradually developed to a coherent narrative. At the same time, this was a 
transformation from personal thoughts to public knowledge: from a vast amount of 
details to a concise output. The established criteria for professional reports involved 
‘readability’ and ‘relevance’ in relation to the proposed audiences of the report. 
Relevant points were actively selected out of the multitude of possibilities according 
to clinical criteria for ‘communication difficulties’. In short, the selections were 
fundamentally interactional accomplishments.
11.4.2 The ‘gaze’
Although a widely used method in clinical work, observation can be rendered a 
problematic w a y  of ‘knowing’. For a constructivist, the core of the epistemology of 
scientific observation is that it sees things as something: the categories are not some 
neutral and abstract set of descriptive pigeonholes but are derived from theories and 
belief systems. However, for Chalmers (1999), what observers see, the subjective
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experiences that they undergo, w h e n  viewing an object or scene, depends on the 
experience, knowledge and expectations of the observer.
In the essentialist view of science, the scientist’s competencies are typically assumed 
to be sensory and cognitive:
“ The scientist must be capable o f  articulating statements that integrate her 
observations. S/he is thus dependent on her fiv e  senses, and particularly on sight 
(observation is always mentioned). The scientist must also be capable o f  imagining 
statements that are not directly linked to observation and o f  introducing translations 
between them”  (Callon , 1995, p. 32).
Indeed empiricism and positivism share the c o m m o n  view that scientific knowledge 
should in some w a y  be derived from the facts arrived at by observation (Chalmers, 
1999). It is assumed that facts are directly given to careful, unprejudiced observers via 
the senses and that they occur prior to, and are independent of theory. This 
assumption is based on the belief that a h u m a n  observer has more or less direct access 
to knowledge of some facts about the world insofar as they are recorded by the brain 
in the act of seeing, in other words, two ‘normal’ observers viewing the same object 
or scene from the same place will ‘see’ the same thing.
The notion of rational activity, as part of the scientist’s role as a ‘knower’, also rests 
on the capacity to m ak e  credible decisions. The scientist has to have the ability to 
justify w h y  one statement -  selected out of a variety of sometimes contradictory 
theories -  is to be preferred to another in a particular context. For Callon (1995), 
scientists base their judgments on the belief that there are explicit and shared 
standards, whether these standards are hypothetical, categorical or based on 
conventions.
In a similar vein, Aronsson et al (1995) have talked about ‘the voice of medicine’ as a 
form of scientific discourse, a scientific, biomedical frame of reference, within which 
problems are understood and interpreted. Significant discursive features of this voice 
are ‘affectively neutral, functionally specific, context-stripping questions and 
responses by physicians’. Furthermore, there is a focus on ‘objective parameters’ of
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the situation that isolate symptoms from patients’ more general problems and life- 
world experiences.
In the T e a m  assessments, the ‘gaze’ was used in the above, essentialist sense. A  
practitioner’s question to m e  - “What do you see that we don’t?” - implied h o w  the 
T e a m  members drew the line between their knowledge and those of other people. The 
practitioners seemed to assume that there was not m u c h  else to see than what the 
clinical/therapeutic gaze allowed for, and that the nature of that ‘gaze’ was more 
accurate than a lay person’s gaze. The T e a m  members were adamant in this assertion, 
whenever it became an issue, even though, at the same time, they did not always agree 
with each other.
11.4.3 Standardisation
Another ‘scientifically proven’ justification for T e a m  work was its standardised 
nature. I argue that an ultimate manifestation of standardisation in assessments was 
testing. Tests involved certain tasks that the child was expected to accomplish in a 
required manner under adult instruction. W h e n  the child did not achieve these 
requirements, the T e a m  members tended to look for reasons for his/her ‘difficulty’ 
within the child or the family, and, again, selected clinically relevant pieces of 
information that was available from the child’s past. The assessments worked on the 
basis of a ‘normal range’ of communication skills. A s  a result of planning and 
preliminary meetings, the T e a m  members then selected which tests to use. The 
‘scientific’ action in assessments was constructed around what were perceived as 
observable and ‘testable’ characteristics of the child. These involved, for instance, eye 
contact, as well as quality and quantity of language use.
For Andersen (1994), tests are a construction of Western psychology, where they have 
been used for practical purposes, validated by ‘the aura of hard science’. Typically, 
testing is based on the notion of a self-contained individual, w h o  ‘does abstract 
problems in his head’. The test subject is expected to be in an ‘optimal’ state and the 
tester assumes that all variables but one - the individual capacity - must he controlled:
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“ The test ‘ subject’ has the passive and reactive role, more o f  an ob ject than a subject, 
an object that must produce isolated responses on demand, rather than a subject that 
interacts with his or her world in ways which reflect the choices and self-reflection 
o f  an agent in charge o f  his or her reality. The test subject is to sit still, pay attention, 
listen carefully to a stranger, fo llo w  all directions given, keep one’ s mind focused on 
the task at all times [ . . . ]  The tester, on the other hand, is clothed in great institutional 
power and authority [ . . . ] ,  commanding the situation, g iving instructions, coding the 
responses as good  or bad, right or wrong. The tester, o f  course, controls all the 
information obtained in the session, writes up the test results, with the authority to 
transform the responses obtained into [ . . . ]  a test score”  (Andersen, 1994, p .128).
S o m e  m a y  argue that not all variables could be controlled: the entire context must be 
considered, including the roles, the thoughts, and the setting as well as the 
expectations of the participants (ibid). For Andersen (1994), a good training ground 
for taking IQ tests would be to live one’s childhood in the typical environment of an 
affluent, middle-class family where there are m a n y  books and toys, but especially one 
where the family sits d o w n  together each evening for dinner. It became evident in m y  
data that middle-class values like this occasionally surfaced during the ‘T e a m  
Service’ assessments.
Standardisation in the assessments also involved regulated use of time and 
quantification processes, both in terms of the child’s biological and developmental 
age. Children were assessed for their success in accomplishing tasks at a certain rate 
within a specific timeframe. They were expected to follow adult instructions at certain 
times, but take initiative in play and express themselves at other times. This 
contextually managed time was then compared to what the child ought to be capable 
of at his biological age. Overall, interactions during the assessments followed a 
certain timetable, which framed the ways in which the adults could co-ordinate their 
interactions. They then attempted to incorporate the child’s actions into this ‘system’ 
by the Team, one w a y  or another.
Furthermore, I observed that standardised as well as non-standardised test materials 
typically allowed for interpretations: only T e a m  members would have specific 
meanings for certain toys, pictures, and ways of addressing the child. The parents
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would regularly notice this, as m y  findings indicate. The child’s interpretations were 
not typically taken into account in m y  observations.
Quantification was another standardising feature of assessment and report writing in 
that it m a d e  the child’s skills comparable across space and time. M y  findings 
indicated that quantification of communicative skills drew on ‘the sturdy oak’ model, 
measuring the ‘degree’ of the child’s problems, according to established parameters 
for normality. Eye contact is an example of a communicative feature to be measured 
in assessments. Individual remarks on its ‘normal length’ were m ad e  and its 
meaningfulness was then retrospectively evaluated and negotiated about in the 
meetings. The T e a m  members tended to be careful in which particular words were 
used; for instance, describing the child’s eye contact as ‘atrocious’ was something that 
ought not to be written d o w n  in the final reports.
I argue that understandings and uses of time and quantification had implications for 
the notion of the ‘accuracy’ of the gaze. For example, during the assessments, the 
T e a m  members would often chat or go in and out of the room. In other words, they 
were not observing all the time. W h e n  they left the room, they would say to m e  that 
they had ‘seen enough’, in terms of what they thought they needed to k n o w  about the 
child. Since the T e a m  members had by no means observed everything, it seems 
plausible to argue that their attention was inevitably selective. This assertion, 
however, is not meant as a criticism. M y  point is that whilst a practitioner was 
focusing on one thing, she could not register everything else as well, such as the 
child’s ‘muscle tones’ or ‘social communication skills’ at the same time. O n  a surface 
level, teamwork was expected to bring different pieces of the mosaic together in this 
way. F r o m  m y  sociological point of view, however, this is an example of h o w  
‘communication difficulties’ were outcomes of social construction processes, which 
fundamentally involved selections, albeit regarded as standardised procedures.
11.4.4 ‘Communicative repertoire’
In child assessments, I frequently recorded statements of stereotypical thinking or 
personal preferences, although all the T e a m  members did not necessarily agree on 
these. Normative value statements revolved around the nature/nurture distinction, and
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involved judgments of ‘normality’. These statements often emerged in the context of 
distinguishing the child’s personality traits from symptoms of ‘disorders’. I observed 
this happening in relation to the child’s socio-economic and cultural background, in 
terms of what I have called ‘locally appropriate’ speech.
For Keating (2001), each speech community (such as native English language 
speakers in Britain) is recognised to have a repertoire of language codes and ways of 
speaking. This includes all varieties, dialects, or styles used in a particular socially 
defined population, and the constraints, which govern the choice a m o n g  them. The 
notion of ‘communicative repertoire’ refers to patterned ways of speaking. It also 
includes non-verbal communication, although it is recognised that this varies from 
one individual to another.
In both settings, I observed a particular ‘communicative repertoire’ being rewarded. I 
argue that this became very apparent in the assessment of bi- or multilingual children. 
A s  expressed in Chapter 2, these children often mix languages; in other words, their 
languages are not separate entities. Obviously this might m a k e  their speech 
incomprehensible to other people than their carers; hence, I assume, children like this 
were referred to the T e a m  for other reasons than difficulties in learning a foreign 
language. Yet their performance in the English language was judged by monolingual 
standards.
Moreover, m y  data indicated that sometimes the pressures of early school entry age in 
Britain and for early intervention to detect complex developmental disorders caused 
problems between the T e a m  and these children’s families. The contexts of the use of 
different languages were not considered in assessment room based testing. The 
visitors, in particular, tended to stress these children’s ‘maladjustment’ to the school 
environment, and expected the T e a m  to find solutions to this problem. However, I 
argue that this was a prime example of what I call the ‘disablement’ of young 
children. I will n o w  turn to the wider societal discourses on this matter.
209
11.5 The pathologisation of ‘communication difficulty’ and the disablement of 
young children
I have noted that, in addition to academic disciplines and child welfare practice, 
behavioural and other childhood syndromes appear to be a topical matter of 
controversy in the British media as well. There are frequently debates on the fact that 
the number of children registered with ‘special needs’ has almost doubled over the 
last decade (see e.g. Owen, 28.7.03, p.3). S o m e  argue that this is because 
psychologists are keen to ‘make a quick buck’ by diagnosing the child with a 
behavioural syndrome, whereas in fact neglectful parents m a y  be to blame (Alderson 
in ibid).
For Talbot, on the other hand:
“ Childhood these days is often a land o f  diagnoses. Detours from  the developmental 
path can easily get a kid tagged with one new syndrome or another. And as far as 
many parents [and clinicians] are concerned, this is an unmitigated good. These 
parents [ . . . ]  are grateful to have an explanation [ . . . ]  and are relieved to know that 
they are not alone. W e  don’t hear quite as much from  parents [or clinicians] who 
react to such labels with tortured ambivalence, who wonder whether their ch ild ’ s 
individuality has been reduced to pathology and what might be lost i f  it has”  (Ta lbot 
quoted in Paul, 2000, p. 205).
This statement captures m y  attitude to this research project: ‘communication 
difficulties’ are real for children and their families. Hence this thesis does not simply 
dismiss or overlook the relief that a diagnosis or decision, or the subsequent 
intervention, can bring to all parties concerned. Nonetheless, what I a m  trying to do 
here, though, is to understand w h y  ‘communication difficulties’ these days are 
regarded as social and individual ills to such an extent, and w h y  Medicine and 
associated professions have assumed a monopoly over these matters. In section 11.5.1 
I discuss pathologisation in the context of the knowledge/power of childhood 
disability experts; and in section 11.5.2 in the context of socialisation of children 
towards ‘adult rationality’.
2 1 0
I agree with D u r h a m  Peters (1999), for w h o m  the discourses on ‘communication’ of 
our time are a technical one about information theory and therapeutic one about 
communication as cure and disease. Across the h u m a n  sciences, children’s 
communication is typically constituted as a matter of ‘development’ and ‘language 
acquisition’ and regarded as inferior to adult speech. In the case of ‘communication 
difficulties’, children are m ad e  into objects of therapy and correction.
For Cameron (2000), communication is another area where expert systems colonise 
individuals’ lives. This is n o w  explicit in educational and therapeutic practices, where 
normalising ideologies rule (Fairclough, 1995). In today’s enterprise culture and its 
alleged requirements, somebody’s decisions over what it means to be a good person -  
a ‘good communicator’ - m a y  have a significant influence on individuals’ lives 
(Cameron, 2000). Another dimension of ‘communication difficulties’ is that they can 
be seen as pathologising boys. Since most children referred to the ‘T e a m  Service’ 
were boys, an inevitable question arises as to whether ‘communication difficulty’ is 
indeed essentially a gender issue. This stems from the discursive preferences for 
emotional articulacy, interactive skills, and listening skills, which are typically seen as 
missing in autistic type syndromes, which were also a frequent concern in this setting.
However, along the lines of the above criticisms of hegemonic discourses on 
‘communication/difficulties’, in this thesis, I attempt to conceptualise children’s 
communication as something other than merely a ‘skill’. A s  previously stated, this 
thesis understands ‘reality’ as socially accomplished, represented, (re)constructed, 
reflected upon in talk and interaction (Potter, 1996). I a m  deconstructing 
‘communication/difficulties’ in the context of ‘Childhood’ and ‘Disability’, because 
those children’s lives, w h o  have or are thought to have disabilities/difficulties, are to a 
significant degree colonised by what I have called clinical/therapeutic practice.
M y  findings indicate that in the two research settings, ‘communication difficulty’ was 
first and foremost located in the speaker or the non-speaker, or his/her family. In the 
assessments, as in Medicine and Developmental Psychology in general, the child was 
isolated as an individual ‘case’. In both assessments and therapeutic interventions, the
1 1 .5 .1  T h e  p o w e r  o f  d is c o u rs e s  o v e r  d is a b le d  c h i ld r e n ’ s l iv e s
2 1 1
child’s abilities were compartmentalised into different sets of skills, some of which 
could be ‘corrected’ through individual therapy, social interaction training, ‘better’ 
parenting or an appropriate school environment. In the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting, 
practitioners would often explain to m e  what they were doing and h o w  they knew 
what was going on, something that a non-specialist would not see. Yet there were 
times w h e n  they admitted they could not understand the child’s speech or non-verbal 
behaviour. In this respect, the practitioners placed the problem with the speaker rather 
than with the ‘listener’.
This finding resonates with the Foucauldian (1973) conceptualisation of Medicine as 
a mechanism of knowledge/power, whose purpose is to correct and normalise under 
the guidance of rational reason. In this view, the medical gaze is a technology of that 
power in terms of h o w  the object can be ‘k n o w n ’ to the observer, since medical 
competencies are typically given more credibility than to those of lay people. As 
implied in Chapter 4, m a n y  Disability Studies writers have objected to this 
‘medicalisation’ of disabled people’s lives. Oliver, for instanc^ has asked what is so 
good about walking:
“ I f  Jenny M orris is right when she says ‘ disabled people are increasingly 
challenging the attitude that says that i f  you cannot walk, then your life  isn’ t worth 
living, and I believe that she is, then that challenge faces us all. A s  Ken Davis put it, 
w e have to put our struggle to create a decent society above our vain attempts to 
force non-walkers and nearly-walkers to walk. I hope, in addressing the question 
‘W hat’ s so wonderful about walk ing?’ I  have made a contribution to this struggle”
(O liver, 1996, p. 109).
In parallel to this, I ask: what is so good about talking? M y  contribution to 
sociological writing on ‘communication/difficulties’ questions the taken-for-granted 
notion of ‘locally appropriate’ speech, as well as preferences for speech and writing 
over other means of communication. W e  m a y  ask whose definitions of ‘good 
communication’ are being imposed on others. At the same time, I a m  questioning the 
sociocultural values that are attached to seemingly objective and neutral practice in 
the two settings, such as rationality and autonomy. This steers the attention away from 
evaluation of the quality of practice. Instead, it analyses the interplay between the
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everyday constraints and allowances for professional work and powerful, discursive 
rhetoric in the form of recommendations for good practice.
11.6 The ambiguity of conceptualising the child as a particular kind of agent
As explained in Chapter 4, the ‘n e w  paradigm of childhood sociology’ involves 
attempts to understand children as agents - as shaping as well as shaped by their 
circumstances. The aim of this proposition has been to m a k e  a m o v e  away from 
treating children as targets of socialisation processes and thereby merely as 
incomplete versions of adults (James et al, 1998), as has traditionally been the case 
within sociology and other h u m a n  sciences.
This paradigm has posed a strong challenge to Piagetian epistemology, which has 
influentially shaped our contemporary understandings of the child. The Piagetian 
approach is here seen as deriving from positivism and rigid empiricism, with its 
procedures of measuring, grading, ranking and assessment of children. A s  for James 
et al:
“ Under the hegemony o f  developmental stage monitoring it is not just iniquitous 
comparison with their peers which children suffer through testing and league tables, 
but also a constant evaluation against a ‘ go ld  standard’ , whether in education, bod ily  
development or welfare, the repercussions and sanctions are strong”  (James et al,
1998, p .19).
Western childhoods, in general, are seen as social constructions that have developed 
through time. For centuries, children have been subject to philosophical enquiries, 
where ‘Reason’ has played a central role. Prominent Enlightenment thinkers, such as 
Locke and Rousseau, for instance, viewed children as either becoming rational 
through education, or indeed needing the external stimuli and appropriate 
environment to develop their natural reasoning skills. James et al (1998) have 
suggested that both of these views of children are still present in the education system.
M y  data indicates that both of these views also manifested themselves in the two 
research settings. In the ‘T e a m  Service’ practice, the child was constituted as a test
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subject, with or without the rational skills that were required to succeed in tests. In the 
test situation, the object of action was the child’s ‘individual capacity’ (Andersen, 
1994), In the nursery, choice making demanded a particular kind of rational agency of 
the child. Speech and language therapy, the use of A A C  and literacy training 
(explicitly and implicitly) all shared the same goal of rationalisation. The objectives 
of adult action were to teach children ‘rational’ thinking and communication, which 
they could use in different arenas of their lives with different people. ‘Irrationality’ 
was something that the child was expected to express through free play, rather than 
during more structured activities, such as circle times.
I argue that in both settings, the point of action was to enable children to be socialised 
in the ‘correct’ way. Rationality, locally appropriate speech genres, and preferences 
for symbolic exchanges were apparent elements of this socialisation process, which 
was referred to as meeting the child’s ‘special needs’. F ro m  the practice point of view, 
the staff in both settings successfully fulfilled these goals. In addition, in the nursery, 
the child’s ‘voice’ (of a particular kind) was seen as an important object of action.
In the child protection context, Lee (2000) has observed a shift from the body to the 
‘voice’. This shift is similar to the shift promoted within Disability Studies, where the 
goal is to achieve societal change and enhance disabled people’s rights (e.g. Marks, 
1999). Yet, in m y  findings, the material equation of the mind with the body as 
‘handicapped’ and ‘delayed’ and ‘undeveloped’ remained. I argue that this derived 
from the clinical/therapeutic regime of truth. Therefore, I witnessed a contradiction 
between the ethos of care and the simultaneous aim of enabling children to 
(sometimes) perform ‘subjecthood’. In other words, although methods such as A A C  
can be seen as a significant development unlike previous strategies of dealing with 
children, they did not solve childhood’s ambiguity (Lee, 2001); in other words, young 
disabled children’s simultaneous positioning as subjects and objects.
I thus attempt to c om e  up with some ways around this ambiguity. For instance, in 
terms of the child’s ‘subjecthood’, I do not see w h y  the notion of multiple dimensions 
of the ‘self (Moser &  Law, 2001) could not apply to young (disabled) children in the 
same w a y  as to anyone else. Different aspects of these ‘multiple selves’ m a y  manifest 
themselves in interaction, verbally or non-verbally. The point is that there m a y  not be
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an ‘ultimate truth’ to social interaction and meaning making: what is revealed to 
others in interaction might be what matters to the individual at the time. Obviously, 
this causes practical problems for people whose duties are to provide services to 
young children with ‘communication difficulties’ and their families. It is not useful to 
waver between different theories, possibilities and propositions: ‘good practice’ today 
denotes firm decision making. For a practitioner, this m a y  create a no-win situation, 
which I want to address in the next section.
11.7 The ambiguity of meeting the child’s ‘needs’
For Marks (1999), whilst the medicalisation critique in Disability Studies represents a 
convincing and powerful challenge to the hegemony of medicine, it is important not 
to exaggerate its influence over peoples’ lives. Marks renders the medicalisation 
critique as negative in that it suggests that the recipient of a label is a ‘victim’ and 
always harmed by medical authority. For example, a refusal to label people m a y  
actually deny them access to important services and treatment. Considering this, 
constructionist views, which are based on an extreme interpretation of Foucauldian 
theory, tend to portray Medicine and its ‘pseudo-professions’ (Oliver, 1996) as a 
tyranny rather than as helpful and necessary practice.
However, I argue that young (disabled) children m a y  fit the ‘victim’ category better 
than disabled adults, since the former do not obviously possess the highly-valued 
‘rational m ind’. Even if adults believed that they did, disabled children are 
nevertheless under constant and necessary supervision by adults. In addition, the 
contemporary urgency for early intervention constitutes children as a target group, 
because of the expectation that once ‘communication problems’ are addressed and 
dealt with in childhood, the individual in question will have better chances of 
achieving success in adulthood. Hence, the power of Medicine and Developmental 
Psychology is unquestionable in current professional practice that deals with 
children’s communication.
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11.7.1 The ambivalence between theory and practice
A s  Woolgar (1988) has noted, everyday scientific work (such as Medicine) can be 
seen as different from public beliefs or accounts of it. For Woolgar, in scientific 
practice, decisions and activities are rarely undertaken in the manner of a 
dispassionate search for truth. Scientists have little time for a reflective evaluation of 
the epistemological status of their actions and interpretations: most of the time, the 
main and immediate aim is to m ak e  things work.
Furthermore, within the Medical scientific community, there m a y  be a knowledge, 
communication or language gap between the ‘esoteric circle’ (the medical scientists) 
and the ‘exoteric circle’ (the practitioners). W h e n  n e w  developments in knowledge 
arise in medical scientific work, they m a y  not necessarily translate easily into 
everyday practice, often simply because practitioners do not have time to read the 
latest literature. In addition, sometimes economic dynamics influence what kind of 
medical knowledge is being produced and most widely diffused (Rochel de Camargo, 
2000).
Hagstrom (2001) has argued that practitioners are not routinely given the tools to 
construct and communicate theoretical practices in their work. Basically, clinical 
hypotheses that lead to decisions of ‘problem/no problem’ are linked to worldviews 
organized by general theory. For example, one m a y  suggest, drawing on Piagetian 
theory that children cannot talk because they lack the cognitive underpinnings needed 
to support language. O n  the other hand, drawing on the Vygotskian perspective, one 
might suggest that they m a y  not have m u c h  language but m a y  still be developing 
cognitive functions. In everyday practice, the practitioner has to determine what to 
privilege in the assessment of the child’s ‘communication difficulties’.
Hagstrom has also argued that integrating theory with clinical concerns and outcomes 
has been pivotal to the development of communication disorders as a professional 
culture, and contributed to the field’s delineation of itself as a science. Science, by 
definition, uses theoretical perspectives to mak e  predictions and formulate coherent 
explanations and understandings. The field of communication disorders has evolved 
as philosophical views and theoretical perspectives advanced by the scholarly
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literature have defined appropriate areas of study, and in so doing defined what is 
practical.
The general theories of both Piaget and Vygotsky have been used as the bases for 
innumerable research studies and clinical applications. Researchers have investigated 
aspects of these theories to prove, disprove or elaborate them, and practitioners have 
translated them into procedures and practices. Dealing with empirical data has 
become a habitual aspect of reporting both research and clinical results. 
Consequently, over time, this practice can lead to a fossilisation of theory defined by 
data if the relationship between specific and general theory is lost (Hagstrom, 2001).
A n  example of the implications of Tost theory5 comes from a recent study that has 
looked at the vagueness of the actual labels that are attached to individuals. A  study 
by Peters et al (2001) has compared and contrasted different professionals’ familiarity 
with three terms - clumsiness, dyspraxia and developmental coordination disorder - 
and the extent to which they found them acceptable, and then characterised any 
systematic similarities and differences in the perception of each term. The results have 
indicated that the respondents tended to be unfamiliar particularly with the latter two 
terms, but there was a variation between occupational groups. The definitions of the 
terms reflected occupational knowledges. Teachers, for instance, would note 
difficulties in carrying out certain classroom specific tasks whereas doctors would 
give a clinical definition. M a n y  professionals found discussions about terminology 
tedious.
Furthermore, Peters et al (2001) have argued that vagueness of terms has prevailed 
since their d a w n  at the turn of the century, w h e n  the idea that there might be a discrete 
childhood syndrome, which had ‘clumsiness’ of movement as its defining symptom, 
began to emerge. The problem is that despite recent attempts to standardise the 
terminology used, variation continues to compromise interprofessional 
communication and interpretation of research. For some professionals, different 
diagnostic labels are used interchangeably. For others, the different labels are used to 
refer to slightly different conditions and m a y  he coloured by the particular 
background of the user.
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A s  a result, I argue that clinical/therapeutic work is constrained by factors, which the 
practitioners do not necessarily have power over, even though they might recognise 
the ambiguities involved in their decisions and actions. The practitioner’s goal is to 
meet the child’s needs, and in an attempt to treat all children fairly, base his/her 
judgments on standards that are available to them. Changes in child law and often 
varied interpretations of them further complicate the practitioner’s task. Therefore, 
work with children’s ‘communication difficulties’ entails an ever-present tension 
between ideals, rhetoric and everyday practice.
11.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I have m ad e  links between contemporary discourses on 
‘communication/difficulties’ and m y  findings. I have concluded that in the two 
clinical/therapeutic settings, ‘communication/difficulties’ were perceived as 
individually based pathologies and objects of expert action. Interventions in children’s 
lives were carried out for moral-pragmatic purposes; yet, as I have argued, the 
objectives of specialist practices involved m a n y  discursive and contextual 
ambiguities.
M y  findings indicated that ‘good communication’ in the two settings was presented 
primarily as the child’s skill, right and need. I have argued that clinical/therapeutic 
practices, particularly in the staff m embers’ accounts, were justified by their 
‘scientific’ merits. M y  sociological perspective, however, has destabilised this view. I 
have highlighted ‘social’ and ‘sociocultural’ elements in expert knowledge and 
practices, as well as in the discourses that underlie them.
This chapter suggests that communication in the two research settings was a matter of 
contextual and interpretive accomplishment. I have criticised the idealisation of the 
so-called ‘mentalistic’ model, which included the ‘fallacy of verbalism’ and the 
ambiguity of abstractions; as well as preferences for rational thought and action as 
primary goals of socialisation. I have seen this as misleading in that it may, in some 
contexts, simplify what is involved in listening to children’s ‘voices’. I have then 
discussed the notion of the ‘voice’ in terms of not only its ‘semantic’ nature, but also 
of what it makes of the child. I have concluded that recent accounts in both child
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welfare practice and some accounts in childhood sociology promote a particular kind 
of agency (e.g. Beresford, 1997; Middleton, 1999), and I found this problematic in 
light of m y  data.
I have also questioned w h y  there is such a heightened need for ‘talk’ in today’s 
society and increasing numbers of children diagnosed with various syndromes. I have 
suggested that pressures on professionals to ‘detect’ communication difficulties as 
early as possible is a result of discourses, where certain ‘competencies’ are valued 
above others. Indeed, in this sense, I have delved into the question of the morality of 
‘good communication’ and intervention into ‘communication difficulties’. In the next 
chapter I will continue with issues or morality and ethics in terms of m y  o w n  research 
practices, returning to matters that I raised in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 12.
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTRUCTING SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE  
AND TALKING ABOUT IT: REFLECTIONS 
12.1 Introduction
Previously in this thesis, Chapters 5 and 6 have described h o w  I went about doing 
institutional ethnography (Smith, 2002), and the practical, theoretical and ethical 
issues that were involved in the process. I have also talked about the ambiguities 
involved in taking on a social constructionist stance and, at the same time, having to 
decide ‘which side I was on’ in order to conduct ethically sound research.
This chapter continues the discussion on m y  o w n  ‘communication difficulties’ as a 
researcher. I suggest that what I have gone through in the field can be generalised to 
other similar research contexts, because it brings to the fore important questions about 
the epistemological value of sociological knowledge accumulation and accounts. The 
focal point of this chapter is on m y  researcher’s ‘voice’, and h o w  it was lost and 
found. Section 12.2 discusses h o w  communication became a ‘difficulty’ to m e  as a 
qualitative researcher.
12.2 The dilemma of ‘communication’ in doing research
Ironically, m y  study of ‘communication difficulties’ included those of m y  own. 
Section 12.2.1 looks at h o w  requirements for reflexivity contributed to m y  
sociological ‘communication difficulties’. In section 12.2.2, I argue that, in the two 
research settings, ‘communication difficulties’ were perceived as the problem of the 
speaker, including m y  position as a researcher.
12.2.1 The problem of reflexivity
The importance of being reflexive has been acknowledged in social science literature 
for some time -  however, it has only recently been pointed out that reflexivity has not 
been translated into ‘doing’ research (Mauthner &  Doucet, 2003). A s  explained in
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Part 2, this has been a major source of m y  ‘sociological angst’ in this research project. 
M y  research interest has been in ‘whatever passes as knowledge in society’ (Berger &  
Luckmann, 1991); the difficulty has arisen from the expectation of looking at m y  o w n  
research practices with the same analytical eye.
Whilst observing the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting in particular, the ambiguity of 
interpreting interpretations finally hit me. I realised that I was trying to use ‘realist’ 
methods to capture ‘social constructions’ and that this was not a balanced approach. 
For Mauthner and Doucet (2003), this kind of ambiguity stems from the inevitable 
inseparability of epistemology, ontology and research practice. In the beginning, I 
assumed I would be representing other people, and would thereby be able to 
distinguish m y  o w n  ‘voice’ as a researcher from them. Gradually, I had to come to 
terms with the fact that I was not representing the voices of either children or adult 
actors in the settings; instead I ended up deconstructing the notion of ‘voice’ 
altogether. Having taken on postmodern and poststructuralist writers’ rejection of the 
authorial ‘voice’, and the deconstruction of ‘truths’ (Barthes, 1974; Geertz, 1988; 
Lyotard, 1994), I struggled with the crisis of representation and legitimation in 
ethnographic writing. At the time, this crisis was a reality for me.
At that point I also realised that, in the same w a y  as report writing within the T e a m  
Service practice, the development of m y  thesis was a matter of another construction 
process. A s  a (social) scientist, I too was selective, employed a particular kind of 
sociological gaze and engaged in reading and writing practices that followed 
academic conventions. The reason w h y  the ‘grounded theory’ type approach was a 
problem for m e  is because doing research in clinical/therapeutic settings did not allow 
for hesitation. For instance, for the M R E C  members, the idea of letting concepts arise 
from the data appeared to be completely alien in terms of proper research practice.
Interestingly, social sciences seem not to be able to escape the traditional parameters 
for accumulating scientific knowledge either. Typically, sociological textbooks 
(Mason, 1996) try to justify qualitative research methods by their ‘rigour’, ‘detail’, 
‘constant comparative method’ (Glaser, 1992) and so on. Qualitative research 
manuals often involve defences of the validity of an interpretive, phenomenologically 
based view of the world, as set against natural scientific norms. The idea here is that
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unless research is s o m e h o w  ‘standardised’, it is inevitably anecdotal (e.g. Silverman, 
2001) or otherwise not ‘scientific’.
Since I did not c ome up with straightforward, ‘factual’ findings in the field, the staff 
members did not understand what m y  research was trying to accomplish. I felt very 
strongly that, as a researcher, I was perceived as having ‘communication difficulties’, 
and that these difficulties were seen as exacerbated by the fact that English was not 
m y  first language. I perceive this as mirroring what was going on between adults and 
children in both settings; hence it is an analytically significant point in this thesis.
12.2.2 ‘Communication difficulties’ of/between adults in the two research settings
It has always been clear to m e  that doing sociological research in a foreign country in 
a foreign language means that as an ethnographer, at least to some extent I would be a 
cultural outsider. Yet I have not thought of this as a major problem; instead, I have 
regarded it as something to take into account as an inevitable part of m y  researcher 
‘self. For sure, m y  ethnographic gaze has been very m u c h  influenced by this attitude, 
for example, in having a heightened interest in communication as a matter of meaning 
making and translation. M y  interest in h o w  bilingual or multilingual children were 
assessed within the ‘T e a m  Service’ setting is another example of the same viewpoint.
I do not deny the fact that speaking and writing in English requires additional effort 
on m y  part. I have experienced this particularly in m y  difficulty with translating 
sociological writing into plain, spoken English. It is, of course, possible that 
oscillating between expert and lay terminology might be difficult in m y  native 
language as well, and that this also might be tricky for native English speakers. 
Nonetheless, I do not want to be wrongly accused of being arrogant and not willing to 
‘translate’, as happened in one of the research settings. I also think the listeners ought 
to be receptive to what the speaker needs to say: otherwise different disciplinary 
speech genres have fewer chances to meet.
Eventually, m y  ‘communication difficulty’ as a researcher manifested itself as a Tost 
voice’. I still a m  not sure in what speech genre a researcher should speak. Should I be 
proud of having learned some abstracted sociological jargon? Should I abandon it and
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try to talk about sociology to various audiences? After all, throughout this thesis I 
have been criticising the ‘fallacy of verbalism’ and the ‘ambiguity of abstractions’ -  I 
should k n o w  better.
Yet I argue that m y  ‘communication difficulties’ during this research project have 
derived from m y  inferior status as a researcher in relation to the actors in the field. 
This contradicts certain literature on reflexivity in social sciences, often found in 
feminist writings, which typically locate power within the researcher. Within this 
discourse, the researcher is expected to create a rapport with the research subjects, be 
sympathetic and understanding (May, 2002). Given the problems that I had to 
address, I do not think that this positioning applies comfortably to m y  research 
experience.
I did not regard the adults in the two settings as vulnerable subjects. For instance, the 
‘T e a m  Service’ practitioners did not fill in the self-completed questionnaires that I 
had prepared for them. I had offered them a chance to express their point of view, but 
could not compel them do it. In addition, in the M R E C  meeting, I was totally at the 
mercy of powerful Others.
M y  point is that I wanted to listen and be listened to, but this did not always happen. 
There were too m a n y  uncertainties, ambiguities and misunderstandings in the way. I 
argue, however, that it was not all attributable to m y  inability to articulate m y  
thoughts. Whilst m y  status and lack of experience as a student was not helpful, it was 
perhaps partially up to the adult actors in the two settings to be more receptive. O n  the 
other hand, as indicated in the previous Chapter, health professionals already have 
their hands full of work and typically struggle with frequently changing 
recommendations for good practice. W h y  should they listen to another ‘theory’, 
particularly one that does not draw on genres that were familial* to them? W h y  should 
they listen to a postgraduate sociology student?
12.2.3 W h e n  I saw the light
I have n o w  understood that doing a P h D  studentship is basically a matter of learning. 
Part of the problem for m e  has been that I did not understand that I was learning while
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I was doing it. Only n o w  that I have been there, I a m  more open to the fact that I will 
continue to do so. Learning is not a matter of linear progress: sometimes it involves 
two steps forwards and one step back. At this point it is obvious that someone else 
would have done this research in a different way, simply because people go to the 
field with different ‘baggages’. Therefore different accounts would arise in the end.
I suggest that the more you cross borders, the more you will experience 
‘communication difficulties’. I have, during this research, crossed a few borders: 
cultural, disciplinary and experiential. M y  research practice has been characterised by 
Bakhtinian ‘multivoicedness’ (Foppa, 1995). At the same time, I can only talk about 
what I thought I saw in the field, because m y  ‘gaze’ was framed by a number of 
discourses and different aspects of m y  researcher and everyday ‘self. In this respect, 
other sociologists’ texts have provided reassurance. While I a m  writing this, I a m  
convinced that m y  research does not merely stand on its own; it is instead anchored in 
a well-established sociological genre, in other words, in texts that recognise the 
complexity of h u m a n  communication, social life and doing sociological enquiries 
about it.
I believe that m y  experiences in the field were by no means unusual; however, in 
typical sociological accounts the craft character of qualitative research has tended to 
be swept under the carpet. I suggest, on the other hand, that instead of seeing 
construction as a weakness it can be perceived as a strength. Since h u m a n  social life is 
ultimately complex, multidimensional, contextual and therefore often unpredictable, 
attempts to describe it cannot be anything but multifaceted as well. I argue that the 
preoccupation of ‘scientific’ accounts with orderliness, rationality and logic, whether 
in natural or social sciences, is inevitably reductionist. In qualitative research -  in 
ethnography in particular -  there are other possibilities for description.
12.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have reflected on m y  ‘sociological angsf about ontological, 
epistemological, ethical and practical uncertainties involved in this research project. 
The purpose of this exercise has been to highlight issues that can be relevant to future 
research on children’s (and adults’) lives. After all, communication as a phenomenon
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will be central to any research project, whether or not it is the object of enquiry in 
itself.
A s  I have attempted to illustrate, in the field, ‘communication difficulty’ was 
perceived as the problem/pathology of the speaker, whether of a child or the 
researcher. During this research project, I genuinely felt that I could not oscillate 
effortlessly between sociological and non-sociological speech genres. I was very 
aware of the fact that, in the two settings, m y  research approach was not seen as 
particularly ‘scientific’ for this reason. This feeling led m e  to explore w h y  this might 
be the case, and thereby I learned more about social constructionism. Looking back 
now, m y  ‘communication difficulty’, then, was a phase where I had yet to read and 
observe more.
O ne  of the issues I had to learn was that there was something ambiguous about the 
idea of ‘listening to children’ in the first place, and that I could not build this research 
on that basis. Indeed the so-called ‘child centred’ approaches continue to be 
questionable (Middleton, 1999; Morris, 1999). They frequently lack a critical 
appraisal of communication as a phenomenon (Goffman, 1967). It is often implied 
that children (and adults) have message-like thoughts that can be exchanged, and 
intentions that match the situations defined by adults; therefore they can be researched 
in an ethical fashion (Alderson, 1995). M y  findings, as it should be clear by now, 
have indicated otherwise.
In general, ethnographic research is always a process of discovery. W ha t  I have 
discovered in this research included the deconstruction of ‘voices’, both those of 
children, adult actors in the two settings, and m y  own. A s  a result, I understand them 
as multidimensional social constructions, which are subject to change rather than as 
stable entities. At the same time, they are manifestations of discourses, practices and 
contexts in which they occur. W ha t  is ‘true’ and ‘real’ about voices remains an 
unresolved puzzle; on the other hand, as for Bakhtin (Emerson &  Holquist, 1986), 
they are always social. Therefore they can be studied and reflected upon by means of 
sociological enquiry.
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Chapter 13.
CONCLUSIONS
13.1 Introduction
The core arguments of this thesis are, first, that ‘communication’ -  whether by adults 
or children, disabled or able-bodied, mono- or multilingual - is a complex social 
phenomenon. Face-to-face, adult-child and child-child communication is situational 
and gains its momentary directions from the contexts in which its different forms 
occur. This view poses a challenge to hegemonic, monological models for ‘good’ or 
‘normal’ communication, which construe it as a rational, cognitive process of 
exchanging messages, preferably via words and/or abstract symbols. Second, this 
thesis proposes that certain aspects of ‘communication difficulties’ are social 
constructions. These constructions draw on various hegemonic discourses - child 
Health, Education, Welfare - underpinned by Developmental Psychology, and are 
both (re)constructed and consumed in local interactional practice.
This thesis has not been aimed at denying the existence of physical and cognitive 
impairments that the child m a y  have. Instead, it has been intended to describe h o w  
intervention into the child’s life is a process, which is shaped by not only what the 
child ‘is’, but also by what expert discourses and practice mak e  of what he/she is, and 
what he/she should become. B y  deconstructing essentialist views of children and the 
knowledge base of clinical/therapeutic work as scientific practice in this particular 
area of expertise, through this thesis I have attempted to illustrate h o w  the 
interventionist process has a ‘h u m a n  face’.
I suggest that the key implications of this thesis for sociology are threefold. Firstly, 
this thesis includes young (disabled) children in the sociological theorising of h u m a n  
communication in face-to-face contexts. This makes a m o v e  away from conventional 
Communication Theory, where children’s communication has so far been given 
marginal attention (see Chapter 3). Secondly, this thesis intends to contribute to both 
childhood sociology and Disability Studies by highlighting some interconnections 
between socially constructed notions of ‘Childhood’, ‘Disability’ and
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‘communication/difficulties’. Finally, in this thesis I apply various sociological 
perspectives (Bakhtinian, interactionist, integrationist, inteipretivist and 
constructionist) not only to the analysis of ’communication/difficulties’ of the 
. research subjects, but also of the social researcher in institutional, specialist settings. 
This makes a case for reflexivity, which I regard as necessary for sound ethnographic 
research practice.
In the following two sections I will return to the research questions that were 
introduced in Chapter 1 (pp. 5-6). The questions are in italics. In section 13.2, I will 
recap the distinction between ‘good communication’ and ‘communication difficulties’ 
in this research. Section 13.3 reiterates h o w  the (disabled) child, both in discourse and 
practice, has become a moral project of our time. In section 13.4,1 will return to the 
so-called ‘sociological communication difficulties’ and h o w  these might be dealt with 
in future research.
13.2 ‘Good communication’ v ‘communication difficulties’
Does non-verbal communication follow the same logic as verbal communication? 
What kinds o f theoretical models may underlie the use o f  augmentative 
communication? How may this be manifested in practical contexts?
In the two research settings, ‘good communication’ was, implicitly and explicitly, 
treated as an innate, measurable, naturally arising skill that could be taught to and 
nurtured in a child. The so-called mentalistic, conduit and monological models 
manifested themselves in daily practice as norms to which children were compared. 
These models, in combination with a developmental and clinical/therapeutic 
understanding of the (disabled) child, were applied to both verbal and non-verbal 
communication.
A s  a result of m y  experience in the field, I learnt that as a researcher I could not make 
distinctions between the ‘logics’ of verbal and non-verbal communication. W ha t  I 
could do, though, was to observe patterns of social interaction between adults, adults 
and children, or between children. It appeared that communication situations, as they 
were organised by the staff for institutional purposes, manifested a clinical/therapeutic
227
‘regime of truth’, based on expectations of rational thought and action. The overall 
impression in both settings was that since the activities were mostly structured and 
adult-led, few opportunities would arise for spontaneous communication. 
Furthermore, spontaneous communication on the part of the children was not 
necessarily regarded as ‘good’ or ‘normal’.
Choice making during mealtimes and circle times in the nursery, and tests in 
assessments, were prime examples of situations where children were expected to be 
rational actors. The use of A A C  and test materials were typically based on the 
assumption that pictures and symbols were representative of reality and allowed for a 
predetermined range of ‘correct’ interpretations. Daily practice in the two settings 
tended to prioritise speech and symbolic exchange, the purpose of which was to 
enable the child to engage in context-free communication and leam literacy skills.
How did health professionals construct 'communication difficulties ’ in 
multidisciplinary interaction? Was there anything particularly ‘social’ about the 
assessment work?
The findings in both research settings suggested that children’s ‘communication 
difficulties’ were understood as pathologies. They were primarily addressed in terms 
of clinically definable disorders or disabilities, the child’s verbal output, 
developmental immaturity/delay or deficiencies in (English) language. The causes for 
the child’s ‘symptoms’ were sometimes located in ‘nature’, sometimes ‘nurture’; 
nevertheless Medicine and its ‘pseudo-professions’ were regarded as the most suitable 
ones to deal with the ‘problems’. This principle was justified by the specialist’s expert 
knowledge as against lay knowledge of children’s communication.
The ‘T e a m  Service’ setting was taken as appropriate for ‘context-free’ assessment: its 
form was justified in the n a m e  of standardisation. W h e n  standardisation ‘did not 
work’, it was explained with the notion that the child was not up to the test. In m y  
data, for m a n y  parents and visitors this was reductionist: the ‘outsiders’ in the setting 
did not share the same gaze on the child, as the T e a m  members - the experts. In 
addition, the former sometimes remarked that the child’s behaviour in the assessment 
was not the same as at h o m e  or at school; i.e. it varied depending on the situation.
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Despite the surface appearance of the ‘scientific’ character of clinical/therapeutic 
work, m y  findings have described the ambivalence between the ‘social’ and the 
‘scientific’. The child in both settings was facing expectations of rational/irrational 
action, the expressions of which were regarded as ‘normal’ w h e n  they fit an adult 
framework. The adults also oscillated along the rational/irrational continuum of 
knowledge and action, sometimes resorting to their expertise, and other times 
explicitly to their ‘c o m m o n  sense’.
The assessment procedures in themselves followed a set protocol, including attempts 
to systematically track d o w n  the child’s ‘symptoms’. The rationale of testing was 
based on controlling other factors apart from the ‘individual capacity’; the underlying 
logic was to isolate the child as a case and his/her ‘mind’ and/or body as objects of 
expert scrutiny. At the same time, the tester’s impact on the situation was not reflected 
upon in the same systematic manner.
Nonetheless, although the ‘scientific’ basis of assessments manifested itself in 
processes of quantification, its ‘socialness’ surfaced in each step of the procedure. The 
assessments were selective, involved interpretive work, account making and 
negotiation, and were in their decision orientation fundamentally moral-pragmatic, as 
well as occasionally coloured by sociocultural preferences for ‘normal’ family and 
home.
13.3 The (disabled) child as a moral project of our time
What kind o f  institutional discourses framed the principles according to which the 
adults communicate with children? What kind o f  communication did these principles 
allow?
In the two settings, an essentialist view of science and children’s communication as its 
object crystallized in the clinical/therapeutic ‘regime of truth’. In this discourse, 
‘Childhood’ was a status characterised by ‘becoming’ in relation to notions of time, 
culture, body/mind and biological growth, and adulthood. In terms of communication, 
children were at an ‘infrahuman’ stage. Disability, disorder, delay, difficulty, and
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other diagnostic labels were markers of deviation from the gold standard of ‘normal5 
childhood.
I associate the contemporary urgency of professional intervention into 
‘communication difficulties’ with the general societal trend, where children -  disabled 
and able-bodied -  have become a moral project. A s  for James et al:
Children have become supremely an issue o f  our time. Nations are investing in 
educational and moral futures and public concerns abound with issues o f  protection, 
rights, and citizenship in relation to the young. It is all too easy to becom e embroiled 
in the urgent hyperbole o f  paedophilia, child abuse, child pornography, childhood 
crim inality or even the perpetual party political battle ground o f  educational 
standards: they are all ‘ the’ issues o f  today and appear to require an immediate 
answer, or at least an opinion”  (James et al, 1998, 197).
I see this thesis and the two research settings as being at the heart of this 
contemporary discourse, which manifests itself in moral-pragmatic justifications and 
political rhetoric and action. W h a t  is important here, as I agree with James et al
(1998), is that in sociology, w e  need to consider this urgent focus on childhood 
analytically. In this respect, I a m  not drawing distinctions between studying the lives 
of disabled or able-bodied children, although I acknowledge that the former are more 
subject to the clinical/therapeutic gaze.
Indeed what most children have in c o m m o n  in Western societies is the regime of 
schooling. Education, as in the Children’s Centre, was characterised by Foucauldian 
(1997) type control: discipline, shaping children’s activities, and learning moral and 
conceptual values; as well as the importance of timetables and divisions in classes 
according to age and ability (James et al, 1998). Adult structures, such as Education 
are concerned with skills -  communication these days is at the forefront of these 
structures. Within this discourse, a distinction is being drawn between children w h o  
have the capacity to learn those skills, or already have them, and children w h o  need 
additional support.
The concept of ‘special needs’ in itself refers to a separation between a mainstream 
educational route and a more appropriate environment to ‘maximise the child’s
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potential’. The purpose of the ‘T e a m  Service’ was to do the weeding out: the 
‘Children’s Centre’ was a ‘special needs’ setting in that ‘corrective practices’ aimed 
to bring the child closer to the ideal of ‘normality’.
‘G o o d  communication’ —  as a m e d i u m  and an objective —  was a crucial element in 
these operations. Hegemonic, ‘adult’ models for ‘good communication’ manifested 
themselves in daily practice, where ‘locally appropriate’ speech and the use of 
symbols were prioritised over other modes of h u m a n  connections (Finnegan, 2002).
What underlying assumptions did the idea o f an individual’s 'voice ’ entail in the two 
settings, if and when it was an object or feature o f  interaction?
I propose that models for good communication that prefer rational, abstract thinking 
and action discriminate between different groups of people. In this research this has 
been observed taking place between adults and children, although in the guise of 
meeting the needs and individual rights of the latter. In this respect, the findings of 
this thesis have particularly urgent implications for the notion of ‘listening to 
children’ as a moral-pragmatic ideal. The so-called ‘culture of consultation’ involves 
m a n y  controversies, w h e n  ‘extended’ to children by virtue of legal-ethical obligations.
At the same time, according to m y  findings, the ‘culture of consultation’ was less 
apparent in the initial process of identifying the child’s needs in assessments, where 
emphasis was on decision making and quantification of aspects of the child and 
his/her life. A s  I have previously argued, discovering a ‘communication difficulty’ - 
rather than consulting the child -  was the objective of action in the ‘T e a m  Service’ 
practice.
Nonetheless, this thesis has not only considered the existence or non-existence of a 
child’s ‘voice’ in the research settings: it has begun to deconstruct the notion of 
‘voice’ in itself. I have questioned a particular version of the child’s agency. I link the 
idea of a rational, autonomous ‘agent’ as an intentional subject to a wider 
individualisation process in the Western world: recognising and accounting for 
children’s ‘voices’ presumes rational action on the part of the speaker. This
2 3 1
perspective has the moral goal of giving rights to children; yet, w h e n  not clarified, it 
m a y  dismiss the complexity of communication as a local interactional activity.
13.4 Sociology and ‘communication/difficulties’
In more ways than one, this thesis has involved processes of translation from a 
multiplicity of probabilities to texts. I have observed adults’ translations of children’s 
meanings and actions, as well as the inscription of these translations into case records. 
Likewise, I have described m y  o w n  -  often unsuccessful -  attempts to translate from 
sociological genre to lay terms, from m y  private thoughts to public texts. In short, I 
have pointed out the prevalence of a disciplinary gap (in terms of epistemology and 
vocabulary) between sociology and clinical/therapeutic fields, which has constituted a 
‘communication difficulty’ in itself.
One cynical aspect of the notion of ‘translation’ is that it seems unlikely that 
constructionist sociology can contribute to practice because of these ‘communication 
difficulties’. Nevertheless, it is also possible to view this situation in a more positive 
light: difficulties, in whatever form they arise, m a y  raise important questions about 
the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of the sociological ‘right to k n o w ’. Since sociology 
comprises of such a range of perspectives, I have suggested that the social researcher 
ought to be reflexive about his/her research conduct.
13.4.1 S o m e  suggestions for future research
In Chapter 3 I introduced some recent discourses on h o w  certain dominant 
understandings of h u m a n  communication are a salient feature in the so-called Tate 
modernity’, and are generated as well as sustained by ‘expert systems’ (Giddens, 
1991; D u r h a m  Peters, 1999; Cameron, 2000). However, it appears that, so far, little 
empirical sociological research has been carried out on w h y  and h o w  communication 
should be such a major concern in our societies, and what is mad e  of this assertion in 
everyday lived experiences.
In this respect, I believe that it is possible to carry out ‘user-friendly’ research, bearing 
in mind that what is ‘real’ to the research subjects and participants is what matters. A
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sociologist’s and/or ethnographer’s task is to describe what these realities are like and 
m ak e  connections with levels of discourse beyond the individual experience of those 
realities. Therefore, institutional ethnography provides ethically and politically sound 
ways of studying aspects of children’s (and adults’) ‘communication/difficulties’ in 
institutional settings (Smith, 2002). It allows scope for exploration, reflexivity and 
change of directions, w h e n  necessary.
At the same time, studies on children’s ‘communication/difficulties’ need not be 
confined to institutional settings. For example, in-depth qualitative interviews with 
parents of children with ‘communication difficulties’ appear to be an under-utilised 
resource in current practice recommendations (e.g. L a w  et al, 2000). Furthermore, 
longitudinal, qualitative follow-up studies could be conducted on what happens to 
children w h o  go through an intervention process, and what they might think about it 
once they grow older.
However, future research needs to pay special attention to the epistemology, ontology 
and practice of qualitative research. This is particularly important in research, which 
encourages the participation of children in the data generation. I have found that 
within the so-called ‘child centred’ discourse in childhood sociology, children are 
often granted an individualistic status as subjects/agents and as intentional beings, 
whose ‘voices’ m a y  remain unheard because of the developmental ‘tyranny’ over 
their lives. Previously, also Lee (2000) has referred to the ambiguity of childhood 
sociology and the construction of the child’s ‘subjecthood’ in this fashion:
“ A s  sociologists o f  childhood have attempted to bring children into socio logica l 
focus in their own right, the disciplinary concern with the ‘ com plete’ has required 
that children be attributed the properties assumed more normally to belong to adults.
The socio logy o f  childhood has thus preserved the priv ilege o f  the com plete and the 
mature over the incomplete and immature”  (L ee , 1999, p.458).
As  m y  findings on face-to-face communication with both verbal and non-verbal 
children and/or children with or without disabilities indicate, communication is a 
complex, context-bound phenomenon. Whatever part children’s communication 
competencies play in encounters with researchers, they are ultimately constructed and 
interpreted by adults. For this reason, I suggest that researchers ought not to impose a
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‘voice’ on a child, but should instead think critically about what the notion of ‘voice’ 
m a y  entail.
. The main epistemological and ontological issues here emerge from the same 
ambivalence between the observer and ‘reality’ as I described happening between 
practitioners and children in the two settings. T o  reiterate, I assert that the researcher 
has to decide between ‘realist’ and ‘constructivist’ approaches. It does not make sense 
to see one’s o w n  actions and research design as the former, and apply the latter to the 
actions of the actors in the field (Williams &  May, 1996). Once more, reflexivity 
about one’s methods is vital.
‘Bridging the gap’ between adult researchers’ and children’s worlds has been subject 
to debate also in terms of the researcher’s role. Mandell (1991), for instance, has 
suggested that adults w h o  research children’s lives should avoid authoritarian or 
patronising attitudes towards children. S o m e  others have emphasised the engagement 
of children in research as equal participants (e.g. Beresford, 1997).
I only learned what role was comfortable for m e  in the field once I had spent some 
time in the two settings, where I gained experience of being both a detached and a 
participant observer. In the end, I preferred being a detached observer, since I did not 
see h o w  m y  participation would have benefited the children or advanced this research. 
At the same time, I acknowledge that some other researchers might find it more 
comfortable and fulfilling to take part in children’s worlds and open up innovative 
avenues for doing it. This obviously depends on the research design and context. At 
any rate, I suggest that one w a y  around this problem is to conduct some pilot work in 
order to learn what is and what is not possible to accomplish in the setting.
Research ethics is another important consideration. W h e n  it comes to Alderson’s 
(1995) ten points for ethical research conduct with children, I argue that since 
listening to children is not a straightforward thing to do, judgments of need and harm 
remain contextual to a certain extent. Decisions need to be m ad e  about whether 
children want to talk if they can - is it really always ‘good to talk?’ A s  far as I a m  
concerned, the contemporary, presumably ‘child centred’ discourse on listening tends
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to advocate the Freudian type ‘talking cure’ (Cameron, 2000), and does not take into 
account the possibly harmful effects of ‘having to talk’.
. Medical research ethics committees, in m y  view, can be important in weeding out 
projects that m a y  obviously harm children, w h o  are based in specialist settings. Then 
again, the problem arises where children no longer are the main concern, but the 
protection of the Medical profession, as seemed to be the case in the M R E C  meeting. 
Instead, there should be established social research ethics committees, or medical 
research ethics committees should have members with experience of qualitative 
research methods. In this w a y  the ‘communication gap’ between medical and, as in 
m y  research, social constructionist views could be avoided or, at least, made 
smoother.
13.5 Conclusion
This thesis has described and analysed notions of ‘good communication’ and 
‘communication difficulties’ in two specialist settings, where they were objects of 
action. It has linked local practice to wider societal discourses, where the (disabled) 
child is constructed as a moral project of our time, within which notions of ‘good’ and 
‘normal’ communication play a significant role. I have also discussed the problem of 
sociology and ‘communication difficulties’ between academic disciplines, as well as 
between people w h o  do not share the same ‘communicative repertoire’. In conclusion, 
in this Chapter, I have suggested some ideas for further research on children’s 
‘communication/difficulties’.
As mentioned earlier on: although I retain the authorship and take responsibility for 
this thesis as an ethnographic text, I will also leave some freedom of interpretation 
with the reader. In this regard, I have intended this thesis to be an ethically sound 
project and for it to be beneficial to the children whose lives were the subject of this 
research, and for the working practices of their adult carers.
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AFTERWORD
At this point, I would like to revisit the original research proposal for this C A S E  
. studentship. This is to spell out some of the reasons for m y  ‘sociological angst’ that I 
have not previously referred to in this thesis, since they are not central to m y  main 
arguments. I would like to momentarily return to the ways in which I initially 
interpreted the purpose of the original research design, and what urged m e  to apply 
for the studentship. The following extracts are drawn from the C A S E  proposal for the 
E S R C  (see Appendix 1). The points that I want to address are underlined.
Project Title:
The social construction o f  ‘ communication difficu lties ’ in child protection 
assessment for disabled children
Background to the research:
The d ifficu lty in actually perceiving what a child is communicating about their life  is 
compounded where there are difficulties in adult-child communication due to a 
disability. This d ifficu lty in communication is especially problematic since disabled 
children have an increased vulnerability to all forms o f  abuse compared to non­
disabled children (Kennedy 1996; W estcott and Cross, 1996). Thus not on ly are 
disabled children at higher risk o f  abuse in their everyday lives both within fam ilies 
and in institutional care settings, but the mechanisms available to them to 
communicate about any abuse they are experiencing are restricted. These restrictions 
lie partly in the skills o f  adults to understand what the child is communicating, and 
partly in what can be communicated through modes such as signing. Makaton boards 
or other iconographic aids.
In the beginning, I became interested in this C A S E  studentship because I wanted 
sociological research to contribute to child protection work. O n  the basis of the 
proposal, I understood that disabled children are more vulnerable to abuse than able- 
bodied children and this is sometimes due to the fact that they have little or no speech, 
and/or that adults do not take children’s accounts of abuse seriously (Morris, 1999).
However, m y  pilot observations in the ‘Children’s Centre’ started to fundamentally 
destabilise the theoretical premises for ‘listening to children’ and the child’s ‘voice’. 
M y  investigations into the methods of A A C ,  in particular, steered the attention away
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from whether or not they allowed for ‘communicating about abuse’ towards the 
dynamics of adult-child interaction. The complexities and ambiguities of 
interpretation, which became apparent in m y  observations, challenged understandings 
of communication as a straightforward exchange of messages, and the positioning of 
the child as a particular kind of communicator. These findings led m e  to analyse the 
practice conceptualisations of communication as the child’s skill, right and need, and 
to question the notions of ‘subjecthood’ and ‘social competence’, which have been 
promoted in recent childhood sociology (Lee, 2000).
Consequently, this research evolved to be deconstructionist in more ways than one. 
This resulted in conceptual and practical changes to the proposed research 
methodology:
1. Ethnographic-type observation o f  (put not direct participation in) the assessment o f  a 
minimum o f  40 disabled children at the Team  Service with a balance between those 
assessments that are specifically  child protection focused and those that are more generic.
2. Interviews with assessment sta ff fo llow ing  from  the observations, with a focus on 
constructions o f  competence/incompetence in communication, and constructions o f  abuse in 
context o f  disability.
M y  observations of the ‘T e a m  Service’ established that there were fewer child 
protection cases than expected, and that these were not necessarily ‘communication 
difficulty’ cases, or vice versa. Furthermore, not all children w h o  were referred to the 
service were subsequently diagnosed as ‘disabled’. Consequently, Morris’ (1999) 
assertion that ‘good practice involves understanding the communicative needs of 
disabled children’ became problematic, because it implies a somewhat homogenous 
image of disabled children as a group. A s  the practice literature and m y  findings have 
suggested, ‘communication difficulties’ are not always a matter of ‘disability’, and a 
‘disability’ does not necessarily involve ‘communication difficulties’.
A s  a result, I had to reconsider the original objectives of the research:
1. Explore the place o f  the child ’ s ‘v o ic e ’ in the multi-agency assessment o f  needs 
(including protection needs).
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2. Analyse constructions o f  disabled children’ s competence to communicate within 
this setting, and within other groups o f  practitioners who work with or have 
contact with disabled children.
3. Examine the affordances that assisted communication techniques (e.g. signing, 
iconographic aids, computer-assisted speech) make available for children wishing 
to communicate about their lives and experiences.
4. D evelop  recommendations for policy  and practice in this area.
5. M ake a significant contribution to the soc io logy  o f  childhood with regard to the 
positioning o f  competence and communication.
W h e n  it conies to the fourth objective, m y  ‘sociological communication difficulties’ 
m ade m e  wonder about h o w  exactly this research could contribute to policy and 
practice. In addition, its contribution to sociology is yet to be seen.
Indeed the above m a y  sound like a critique of the original research proposal. Yet this 
is not m y  intention. In fact, I would like to express m y  respect not only for the 
original proposal, but also for those, w h o  work in the field of child protection, and 
w h o  care for disabled children. For someone w h o  does not have a professional role in 
these environments, either institutional or home-based, it can all be incredibly 
overwhelming. Hence, throughout the making of this thesis, I have wrestled with the 
moral and political questions about child protection, and doing research with children. 
These have been serious questions about what is right and what is wrong.
I have also dwelled on m y  anxieties about moving back and forth between different 
disciplinary ‘speech genres’. I have called this whole experience a ‘sociological 
angst’, which I have n o w  encountered for the first time. The problem is that this angst 
has an intellectually and emotionally paralyzing effect. Apparently, m any 
postgraduate students experience it, although not necessarily in the same way; I a m  
not unique in this respect.
Nevertheless, I have gained immensely from this research. Although I have faced 
arrogance and suspicion, I have also witnessed unconditional caring. I could leave the 
two settings knowing that the children there were well looked after. Moreover, at the 
final stages of writing up this thesis, I have started to recover from m y  angst. I have
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learned a lot about the ‘grey areas’ of h u m a n  social life and that sociology is an 
appropriate subject for studying those areas.
In here I rest m y  C A S E .  I a m  grateful for all the advice and help that I have received 
over the course of this studentship. This is something one cannot quantify.
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APPENDIX 1
A CASE studentship proposal for the ESRC; Section 21
Project T itle:
The social construction of ‘communication difficulties’ in child protection 
assessment for disabled children
Outline o f  Proposed Project:
Introduction
A  key element in protecting children from  abuse lies in a) identifying situations where children face 
high risk o f  such abuse occurring, and b ) being alert to situations where abuse or harm may already 
have occurred. For the latter, adult sensitivity to hearing children when they are trying to tell an adult 
that they have been maltreated in some w ay or are describing incidents that would be seen 
professionally as constituting abuse is vital. It is clear from research, however, that adults in both 
professional and lay capacities may not ‘ hear’ children indicating a need for protection (Speight, 1989; 
B lagg et al, 1989).
The d ifficu lty in actually perceiving what a child is communicating about their life  is compounded 
where there are difficulties in adult-child communication due to a disability. This d ifficulty in 
communication is especially problematic since disabled children have an increased vulnerability to all 
forms o f  abuse compared to non-disabled children (Kennedy 1996; W estcott and Cross, 1996). Thus 
not only are disabled children at higher risk o f  abuse in their everyday lives both within fam ilies and in 
institutional care settings, but the mechanisms available to them to communicate about any abuse they 
are experiencing are restricted. These restrictions lie partly in the skills o f  adults to understand what the 
child is communicating, and partly in what can be communicated through modes such as signing, 
Makaton boards or other iconographic aids.
Morris (1995; 1999) found that the experience o f  abuse by disabled children was not recognised as 
such by professionals, and that different standards appeared to operate as to what is acceptable in the 
lives o f  disabled and non-disabled children. Furthermore, there was a lack o f  recognition and provision 
o f  the support and assistance for children with communication difficulties needed in order to 
communicate an experience o f  abuse or a fear o f  abuse, and the needs o f  disabled children for 
protection from  abuse were not generally met.
In the light o f  this, the project seeks to explore, with a sociological focus on children and 
communication, the means by which child protection needs for disabled children are assessed and how 
disabled children are positioned as communicators about their lives or as people with ‘ communication 
d ifficu lties’ . This w ill draw on paradigms from  the new social studies o f  childhood (see James and 
Prout, 1998; Hutchby and Moran-Ellis, 1998), which questions assumptions about children’ s lack o f  
agency and competence. In this context the research w ill explore both the positioning o f  the child ’ s 
communication in the assessment process, and the more general positioning o f  disabled children’ s 
communication in institutional and fam ily settings. This is a com plex area relatively unexamined 
sociologically, and the research design w ill reflect both the openness o f  the field  and the need to focus 
in order to undertake effective  research.
The disabled children attending ‘ Team  Service ’ (a  pseudonym) w ill form  the research population for 
the study. Some 60-70 children a year are assessed by the Team  Service. Approxim ately 50 % o f  these 
assessments are specifically  related to child protection concerns, and the other ha lf are general 
assessments o f  need.
1 This is an extract from  the fu ll original document. It has been shortened for confidentiality reasons, 
and for the sake o f  relevance to the points that I make in Chapter 1. The author o f  the original proposal: 
Jo Moran-Ellis, Senior Lecturer; The University o f  Surrey, Guildford, the U K .
1. Explore the place o f  the child ’ s ‘vo ic e ’ in the multi-agency assessment o f  needs (including 
protection needs).
2. Analyse constructions o f  disabled children’ s competence to communicate within this setting, 
and within other groups o f  practitioners who work with or have contact with disabled children.
3. Examine the affordances that assisted communication techniques (e.g. signing, iconographic 
aids, computer-assisted speech) make available for children wishing to communicate about 
their lives and experiences.
4. D evelop  recommendations for policy  and practice in this area.
5. M ake a significant contribution to the soc io logy  o f  childhood with regard to the positioning o f  
competence and communication.
Proposed methods
The research w ill have a flexib le, qualitative approach to facilitate the developm ent o f  the project as 
more data and findings emerge from the fieldw ork and literature reviews. H ow ever, in general the 
fo llow ing  methods w ill be employed:
1. Ethnographic observations (in a nursery) with a focus on the positioning o f  communication in 
the everyday work o f  professionals and the everyday lives o f  the children.
2. Ethnographic-type observation o f  (put not direct participation in) the assessment o f  a 
minimum o f  40 disabled children at the Team  Service with a balance between those 
assessments that are specifically  child protection focused and those that are more generic.
3. Interviews with assessment sta ff fo llow in g  from  the observations, with a focus on 
constructions o f  competence/incompetence in communication, and constructions o f  abuse in 
context o f  disability.
4. Tracking 10-15 cases o f  child protection concerns as they progress through the child 
protection system with interviews with relevant groups o f  professionals.
5. Interviews with a number o f  fam ilies and children about communication strategies employed.
6. Interviews with 10-15 disabled adults about their experiences o f  care/harm as children.
7. Textual analyses o f  communication aids, i.e. exploring what can and cannot be said via the 
aids/assistance mechanisms. This may also involve interviews with communication 
professionals, such as speech therapists.
Anticipated outcomes
It is anticipated that this research w ill make a significant contribution to the fields o f  social studies o f  
childhood, and disability studies. In addition, it is seen as having key significance for policy and 
practice in the care o f  disabled children.
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APPENDIX 2
The Reynell Developmental Language Scales III
[ h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  R e a d m i t  Kd i t i o n
' 'ill tv»
Name;
Date o f  testing: 1st session: 
2nd session:Date o f birth:
School/Nursery:
Tester:
A8e,equivalent 
1st 2nd
Percentile 
score 
1st 2nd
Standard 
score 
1st 2nd 1st
Comprehension
Expressive
Comments
Chronological age
grajjsf
NFER-NELSON
Health &  Social Care
COMPREHENSION SCALE
Comments
Where’s the..
V'&ZiMi&F
teddy
§
brush
cup
§ sock
doll
M
purse
Where’s the... --------------------------------------------------
apple
S
keys
chair
$ §
fish
cheese
table
watch
$ 1
horse
bath
Comprehension Scale: Section A Score (max. 15)
B R E L A T I N G  T W O  N A M E D  O B J E C T S  (teddy, bed, keys, box, apple, chair)
16 $ Put teddy on the bed.
17 Put the keys in the box.
IS Give me the apple and the teddy.
19 $& Put the apple on the bed.
20 Give me the bed and the chair.
21 $ Put the keys on the bed.
Comprehension Scale: Section B Score (max. 6)
c A G E N T S  A N D  A C T I O N S  (rabbit, teddy) •>i?y . .• + i~,^ ;Sy /-.*■{ ■
■ :
- i s Make teddy sit.
Make rabbit jump.
* 1 $ Make teddy walk.
Comprehension Scale: Section C Score (max. 3)
“Toys required for each section are shown in brackets.
2 Illegal photocopying is theft and may result in prosecution.
Expressive Seale
Stimulus (Target) Response Score
17
I I I Example: Here is one cat. Here is another cat; so now there are two...
I I I (bananas)
18 I I ! (balloons)
19 111 (hats)
20 I I I (books)
21 111 (cows)
22 I I I (buses)
Cii I N F L E C T I O N S  - THIRD P E R S O N  (picture book)
23
I I I Example: Every day this lady dances. What does she do every day? She... NB I f  no response, prompt with: What does he/she do every day/week?
I I I
Every day I eat dinner, every day you eat dinner. 
Every day he...
(eats)
24 I I I
Look at this girl. 
Every day she... 
(runs)
25 111
Here’s another girl. 
Every day she... 
(reads)
26 M l
Every week I wash my car. Look at the lady. 
Every week she...
(washes)
1 1 1 Example: Now I’m going to tell you about some things that happened yesterday. Yesterday these children painted. What did they do yesterday? They... 
NB Prompt with: Yesterday she/he... i
27 I I I This baby cries a lot. Yesterday he...
(cried)
28 I I I This lady likes walking. Yesterday she... (walked)
E xpressive Scale: Section C  Score (m ax. 12)
Stimulus (S) Target (T) Response (R) Score
D 3  A N D  4  C L A U S A L  (teddy, rabbit, flag, apple, table, bed, blue car, red car, bricks, truck, knife)
Now the toys are going to do some things and 
I want you to tell me about them. Y- >+; "if-
29
&
(S) Teddy’s waving the flag. Now you tell me what’s happening. 
(T) Teddy’s waving the flag.
(R)
30
(S) Tell me what’s happening now. 
(T) Teddy’s eating the apple.
(R)
6 Illegal photocopying is theft and may result in prosecution.
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APPENDIX 4
UniS , I
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
School of 
Human
Sciences
Dear Parent/s,
I a m  a post-graduate research student at the University of Surrey. M y  P h D  research is 
looking at the methods of communication that disabled children use. M y  research is 
under the supervision of Jo Moran-Ellis (The University of Surrey, Guildford) and 
‘Collaborative Supervisor’. I a m  writing to you to ask whether you would be willing 
for your child to be in m y  study of communication difficulties.
A s  part of m y  study, I would like observe a number of children while they are being 
assessed by ‘T e a m  Service’ practitioners. I would m ak e  m y  observations from behind 
a One-way mirror so as to not disturb the assessment.
I have enclosed an information leaflet about the research. If you would like further 
information, do not hesitate to contact me.
If you are happy for m e  to observe your child, please return the enclosed consent 
form. It can be returned in the ffee-post envelope, preferably at least a w ee k  before 
your child's appointment with the ‘T e a m ’. Please be assured that if you do not want 
m e  to observe your child, this will not affect any of the services you will receive in 
any way.
Yours sincerely,
M s  Sirkka Komulainen 
BaSocSc(sociology); MA( Ec o n)
e-mail: S.Komulainen@surrev.ac.uk
H o m e  phone number
UniS A lt
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
School of 
Human
Sciences
INFORMATION FOR PARENTS
Title of the PhD project:
A  study of 'communication difficulties’ in multi-agency needs assessment for 
disabled children
I  am asking your consent to involve your child in my PhD-study. Before you decide I  
would like to explain why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
do not hesitate to ask me if  there is anything that is not clear or if  you would like more 
information.
Thank you for reading this!
1. W h a t  is this study about?
This study looks at h o w  children's 'communication difficulties' are dealt with by 
different practitioners w h o  assess children's needs. The purpose of doing this is to 
understand children's communication difficulties better. This is still an unexplored 
area in the sociology of childhood.
2. H o w  will the children be involved in the study?
I will be observing the children, w h o  are being assessed by ‘T e a m  Service’ 
practitioners from behind a one-way mirror. In other words, the child will not see m e  
or the other practitioners w h o  are behind the mirror. The study that takes about 9 
months starting from October 2001.1 will carry out up to 40 obseivations.
Because the children are young, I a m  asking parents for their consent to carry out the 
observations. Non-participation in the research will not affect the assessment of your 
child. Y o u  are also free to withdraw your child from the research at any time during 
the assessment or afterwards
3. H o w  does this study aim to benefit the children and their families?
I will inform the practitioners of the research results. Discussions with practitioners 
will then be used to develop their practices. Parents will receive a research report 
explaining h o w  communication difficulties are dealt with and h o w  children might be 
understood better. This aims to provide s ome help to solve some communication 
difficulties that the parents and children m a y  have experienced at home.
4. W h a t  will be done to protect the privacy of children and their families?
The notes that I will take during the assessments will be kept in a secure locked place, 
and they will only be seen by m e  as the researcher. The final results of the study 
would be part of m y  P h D  thesis and possibly referred to in other publications, such as 
in sociological journals. However, the identity of all the children and their families 
will be protected so that, for example, their real names will not be used, and the 
location of the research will not be revealed. A n y  records (medical or other) of the 
children or their families will not be part of the study.
5. W h o  else is involved with the study?
The study is supervised by Jo Moran- Ellis w h o  is a lecturer at the University of 
Surrey (Department of Sociology) and ‘Collaborative Supervisor’. The research is 
reviewed by Local Medical Research Ethics Committee. The researcher receives a 
student grant for doing P h D  research.
6. Contact details
If you would like further information, please do not hesitate to contact us! 
(details withheld for confidentiality reasons)
APPENDIX 5
CONSENT FORM
Title of Project: A  study of'communication 
difficulties' in multi-agency needs assessment for 
disabled children
N a m e  of Researcher: Sirkka Komulainen
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the
information sheet dated. . . . . . . . . . . . for the
above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions.
2. I understand that the participation of m y  child is 
voluntary and that I a m  free to withdraw m y  child 
at any time, without giving any reason, without the 
services that m y  child receives affected.
3. I understand that m y  child's medical or other notes 
will not be used in this study.
4. I understand that m y  child's name, or the n a m e  of 
the place where m y  child is assessed, will not be 
used in the study.
5. I understand that the research is fully confidential.
6. I agree my child to take part in the above study.
N a m e  of Parent Date
Signature
Name of Child
Researcher Date
Please initial box
□
□
□
□
□
□
Signature
APPENDIX 6
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INFORMATION FOR ‘TEAM SERVICE’ PRACTITIONERS
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
Ah
School of 
Human
Sciences
Working title of the PhD project
A  study of ‘communication difficulties’ in multidisciplinary needs 
assessment for disabled children
1. The nature and purposes of the study
This study looks at h o w  disabled children's 'communication difficulties' are dealt with in 
the multidisciplinary assessment of needs. Findings that will be based on observational 
and questionnaire data, aim to suggest recommendations for policy and practice, as well 
as contribute to the sociology of childhood.
The hoped-for benefits of this research for disabled children are development in practices 
that deal with their everyday life events and actions, define their status as individuals, and 
decide about options and choices open to them. The benefits for the practitioners would 
be the addition of sociological insights to their work practices.
This study does not seek to evaluate the work of the ‘T e a m  Service’ or provide 
immediate solutions to possible practical problems. Instead, it aims to inform academic 
audiences about the nature of child assessment work: this is an area that has not yet been 
addressed in sociological literature on childhood and disabilities. The participation of 
‘T e a m ’ members is highly appreciated, keeping in mind that their participation is 
voluntary.
1.1 Research questions
With regard to children's rights, ability to hear children's accounts of their lives is a skill 
that adult practitioners and lay people need to possess. However, hearing the child's voice 
is problematic, especially in the case of disabled children w h o  have little or no speech. 
Thus this research project poses the following questions:
1. W h a t  kind of interactions take place a m o n g  adults and between adults and children in 
the assessment situations?
2. W h a t  is seen as 'normal communication'?
3. H o w  m a y  children's rights be taken into account in the assessment process?
1.2 Methods
a) Non-participant observation of assessments from behind a one-way screen.
b) Self-completed questionnaires
The resulting data will be strictly anonymous and confidential, and stored in a secure 
locked filing cabinet for up to 5 years after the completion of the P h D  thesis.
2. Other details
The researcher, M s  Sirkka Komulainen is currently a 2nd year P h D  student at the 
Department of Sociology at the University of Surrey. She completed her 1st Degree and 
Master's Degree in sociology in Manchester between 1996-2000. The researcher is a 
Finnish citizen (EU-member) and is fluent in English.
The police records of the researcher have been checked in Finland and the U K  and 
accepted by ‘Children’s Centre’. She has previous experience of participant observational 
research with children in the nursery at ‘Children’s Centre’.
The research is supervised by Jo Moran-Ellis w h o  is a lecturer at the University of Surrey 
(Department of Sociology), and by ‘Collaborative Supervisor’.
The duration of the fieldwork with ‘T e a m  Service’: 9 months (October 2001- July 2002). 
‘T e a m ’ practitioners will receive an interim report in the end of the fieldwork period, and 
a final report in the end of the P h D  programme (October 2003).
3. Contact details
If you would like further information, please do not hesitate to contact us!
(details withheld for confidentiality reasons)
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APPENDIX 7
CONSENT FORM
Title of Project: A  study of'communication 
difficulties' in multi-agency needs assessment for 
disabled children
N a m e  of Researcher: Sirkka Komulainen
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the
information sheet dated.  . . . . . . . . . . for the
above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions.
2. I understand that m y  participation is voluntary and 
I m a y  withdraw at any time.
3. I understand that the research is fully confidential 
and that m y  n am e  or the n a m e  of the research 
location will not be used in the study.
4. I agree to take part in the above study.
N a m e  of Practitioner Date
Signature
Researcher Date
Signature
APPENDIX 8
UniS
Dear Parent/s,
I a m  a post-graduate research student at the University of S 
looking at the methods of communication that disabled chil 
fieldwork at the ‘Children’s Centre’ at the moment. M y  res 
of Jo M o r a n  Ellis (The University of Surrey) and ‘Collabor^u 
Children’s Centre).
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
iirrey. M y  P h D  research is 
iren use. I a m  conducting m y  
^arch is under the supervision 
live Supervisor’ (The
School of 
Human
Sciences
I a m  interested in h o w  children communicate in the nursery at the Children’s Centre 
w h e n  they are looked after by care workers. So far I have been observing children in the 
nursery at the Children’s Centre. I have also observed a speech therapist and an 
occupational therapist working with children. However, to make the observation more 
accurate and less influenced by my presence, I would like to ask your permission to 
video-record children and care workers/practitioners together.
These video-recordings would only be used for this research, stored in a locked filing 
cabinet at the university, and destroyed after I have finished analysing them. Children 
would not be put in any risk and they would not be asked to participate against 
their will. The final results of the analysis would be part of m y  P h D  thesis and possibly 
referred to in other publications, such as sociological journals. However, the identity of 
children would be protected so that, for example, their real names would not be used, 
and the location of the centre would not be revealed.
The purpose of the research is to help sociologists and practitioners to understand 
children’s communication difficulties better. This is still an unexplored area in 
sociology.
If you do not wish your child to be video-recorded, simply return the slip attached in the 
free-post envelope by the 28th February. Further information of the research m a y  be 
obtained from m e  or ‘Nursery Nurse’. Non-participation will not affect the care your 
child receives, and you m a y  withdraw your child from the study at any point you or they 
wish to no longer participate.
Yours Sincerely,
C O N S E N T  F O R M
I agree/1 do not agree (please circle) to m y  child- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (name)
taking part in a study of disabled children and communication conducted by Sirkka 
Komulainen at ‘Children’s Centre’.
If you have agreed to your child being included in the study please sign below to indicate 
your consent.
® I understand the study involves Sirkka Komulainen video-recording m y  child at 
‘Children’s Centre’.
® I understand the videotapes will be securely stored and accessed only for the research 
and that strict confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained.
9 I understand that I m a y  withdraw m y  child from the study at any time and that this 
will not in any w a y  affect the services he/she receives.
Signed  --
Print n a m e  ■
Date
